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Third Judicial District Court - Owyhee County Date: 1/26/2009 User: TRlNA 
Trme 01 42 PM ROA Report 
Page 2 of 9 Case CV-2006-0005807-M Current Judge Thomas J Ryan 
Henry Ogden, eta1 vs Dennis C Gr~ffith, eta1 
Henry Ogden, Michelle Hurst vs Dennis C Griffith, Bonn~e M Porter 
Date Code User Judae 
511 112007 AFFD DORLA Affidavit of Dennis Griffith in opposition to James C. Morfitt 
plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and in 
support of defendants' motion for summary 
judgment 
MEMO DORLA Memorandum in opposition to plaintiffs' motion for James C. Morfitt 
summary judgment and in support of defendants' 
motion for summary judgment 
MOTN 
NOTC 
AFFD 
CONT 
DORLA 
DORLA 
TRlNA 
TRlNA 
Defendants' Motion for summary judgment James C. Morfitt 
Notice of hearing James C. Morfitt 
Affidavit of Ron R. Shepherd James C. Morfitt 
Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment Gregory M. Culet 
held on 06/08/2007 01:30 PM: Continued 
Plaintiffs Motion 
HRSC Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary Renae J. Hoff 
Judgment 0711 312007 01 :30 PM) Plaintiffs 
Motion 
Affidavit of Daniel Godoy Renae J. Hoff 
TRlNA 
AFFD 
MISC 
TRlNA 
TRlNA Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Renae J. Hoff 
Motion for Summary Judgment and in Opposition 
to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
Affidavit of Shelli D. Stewart in Support of Reply Renae J. Hoff 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Summary Judgment and in Opposition to 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
AFFD TRlNA 
AFFD Affidavit of Carrie Redovian in Support of Renae J. Hoff 
Pliantiffs' Reply Memorandum 
MlSC Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants James C. Morfitt 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
Affidavit of Ron R. Shepard James C. Morfitt AFFD 
MlSC 
HRHD 
TRlNA 
TR l NA 
TR l NA 
Judge Morfitt took the file for review James C. Morfitt 
Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment James C. Morfitt 
held on 0711 312007 01 :30 PM: Hearing Held 
Plaintiff's Motion 
Change Assigned Judge Thomas J. Ryan CHJG 
MlSC 
TRlNA 
TR l NA Memorandum Decision and Orders on Cross James C. Morfitt 
Motions for Summary Judgment( Both Motion's 
for Summary Judgment Denied) 
MlSC 
MlSC 
FSTC 
TRlNA 
TRlNA 
TRl NA 
Request for Trial Setting Thomas J. Ryan 
Response to Request for Trial Setting Thomas J. Ryan 
File Sent To Caldweii- for setting of trial to Thomas J. Ryan 
Caroline for Judge Ryan's Calendar 
STlP 
ORDR 
HRSC 
TRlNA 
TRlNA 
TRlNA 
Stipulation pretrial and trial dates Thomas J. Ryan 
Order Setting Case for Trial and Pretrial Thomas J. Ryan 
Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference Thomas J. Ryan 
0111 112008 09:00 AM) , -, 
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Third Judicial District Court - Owyhee County *; Date 1/26/2009 User: TRlNA 
Time 01 42 PM ROA Report 
Page 3 of 9 Case CV-2006-0005807-M Current Judge Thomas J. Ryan 
Henry Ogden, etal. vs Dennis C Griffith, etal. 
Henry Ogden, Michelle Wurst vs. Dennis C Griffith, Bonnie M Porter 
Date 
1 0/2412007 
Code User Judge 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 03/05/2008 09:OO Thomas J. Ryan 
AM) 3-day jury trial 
HRSC 
NOTC 
MlSC 
ST1 P 
MOSJ 
MEMO 
Notice of Service of a Discovery Document Thomas J. Ryan TRlNA 
TRlNA 
TRl NA 
LENA 
LENA 
Plaintiffs' Expert Disclosure Thomas J. Ryan 
Stipulation for Scheduling and Planning Thomas J. Ryan 
Motion For Summary Judgment Thomas J. Ryan 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Thomas J. Ryan 
Summary Judgment 
AFFD LENA Affidavit of Shelli D. Stewart in Support of Thomas J. Ryan 
Memorandum in Support of Plaitniffs Motion for 
Sumamry Judgment 
Notice Of Hearing Thomas J. Ryan NOHG 
HRSC 
LENA 
LENA Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary Gregory M. Culet 
Judgment 02/08/2008 01 :30 PM) 
NOTC 
MISC 
MlSC 
MlSC 
ORDR 
FSTC 
TRlNA 
TR I NA 
JAM1 E 
TRlNA 
TRl NA 
TRlNA 
Notice of Service of Discovery Responses Thomas J. Ryan 
Plaintiffs Witness and Exhibit lists Thomas J. Ryan 
Witness / Exhibit List Thomas J. Ryan 
Witness-Exhibit List Thomas J. Ryan 
Order Referring Case to Mediation Thomas J. Ryan 
File Sent To Caldwell for Judge Ryan-Motion for Thomas J. Ryan 
Summary Judgment to be heard in Caldwell 
2/8/08 at 2:30 p.m. 
HRSC TRlNA Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary Thomas J. Ryan 
Judgment 02/08/2008 02:30 AM) changed to 
Caldwell 
HRSC Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 03/05/2008 09:OO Thomas J. Ryan 
AM) 3-day 
MlSC Amended Notice of Hearing for 2/8/08 at 2:30 Thomas J. Ryan 
p.m. 
File Sent To Caldwell Thomas J. Ryan FSTC 
CONT 
TRlNA 
TRlNA Continued (Motion for Summary Judgment Thomas J. Ryan 
02/08/2008 02:30 PM) changed to Caldwell 
CONT TRlNA Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment Thomas J. Ryan 
held on 02/08/2008 01:30 PM: Continued 
Changed to Caldwell 
MlSC TRlNA Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Second Thomas J. Ryan 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
Motion to Strike Thomas J. Ryan MOTN 
MlSC 
MlSC 
TRlNA 
TRlNA 
TRlNA 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike Thomas J. Ryan 
Exparte Motion to Shorten Time- Order sent to Thomas J. Ryan 
Judge Ryan for signature with Judge Grober 214 
MlSC TRlNA Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Thomas J. Ryan 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
? , I  3 
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Third Judicial District Court - Owyhee County Date. I12612009 User: TRINA 
Time 01 42 PM ROA Report 
Page 4 of 9 Case CV-2006-0005807-M Current Judge Thomas J Ryan 
Henry Ogden, etal. vs. Dennis C Griffith, eta1 
Henry Ogden, Michelle Hurst vs. Dennis C CiirifTith, Bonnie M Porter 
Date Code User Judge 
MEMO 
AFFD 
Memorandum in Opposition to defendant's Motion Thomas J. Ryan 
to Strike 
Affidavit of Shelli D. Stewart in Support of Thomas J. Ryan 
Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Motion to 
Strike 
MlSC 
MI SC 
MlSC 
TRlNA 
TR l NA 
TRlNA 
Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Thomas J. Ryan 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment 
Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Thomas J. Ryan 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment 
Memorandum Decision and Order of Plaintiffs' Thomas J. Ryan 
Motion for Summary Judgment - copies faxed to 
Attorney's along with cover sheet from Wendy 
MOTN TRINA Motion for Reconsideration of Memorandum and Thomas J. Ryan 
Decision Re: Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
HRSC TRlNA Hearing Scheduled (Motion 02/29/2008 10:OO Thomas J. Ryan 
AM) Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration of 
Memorandum and Decision 
MlSC TRlNA Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion Thomas J. Ryan 
for Reconsideration of Memorandum and 
Decision Re: Plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
CONT TRlNA Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 03/05/2008 Thomas J. Ryan 
09:OO AM: Continued 3-day 
Hearing Scheduled (Court Trial 03/06/2008 Thomas J. Ryan 
09:30 AM) 
HRSC TRlNA 
MEMO 
H RVC 
TRl NA 
TRlNA 
Memorandum of Stipulated Facts Thomas J. Ryan 
Hearing result for Court Trial held on 03/06/2008 Thomas J. Ryan 
09:30 AM: Hearing Vacated 
Motion for Leave to W~thdraw Thomas J. Ryan MOTN 
AFFD 
TRlNA 
TRlNA Affidavit of Ron R. Shepherd in Support of Motion Thomas J. Ryan 
for Leave to Withdraw 
NOTC 
HRSC 
TRINA 
TRl NA 
Notice of Hearing Thomas J. Ryan 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Withdraw Dennis E. Goff 
0411 112008 01 :30 PM) 
Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement Thomas J. Ryan MOTN 
AFFD 
TRlNA 
TRlNA Affidavit of Kevin E. Dinius in Support of Motion Thomas J. Ryan 
Enforce Settlement Agreement 
NOTC 
HRSC 
TRlNA 
TRl NA 
Notice of Hearing Thomas J. Ryan 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 04/17/2008 01:30 Thomas J. Ryan 
PM) Plaintiffs Motion to Enforce Settlement 
Agreement 
CONT 
HRSC 
Hearing result for Motion to Withdraw held on Dennis E. Goff 
0411 112008 01:30 PM: Continued 
TRl NA 
TRI NA Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Withdraw Thomas J. Ryan 
04/25/2008 10:30 AM) Attorn2y for Defendants 
*&$-> #!* 
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-&&FA Third Judicial District Court - Owyhee County Date: 1/26/2009 
Time: 01:42 PM 
Page 5 of 9 
User: TRlNA 
ROA Repot-t 
Case CV-2006-0005807-M Current Judge Thomas J. Ryan 
Henry Ogden, etal. vs Dennls C Grrffith, etal. 
Henry Ogden, M~chelle Wurst vs Denn~s C Griffith, Bonn~e M Porter 
Date Code User Judae 
MI SC 
CONT 
TR l NA 
TRlNA 
Second Amended Notice of Hearing Thomas J. Ryan 
Hearing result for Motion to Withdraw held on Thomas J. Ryan 
04/25/2008 10:30 AM: Continued Attorney for 
Defendants 
HRSC Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Withdraw Thomas J. Ryan 
0411 712008 01:30 PM) 
Memorandum Decision Re: PlaintiWs Motion to Thomas J. Ryan 
Reconsider 
ORDR 
HRHD 
TRlNA 
TRlNA 
Order Allowing Withdrawal of Counsel Thomas J. Ryan 
Hearing result for Motion to W~thdraw held on Thomas J. Ryan 
04/17/2008 01 :30 PM: Hearing Held 
MOTN 
AFFD 
Motion for Summary JudgmentlMotion to Enforce Thomas J. Ryan 
Settlement Agreement 
TRlNA 
Affidavit of Kevin D. Dinius in Support of Motion Thomas J. Ryan 
for Summary Judgment Motion to Enforce 
Settlement Agreement 
NOTC Notice of Hearing ( contacted Atty. for new Notice Thomas J. Ryan 
to correct to Owyhee County Courthouse in 
Murphy not Caldwell) 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary Thomas J. Ryan 
Judgment 05/30/2008 11 :00 AM) and Motion to 
Enforce Settlement Agreement 
HRSC 
Amended notice of hearing Thomas J. Ryan MISC 
AFFD 
TRlNA 
TR l NA Affidavit Re:Service of Order Allowing Withdrawal Thomas J. Ryan 
of Counsel 
APER Defendant: Griffith, Dennis C Appearance R. Thomas J. Ryan 
Wade Curtis 
APER TRlNA Defendant: Porter, Bonnie M Appearance R. Thomas J. Ryan 
Wade Curtis 
Notice of Appearance Following Withdrawal of Thomas J. Ryan 
Counsel 
NOTC 
Motion to Continue Hearing Thomas J. Ryan MOTN 
ORDR 
CO NT 
TRlNA 
TR l NA 
TRlNA 
Order Continuing Summary Judgment Hearing Thomas J. Ryan 
Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment Thomas J. Ryan 
held on 05/30/2008 1 1 :00 AM: Continued and 
Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary Thomas J. Ryan 
Judgment 0611 012008 01 :30 PM) 
HRSC TRlNA 
Order Continuing Summary Judgment Hearing Thomas J. Ryan ORDR 
ORDR 
CONT 
Order Resetting Summary Judgment Hearing Thomas J. Ryan 
Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment Thomas J. Ryan 
held on 06/10/2008 01:30 PM: Continued 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary Thomas J. Ryan 
Judgment 06/05/2008 01 :30 PM) 
HRSC TRlNA 
Notice of Substitution of Cynsel  Thomas J. Ryan NOTC 
g;z> 
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Third Judicial District Court - Ovvyhee County 4$:9 Date 3/26/2009 
Time 01 42 PM 
Page 6 of 9 
User: TRlNA 
ROA Reporl 
Case CV-2006-0005807-M Current Judge Thomas J Ryan 
Henry Ogden, etal. vs. Denn~s C Griffith, etal. 
Henry Ogden, Michelle Hurst vs. Dennis C Griffith, Bonnie M Porter 
Date Code User Judge 
Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Thomas J. Ryan 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Enforce Settlement 
Agreement 
5/23/2008 MlSC TRINA 
AFFD 
AFFD 
5/28/2008 CONT 
TRINA 
TRINA 
TR l NA 
Affidavit of Bonnie M. Porter Thomas J. Ryan 
Affidavit of Dennis Griffith Thomas J. Ryan 
Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment Thomas J. Ryan 
held on 0610512008 01:30 PM: Continued 
MISC Second Order Setting Summary Judgment Thomas J. Ryan 
Hearing 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary Thomas J. Ryan 
Judgment 06/26/2008 09:OO AM) 
5/29/2008 HRSC TRlNA 
5/30/2008 MlSC 
NOTC 
TRlNA 
TRINA 
Subpoena Duces Tecurn to Ronald Shepherd Thomas J. Ryan 
Notice of Taking Audio Visual Deposition of Thomas J. Ryan 
Ronald Shepherd 
MlSC 
NOTC 
TRINA 
TR I NA 
Subpoena Duces Tecum to Bruce Hendricks Thomas J. Ryan 
Notice of Taking Audio Visual Deposition of Bruce Thomas J. Ryan 
Hendricks 
MISC 
NOTC 
TR l NA 
TRlNA 
Subpoena Duces Tecum to Brenda Seegar Thomas J. Ryan 
Notice of Taking Audio Visual Deposition of Thomas J. Ryan 
Brenda Seegar 
MlSC 
MlSC 
MI SC 
NOTC 
TR l NA 
TRl NA 
TRlNA 
TRlNA 
Subpoena to Brenda Seegar Thomas J. Ryan 
Subpoena to Bruce Hendricks Thomas J. Ryan 
Subpoena to Ronald Shepherd Thomas J. Ryan 
Notice of Intent to Present Evidence and to Thomas J. Ryan 
Produce Testimony 
Notice of Intent to Cross Examine Thomas J. Ryan 6/5/2008 NOTC 
6/6/2008 NOTC 
61912008 NOTC 
TRINA 
TRlNA 
TRlNA 
Notice of Intent to Cross Examine Thomas J. Ryan 
Notice of Intent to Present Evidence and to Thomas J. Ryan 
Produce Testimony 
611 612008 NOTC 
612312008 STlP 
TRlNA 
TRINA 
Notice of Intent to Cross Examine Thomas J. Ryan 
Stipulation to Continue Hearing to 9:30 a.m. Thomas J. Ryan 
instead of 9:00 a.m. 6-26 
CONT TRlNA Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment Thomas J. Ryan 
held on 06/26/2008 09:OO AM: Continued 
HRSC Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary Thomas J. Ryan 
Judgment 06/26/2008 09:30 AM) 
6/26/2008 HRHD Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment Thomas J. Ryan 
held on 0612612008 09:30 AM: Hearing Held 
7/21 12008 MlSC TRlNA Defendants' Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Thomas J. Ryan 
Law 
8/7/2008 MlSC TRlNA Finding of Fact & Conclusions of Law Upon Thomas J. Ryan 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Enforce Settlement 
8/22/2008 MOTN TRlNA Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs Thomas J. Ryan 
Date 112612009 
\,&& *Z-de* r$"?? 
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Third Judicial District Court - Owyhee County <$9 
T~me 01 42 PM ROA Report 
Page 7 of 9 Case CV-2006-0005807-M Current Judge. Thomas J. Ryan 
Henry Ogden, eta1 vs Dennis C Gntfith, eta1 
Henry Ogden, Michelle Hurst vs. Dennis C Griffith, Bonnie M Porter 
Date Code User 
812212008 MEMO TR I NA 
MEMO TR l NA 
9/2/2008 MlSC TRlNA 
APER TRlNA 
9/4/2008 HRSC TRlNA 
9/9/2008 HRHD TR l NA 
JDMT TRINA 
911 212008 MI SC TRlNA 
MOTN TRlNA 
NOTC TRlNA 
HRSC TRlNA 
911 512008 TRlNA 
MOTN TRI NA 
MEMO TRlNA 
HRSC TRlNA 
9/22/2008 MlSC TRl NA 
9/24/2008 MlSC TRl NA 
AFFD TRl NA 
9/26/2008 HRHD TRl NA 
User: TRINA 
Judge 
Memorandum In Support of Motion for Attorney Thomas J. Ryan 
Fees and Costs 
Memorandum of Costs and Attorneys Fees and Thomas J. Ryan 
Affidavit of Attorney 
Substitution of Attorney Thomas J. Ryan 
Defendant: Griffith, Dennis C Appearance Allen Thomas J. Ryan 
B. Ellis 
Hearing Scheduled (Telephonic Conference Thomas J. Ryan 
09/09/2008 01:30 PM) Court will initiate the call. 
Plaintiffs proposed Judgment 
Hearing result for Telephonic Conference held on Thomas J. Ryan 
09/09/2008 01 :30 PM: Hearing Held Court will 
initiate the call. Plaintiffs proposed Judgment 
Judgment Thomas J. Ryan 
Certificate of Service Thomas J. Ryan 
Motion to Disallow Costs and Fees Thomas J. Ryan 
Notice of Hearing Thomas J. Ryan 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 0911212008 10:11 Thomas J. Ryan 
AM) Motion to Vacate Judgment and Motion to 
Disallow Costs and Fees 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Comparing And Thomas J. Ryan 
Conforming A Prepared Record, Per Page Paid 
by: Morrow, Dinius Attys at Law Receipt number: 
0045280 Dated: 911 512008 Amount: $1.50 
(Check) 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Certifying The Same Thomas J. Ryan 
Additional Fee For Certificate And Seal Paid by: 
Morrow, Dinius Attys at Law Receipt number: 
0045280 Dated: 911 512008 Amount: $2.00 
(Check) 
Motion to Vacate Judgment Thomas J. Ryan 
Memorandum in Support of Motions to Vacate Thomas J. Ryan 
Judgment and Disallow Attorney FeeslCosts 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 09/26/2008 10:30 Thomas J. Ryan 
AM) Motion to Vacate Judgment and Motion to 
Disallow Costs and Fees 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Thomas J. Ryan 
Defendants Motion to Vacate Judgment and 
Disallow Attorney FeesICosts 
Reply Brief in Support of Motion to Vacate Thomas J. Ryan 
Judgment and Motion to Disallow Attorney Fees 
and Costs 
Affidavit of Allen B. Ellis Thomas J. Ryan 
Hearing result for Motion held on 09/26/2008 Thomas J. Ryan 
10:30 AM: Hearing Held Motion to Vacate 
Judgment and Motion to Disallow Costs and Fees 
r: 
/ 
Date 2/26/2009 
Time 01 42 PM 
Page 8 of 9 
w 
Third Judicial District Court - Owyhee County 
ROA Report 
Case CV-2006-0005807-M Current Judge Thomas J. Ryan 
Henry Ogden, eta! vs. Dennis C Gnffith, etal. 
Henry Ogden, M~chelle Hurst vs Clenn~s C Griffith, Bonnie M Porter 
Date Code User Judge 
User: TRlMA 
9/29/2008 MlSC TRlNA 
101612008 MlSC TRI NA 
1 011 412008 CONT TRl NA 
1 1/6/2008 MEMO TRl NA 
1 1 11 212008 NOTC 
HRSC 
MOTN 
MEMO 
1211 112008 NOTC 
BNDC 
BNDC 
BNDC 
TRl NA 
TRlNA 
TRl NA 
TR I NA 
TRl NA 
TRl NA 
TRl NA 
TRlNA 
TRl NA 
APSC TRlNA 
1211 212008 MlSC TRlNA 
1211 512008 BNDT TRl NA 
BNDT TRlNA 
MI SC TRl NA 
1211 612008 NOTA TRlNA 
Supplemental Brief in Support of Motion to Thomas J. Ryan 
Vacate Judgment 
Plaintiffs Supplemental Brief in Opposition to Thomas J. Ryan 
Defendantswotion to Vacate Judgment and 
Disallow Attorney Feeslcosts 
Hearing result for Motion held on 09/12/2008 Thomas J. Ryan 
10:l I AM: Continued Motion to Vacate 
Judgment and Motion to Disallow Costs and Fees 
( to be held by Briefs) 
Memorandum Decision Upon Rule 59(e) Motion Thomas J. Ryan 
to Vacate Judgment and Motion for Fees and 
Costs 
Notice of Hearing Thomas J. Ryan 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 1212312008 10:30 Thomas J. Ryan 
AM) Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration 
Motion for Reconsideration Thomas J. Ryan 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Thomas J. Ryan 
Reconsideration 
Notice of Appeal Thomas J. Ryan 
Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 46078 Dated Thomas J. Ryan 
1211 112008 for 86.00) - Supreme Court fee 
Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 46079 Dated Thomas J. Ryan 
1211 112008 for 200.00)- Reporters Transcript 
Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 46080 Dated Thomas J. Ryan 
1211 112008 for 200.00) - Clerk's Record 
Filing: T - Civil Appeals To The Supreme Court Thomas J. Ryan 
($86.00 for the Supreme Court to be receipted via 
Misc. Payments. The $15.00 County District 
Court fee to be inserted here.) Paid by: Ellis, 
Allen B. (attorney for GriBth, Dennis C) Receipt 
number: 0046081 Dated: 1211 112008 Amount: 
$15.00 (Check) For: Griffith, Dennis C 
(defendant) 
Appealed To The Supreme Court Thomas J. Ryan 
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Oppostion to Thomas J. Ryan 
Defendants Motion for Reconsideration 
Bond Transferred To County: (Transaction Thomas J. Ryan 
number 33703 dated 1211 512008 amount 86.00) 
Idaho Supreme Court 
Bond Transferred To County: (Transaction Thomas J. Ryan 
number 33704 dated 12/15/2008 amount 200.00) 
Amended Notice of Appeal Thomas J. Ryan 
NOTICE OF APPEAL-filed by Kevin E. Dinius Thomas J. Ryan 
Date: 112612009 
Time 01 42 PM 
Page 9 of 9 
tiv"$: #*t 
3&$3 
Third Judicial District Court - Owyhee County 
ROA Report 
Case CV-2006-0005807-M Current Judge Thomas J. Ryan 
Henry Ogden, etal. vs. Denn~s C Grtffith, etal. 
Henry Ogden, M~chelle Hurst vs. Dennis C Griffith, Bonnie M Porter 
Date Code User Judge 
User: TRlNA 
TRl NA Filing: T - Civil Appeals To The Supreme Court Thomas J. Ryan 
($86.00 for the Supreme Court to be receipted via 
Misc. Payments. The $15.00 County District 
Court fee to be inserted here.) Paid by: Morrow 
and Dinius Receipt number: 0046129 Dated: 
1211 612008 Amount: $1 5.00 (Check) For: Ogden, 
Henry (plaintiff) 
Hearing result for Motion held on 12/23/2008 Thomas J. Ryan 
10:30 AM: Continued Defendant's Motion for 
Reconsideration 
1212212008 CONT LENA 
HRSC LENA 
NOHG LENA 
112312009 HRHD TRlNA 
DCHH TRlNA 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 01/23/2009 10:30 Thomas J. Ryan 
AM) Motion for Reconsideration 
Amended Notice Of Hearing Thomas J. Ryan 
Hearing result for Motion held on 01/23/2009 Thomas J. Ryan 
10:30 AM: Hearing Held Motion for 
Reconsideration 
District Court Hearing Held Thomas J. Ryan 
Court Reporter: Kim Saunders 
Number of Transcript Pages for this less than 100 
pages estimated: 
Kevin E. Dinius 
Dennis P. Wilkinson 
WHITE PETERSON, P.A. 
5700 East F r d l i n  Road, Suite 200 
Nampa, Idaho 83687-7901 
Telephone: (208) 466-9272 
Facsimile: (208) 466-4405 
ISB No. 5974,6023 
kedehitepeterson. corn 
dwilkinson@whitepeterson. corn 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
HENRY OGDEN, an unmarried man; and, 
MICHELLE HURST, an unmarried woman, 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs- 
DENNIS C. GRIFFITH, an unmarried man; 
and, BONNIE M. PORTER, an unmarried 
woman, 
Defendants. 
) COMPLAINT 
) and DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
) Fee Category: A-1 
) Filing Fee: $88.00 
COMES NOW, Plaintiffs Henry Ogden and Michelle Hurst, by and through their 
attorneys of record, the law firm of White Peterson, P.A., and for cause of action against the 
above-named Defendants hereby complain and allege as follows: 
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PARTIES 
1. At all relevant times herein mentioned, Plaintiffs Henry Ogden and Michelle 
Hurst (hereinafter '"Plaintiffs"), were and are residents of the State of Georgia, residing in 
Atlanta, Georgia. 
2. At all relevm times herein mentioned, Defendants DENNIS C. GRIFFITH and 
BONNIE M. PORTER (hereinafier "Defendants") were and are residents of the State of Idaho, 
residing in Owyhee County, Idaho. 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
3. The Defendants to this action reside in Owyhee County, Idaho, making 
jurisdiction proper in this court. 
4. The subject property at issue in this action is located in Owyhee County, Idaho, 
making jurisdiction proper in this court. 
5. Venue is appropriate pursuant to Idaho Code 5 5-404. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
6. On or about October 12, 2006, the Plaintiffs entered into a Real Estate Purchase 
and Sale Agreement (hereinafter "Contract") with Defendants to purchase real property located 
at 2517 Succer Creek Rd., Hornedale, Owyhee County, Idaho ("subject property") , for the sum 
of $500,000.00. A true and correct copy of the Contract is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
7. Pursuant to the Contract, the Plaintiffs were required to provide the Defendants 
with $1,000.00 in earnest money. On or about October 13, 2006, the Plaintiffs tendered a check 
to the Defendants for $1,000.00. 
8. Pursuant to the Contract, the closing was to be no later than November 30, 2006 
at Pioneer Title in Nampa, Idaho. 
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9. In November 2006, the Plaintiffs arranged for and obtained the necessary 
financing to purchase the property. 
10. The Defendants executed Addendum ##3 to the Contract, dated November 27, 
2006, which extended the closing date to "on or before 12-08-06." Defendant Dennis Griffith 
signed Addendum #3 on December 1,2006, and Defendant Bonnie M. Porter signed Addendum 
ki3 on December 4, 2006. A true and correct copy of Addendum tr"3 is altached hereto as Exhibit 
B. 
11. On December 5,2006, the Defendants informed Pioneer Title that Defendants had 
not received funds from the sale of the subject property, Defendants considered Plaintiffs in 
breach of the Contract and Defendants were no longer willing to sell the subject property to 
Plaintiffs. 
12. On December 6, 2006, the Defendants retrieved the original warranty deed from 
Pioneer Title. A true and correct copy of the warranty deed is attached hereto as Exhibit C. 
13.  On December 6, 2006, Plaintiffs made demand for Defendants to honor the 
Contract and addendurns and proceed with the sale of the subject property. 
14. Defendants have failed and refused to proceed with the sale of the subject 
property. 
15. Plaintiffs have performed all conditions and covenants required of them by the 
Contract. 
16. Plaintiffs remain ready, willing, and able to perform under the Contract, but the 
Defendants refuse to sell the subject property to Plaintiffs. 
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COUNT ONE 
Breach of Contract 
17. P l a i ~ i f f s  reallege and incorporate the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as 
if they were fully set forth herein. 
18. The Contract is a valid and enforceable Contract between the Plaintiffs and the 
Defendants. 
13. Plaintiffs have performed all their conditions and covenants required under the 
Contract, or Defendants have waived andlor are estopped from claiming that the Plaintiffs are in 
breach of the Contract. 
20. Defendants breached the Contract by purporting to cancel the Contract and 
refusing to perform their obligations under the Contract. 
21. As a direct result of the breach of the Contract by the Defendants, Plaintiffs have 
suffered damages, the exact amount to be proven at trial. 
COUNT TWO 
Injunction 
22. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as 
if they were fully set forth herein. 
23. The Contract represents a valid and binding agreement between the Plaintiffs and 
the Defendants. 
24. By virtue of their binding Contract with the Plaintiffs, Defendants should be 
precluded from selling or attempting to sell the subject property or any part of the property to 
anyone other than the Plaintiffs. 
25. Plaintiffs' rights to purchase the subject property are prior and superior to the 
rights of any other party with respect to such purchase. 
COMPLAINT and DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 4 
- 2  
26. Should the Defendants proceed to sell or transfer the subject property to any third 
party; Plaintiffs will suffer immediate, great, and ineparable h m .  
27. Monetary damages, alone, would be inadequate to prevent irreparable harm to the 
Plaintiffs, and Plaintiffs have no other adequate remedy at law to prevent such h a m  andor to 
recover for the harm it will suffer as the result of such sale. 
28. Unless otherwise restrained, Defendants may attempt to proceed to sell or transfer 
the real estate to a third party, resulting in the foregoing h a m  to the Plaintiffs. 
29. Plaintiffs are entitled to preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, enjoining 
and restraining Defendants andlor their agents or real estate broker from selling the real estate or 
any part of the property to anyone other than the Plaintiffs. 
COUNT THlREE 
Specific Performance 
30. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as 
if they were fully set forth herein. 
31. Pursuant to the Contract, Defendants are obligated to sell the subject property to 
the Plaintiffs, in accordance with the terms and conditions provided therein. 
32. Pursuant to the Contract, Plaintiffs are entitled to purchase the subject property 
from the Defendants, in accordance with the terms and conditions provided therein. 
33. The Contract involves unique property; and therefore, damages alone will not 
provide Plaintiffs with an adequate remedy at law upon the event of a breach. 
34. Plaintiffs are entitled to a judgment or order specifically requiring the Defendants 
to sell the subject property in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth in the Contract. 
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COUNT FOUR 
Declarafary Judgmerzt 
35. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as 
if they were fully set forth herein. 
36. The parties are persons interested under wrillen instruments, whose rights, status, 
and/or other legal relations are affected thereby, and who are entitled to a detemination of any 
question of construction or validity arising under the instments,  and to obtain a declaration of 
rights, status or other legal relations there under. 
37. An actual, justifiable controversy exists between Plaintiffs and Defendants with 
respect to the validity and enforceability of the Contract vis-ti-vis Idaho law or any other 
Contract or agreement between Defendants and other parties concerning the sale and purchase of 
the subject property. 
38. Entry of a judgment or decree by the court with respect to said controversy would 
terminate the controversy between the parties. 
39. Plaintiffs are entitled to entry of a judgment or decree declaring that: (a) the 
Contract is a valid, binding, and enforceable Contract requiring Defendants to sell the subject 
property to the Plaintiffs in accordance with the terms provided herein; (b) Plaintiffs' rights to 
purchase the subject property under the Contract are prior and superior to the rights of any other 
parties with respect to the purchase of the real estate or any part of the property; (c) Defendants 
are not Contractually or legally obligated to sell the real estate or any part of the property to any 
party other than the Plaintiffs; (d) Plaintiffs have not breached the Contract; and (e) Defendants 
have breached the Contract. 
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COUNT FIVE 
Breach ofthe Implied Covenant o j  Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
40. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as 
if they were fully set forth herein. 
41. The Contract contains an implied covenmt of good faith and fair dealing. 
42. Defendants breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by 
purposing to cancel the Contract, and presumably attempting to sell the subject property to 
someone other that the Plaintiffs. 
43. Defendants did not perform their obligations under the Contract in good faith, and 
breached the implied covenant of good faith, and fair dealing by nullifying and/or significantly 
impairing the benefit of the Contract owing to the Plaintiffs. 
44. As a result of the Defendants' breach of the implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing, the Plaintiffs have suffered damages, the exact amount to be proven at trial. 
ATTOWEY FEES 
As a result of the Defendants' actions as set forth above, Plaintiffs have been required to 
retain the law firm of White Peterson, P.A., to prosecute this action and has incurred and will 
continue to incur costs and attorney fees for which the Plaintiffs are entitled to a separate award 
pursuant to Idaho Code $9 12-120 and 12-121, and Rule 54(e)(l) of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure as well as any other applicable statute or rule, in an amount to be determined by the 
Court, or, if judgment is rendered by default, in the amount of $7,500.00. 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Plaintiffs hereby request a jury trial pursuant to 1.R.C.P 38. 
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PRAYER FOR WLIIEF 
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs pray for judgment against the Defendants as follows: 
I .  As to the First Count, an order and accompanying judgment finding that the 
Contract is a valid and binding Contract, that the Defendants breached the Contract, and that 
Defendants are liable for the breach of the Contract and owe damages to the Plaintiffs, the exact 
mount  to be proven at trial; 
2. As to the Second Count, for a judgment or order permanently enjoining and 
restraining Defendants and/or their agents from selling the subject property or any part of the 
property to any party other than the Plaintiffs; 
3. As to the Third Count, for a judgment or order specifically requiring and 
compelling the Defendants to promptly follow through with the terms of the Contract and sell the 
subject property to the Plaintiffs as agreed upon; 
4. , As to the Fourth Count, for a judgment or decree declaring that: (a) the Contract 
is a valid, binding, and enforceable Contract requiring Defendants to sell the subject property to 
the Plaintiffs in accordance with the terms provided herein; (b) Plaintiffs' rights to purchase the 
property under the Contract are prior and superior to the rights of any other parties with respect 
to the purchase of the subject property or any part of the property; (c) Defendants are not 
Contractually or legally obligated to sell the subject property or any part of the property to any 
party other than the Plaintiffs; (d) Plaintiffs have not breached the Contract; and (e) Defendants 
have breached the Contract. 
5 .  As to the Fifth Count, an order and accompanying judgment finding that the 
Contract is a valid and binding Contract, that such Contract contains an implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing, that Defendants breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
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dealing contained in the Contract, that Defendmts are Liable for breach of the implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing contained in the Contract, and that Defendants owe Plaintiffs 
damages, the exact amount to be proven at trial. 
6. For costs incurred in the prosecution of this action. 
7. For an award of reasonable altorneysVees incurred in the prosecution of this 
matter, the exact amount to be proven at trial or othewise in this case. 
8. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable. 
rL"- 
DATED this 1day of December, 2006. 
W I T E  PETERSON, P.A. 
-. \ 
By: 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
cm\W:\WorMO\Ogden, Henyipdon-Discoveq\Complaint.doc 
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RE-21 R E A L  ESTATE PURCHASE AND SALE AGREEMENT 
HAVE ANY QUESTIONS. CONSULT YOUR AITORNEY AND/OR ACCOUNTANT BEFORE SIGNING 
THIS IS A LEGALLY BINDING CONTRACT READ THE ENTIRE DOCUMENT INCLUDING ANY ATACHMENTS IF YOU 
ID# 
2 
DATE 1011 212006 
3 LISTING AGENCY RUMAX ADVANTAGE - Office Phone # 
Ltsttng Agent PETE M C A R T H U R  E-Ma11 
SELLING AGENCY R U M A X  A D V A N T A G E  Office Phone # &&wok Fax # 
6 Selltng Agent STACEY BUDELL E-Mall- staceybQ - remax.net 
1. BUYER: H E N R Y  OGDEN AND MICHELLE HURST (Hereinafter called 
9 "BUYER") agrees to purchase, and the undersigned SELLER agrees to sell the followlng descrtbed real estate heretnaffer referred to as "PREMISES" 
' 0  COMMONLY KNOWN AS 2517 SUCCER CREEK Clty - HOMEDALE 
11 OWYHEE County. ID. Zip legally descrtbed as thhe Nw 114 of the SW 114 of S 17 T3N, R5W 
12 Boise Meridian, Owyhee County Parce l  I and I1 the E 240' of N240' of EW 114 of SW 114 of S17 T3N R5W 
'3 OR Legal Descrlptlon Altached as addendum # (Addendum must accompany origtnal offer.) 
14 
i5 2, $- PURCHASEPRICE- Flve Hundred Thousand and Zero1100 - DOL LARS, 
$6 payable upon the following TERMS AND CONDITIONS ( not lncludlng clostng costs ) 
17 
3. FINANCIAL TERMS: Note: A+C+D+E must add  u p  t o  total purchase price. 
$ (A). EARNEST MONEY BUYER hereby deposlts One Thousand and ZeroilOO DOLLARS as 
Earnest Money evidenced by a cash Epersonal check q cashier's check IL] note (due date) 
other and a recetpt IS hereby acknowledged Earnest Money to be deposited 
tn trust account Oupon receipt, or upon acceptance by all parttes and shall be held by L~stlng Broker q Selllng Broker 
other both for the benefit of the parttes hereto The responsible Broker shall be Don V Y . k m  
(B). ALL CASH OFFER: a NO a YES If this is an all cash offer do not complete lines 32 through 61, fill blanks with 
" 0  (ZERO.) IF CASH OFFER. BUYER'S OBLIGATION TO CLOSE SHALL NOT BE SUBJECT TO ANY FINANCIAL CONTINGENCY. 
BUYER agrees to provide SELLER within 10 business days from the date of acceptance of this agreement by all patties, evidence of 
sufficient funds and/or proceeds necessary to close transaction. Acceptable documentation includes, but is not limited to, a copy of a recent bank or 
financial statement or contract(s) for the sale of BUYER'S current residence or other property to be sold. 
$ma (C). NRN LOAN PROCEEDS: This Agreement is contingent upon BUYER obtaining the following financing: q FIRST LOAN of $ not including mortgage insurance, through q FHA. q VA. OCONVENTIONAL. 0 IHFA. 
q RURAL DEVELOPMENT. 0 OTHER with mterest not to exceed % for a period of year@) at: 0 Fixed Rate 
q Other BUYER shall pay no more than-point(s) plus origination fee i f  any. SELLER shall pay no more than point(s) 
Any reduction in points shall first accrue to the benefil of the 0 BUYER q SELLER q Divided Equally a NIA. 
0 SECOND LOAN of $ with interest not to exceed % for a period of year(s) at: a Fixed Rate 
q Other BUYER shall pay no more than point(s plus origination fee if any. SELLER shall pay no more than point(s). Any 
reduction in points shall first accrue to h e  benefit of the q BUYER b SELLER 0 Divided Equally 0 NIA. 
LOAN APPLICATI0N:BUYER q has applied q shall apply for such loanjs) within b u s i n e s s  day(s) of SELLER'S acceptance. Within 
business days of final acceptance of all parties. BUYER agrees to furnish SELLER with a written confirmation showing lender approval of 
credit report, income verification, debt ratios in a manner acceptable to the SELLER(S) and subject only to satisfactory appraisal and final lender 
underwriting. If such written confirmation is not received by SELLER(S) within the strict time allotted. SELLER(S) may at their option cancel this 
agreement by notifying BUYER(S) in writing of such cancellation within -business day(s) after written confirmation was required. If SELLER does 
not cancel within the strict time period specified as set forth herein. SELLER shall be deemed to have accepted such written confirmation of lender approval 
and shall be deemed to have elected to proceed with the transaction. SELLER'S approval shall not be unreasonably withheld. If an appraisal is required 
by  lender, the property must appraise at not less than purchase price or BUYER'S Earnest Money may be returned at BUYER'S request. BUYER 
may also apply for a loan with different conditions and costs and close transaction provided all other terms and conditions o f  this Agreement are 
fulfilled, and the new loan does not increase the costs or requirements to the SELLER 
FHA IVA: If applicable, it is expressly agreed that notwithstanding any other provisions of this contract. BUYER shall not be obligated to complete the 
purchase of the property described herein or to incur any penalty or forfeiture of Eamest Money deposits or otherwise unless BUYER has been given in 
accordance with HUOIFHA or VA requirements a written statement by the Federal Housing Commissioner, Veterans Administration or a Direct 
Endonement lender setting foith the appraised value of the property of not less than the sates price as stated in the contract. SELLER agrees to pay fees 
required by FHA or VA. 
$ (D). ADDITIONAL FINANCIAL TERMS: 
a Additional financial terms are specified under the heading "OTHER TERMS AND/OR CONDITIONS" (Section 4). 
a Additional financial terms are contained in a FINANCING ADDENDUM of same date, attached hereto, signed by both parties. 
Line E below is the total of the Purchase Price minus Lines A. C, and D. Only use numbers in these lines. 
$&@,Qf&QO (E). APPROXIMATE FUNDS DUE FROM BUYERS A T  CLOSING (Not including cfosing costs): Cash at closing 
to be paid by BUYER at closing in GOOD FUNDS, includes: cash, electronic transfer funds, certified check or cashier's check. NOTE: I f  any 
of above loans being Assumed or taken "subject to", any net differences between the approximate balances and the actual balance of said loanfs) 
shall be adjusted at dosing of escrow in: Cash mother: 
BUYER'S Initials ( )( ) Date- SELLER'S Initials ( )( ) Date 
Thts brm 1s pnnled and dtstnbuled by Ihe ldaho Assmalton of REALTORS@, Inc Thts form has been deegned fcx and ts pmvtded only for use by real eslale profess~onals who are members of the 
Naltonat Assoaabon of REALTORS USE BY ANY OTHER PERSON IS PROHIBITEO Copynghl Idaho Assmalton of REALTORS@ Inc All rfghls reserved 
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PROFERTY ADDRESS: HOMEDALE -- ID#: 3.4 -- 
4. OTHER TERMS ANDiOR CONDITIONS: This Agreement is made subject to  the following special terms, considerations andlor contingencies 
which must be satisfied rior to closln SELLERS SHALL HA& A R E A S O ~  
NOT TO EXCEED 180 DAYS. 
5. ITEMS INCLUDED & EXCLUDED IN THIS SALE All exlsttng fixlures and fittrngs that are attached to the property are INCLUDED IN THE PURCHASE 
PRICE (unless excluded below), and shall be transferred free of isens These include, but are not limited to, all attached floor coverlngs, attached televlslon 
antennae, satelllfe dlsh and recelvlng equ~pment, attached flumbing, bathraom and lrflhtlng fixtures, window screens, screen doors, storm wmdows, storm doors. 
all wtndow coverlngs, garage door opener(s) and transmttter(s), exterlor trees, plants or shrubbery, water heatlng apparatus and fixtures, attached fireplace 
equlprnent, awnmgs, ventllatlng, cooling and heatlng systems, all ranges . ovens bull1 ~n dishwashers, fuel tanks and lnlgatton fixtures and equlprnent, all water 
systems. wells spnngs, water, water rfghts, d~tches and dftch rights. lf any, that are appurlenant thereto that are now on or used In connection with the premtses 
and shall be Included In the sale unless othewlse prov~ded heretn BUYER should satisfy h~mselflherself that the condltton of the Included Items IS acceptable It 
1s agreed that any Itern Included In thls sectton 1s of nominal value less than $100 
ADDITIONAL ITEMS SPECIFICALLY INCLUDED IN THIS SALE: 
n L & 3 k t c n n o  N EQUIPMENT INCLUDING BUT NOT LtMrTEo T o  ALL  P p r s  
(B). ITEMS SPECIFICALLY EXCLUDED IN THIS SALE: SELLERS PERSONAL PROPERTY 
6.  TITLE CONVEYANCE: Titk of SELLER is to be conveyed by warranty deed, unless otherwise provided, and is to be marketable and insurable except for 
rights resewed in federal patents, state or railroad deeds, building or use restrictions, building and zoning regulations and ordinances of any governmental unit. 
and rights of way and easements established or of record. Liens, encumbrances or defects to be discharged by SELLER may be paid out of purchase money at 
date of closing. No liens, encumbrances or defects which are to be discharged or assumed by BUYER or to which title is taken subject to, exist unless otherwise 
specified in this Agreement. 
7. TITLE INSURANCE; There may be types of title insurance coverages available other than those listed below and parties to this 
agreement are advised t o  talk t o  a tit le company about any other coverages available that wi l l  g i ve  the BUYER addit ional coverage. 
(A). PRELIMINARY TITLE COMMITMENT: Prior to closing the transaction,  SELLER or 0 BUYER shall furnish to BWER a preliminary commitment of a 
title insurance policy showing the condition of the title to said premises. BUYER shall have L b u s i n e s s  day(s) from receipt of the preliminary commitment or 
not fewer than twenty-four (24) hours prior to closing, within which to object in writing to the condition of the title as set forth in the preliminary commitment. If 
BUYER does not so object. BUYER shall be deemed to have accepted the conditions of the title. It is agreed that if the title of said premises is not marketable. 
or cannot be made so within 5 business day(s) after notice containing a written statement of defect is delivered to SELLER. BUYER'S Earnest Money 
deposit will be returned to BUYER and SELLER shall pay for the cost of title insurance cancellation fee, escrow and legal fees, if any. 
(B). TITLE COMPANY. The parties a me that PIONEER Title Company 
located at FRANKLI~ RD. NAMPA shall provide the title policy and preliminary report of commitment. 
(C). STANDARD COVERAGE OWNER'S POLICY: SELLER shall within a reasonable time after closing furnish to BUYER a title insurance policy in the 
amount of the purchase price of the premises showing marketable and insurable title subject to the liens, encumbrances and defects elsewhere set out in this 
Agreement to be discharged or assumed by BUYER unless othewise provided herein. The risk assumed by the title company in the standard coverage 
policy i s  limited to matters of public record. BUYER shall receive a ILTAfALTA Owner's Policy ofTitle Insurance. A title company, at BUYER'S request, can 
provide information about the availability, desirability, coverage and cost of various title insurance coverages and endorsements. If BUYER desires title 
coverage other than that required by this paragraph. BWER shall instruct Closing Agency in writing and pay any increase in cost unless otherwise provided 
herein. 
(D). EXTENDED COVERAGE LENDER'S POLICY (Mortgagee policy): The lender may require that BUYER ( B o w e r )  furnish an Extended Coverage 
~ender's Policy. This extended coverage lender's policy considers matters of public record and additionally insures against certain matters not shown in the 
public record. This extended coverage lender's policy is solely for the benefit of the lender and only protects the lender. 
8. MECHANIC'S LIENS -GENERAL CONTRACTOR DISCLOSURE STATEMENT NOTICE: BUYER and SELLER are hereby notified that. 
subject to ldaho Code 545.525 et seq.. a "General Contractor" must provide a Disclosure Statement to a homeowner that describes certain rights afforded 
to the homeowner (e.g. lien waivers, general liability insurance, extended policies of title insurance, surety bonds, and sub-contractor information). The 
Disclosure Statement must be given to a homeowner prior to the General Contractor entering into any contract in an amount exceeding $2.000 with a 
homeowner for construction, alteration, repair, or other improvements to real property, or with a residential real property purchaser for the purchase and 
sale of newly constructed property. Such disclosure is the responsibility of the General Contractor and it is not the duty of your agent to obtain this 
information on your behalf. You are advised to consult with any General Contractor subject to ldaho Code 545-525 ef seq. regarding the General 
Contractor Disclosure Statement. 
BUYER'S Initials ( )( ) Date SELLER'S Initials ( / 
This form is piinled and distributed by the ldaho Associalion of REALTORS@, Inc. This form has been designed fw and is provided only for use by real eslale pfofess~onals who are members of the 
Nalional Asswialion of REALTORS@. USE BY ANY OTHER PERSON IS PROHIBITEO. 
Copyrighl ldaho Associalion of REACTORSO. Inc. All rights reserved. 
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PROPERIY ADDRESS: 2517 SUCCER CREEK 
- 
HOMEDALE ID#: 
9. INSPECTION: 
(A). BUYER chooses @ lo have lnspectron tf not to have tnspectton If BUYER chooses not to have tnspection sktp sectton 9C BUYER shall 
have the r~ght o conduct tnspecttons. ~nvest~galtons, tests, surveys and other studtes at BUYER'S expense BUYER shall, wlthln 10 buslness 
day(s) of acceptance, complete these tnspecttons and glve to SELLER wrttten nottce of dtsapproved of Items BUYER 1s strongly advlsed lo exerclse 
these r~ghtsand to make BUYER'S own selectton of professionals wlth appropriate qualtfications to conduct lnspectlons of the enttre property 
(8). FHA INSPECTION REQUIREMENT, If applicable: "For Your Protection: Get a Home Inspection", HUD 92564-CN must be signed on or 
before execution o f  this agreement. 
(C). SATISFACTIONIREMOVAL OF INSPECTION CONTiNGENCIES: 
1). If BUYER does not within the strtct ttme per~od specified glve to SELLER wrltlen notlce of disapproved Items. BUYER shall eonclustvely 
be deemed to have (a) completed all Inspections. tnvesttgattons, revtew of appltcable documents and dtsclosures. (b) elected to proceed with the 
transaction and (c) assumed all Itablltty, responstbtltty and expense for repalrs or corrections other than for ttems whtch SELLER has otherw~se agreed In 
wrttlng to repair or correct 
2) If BUYER does wlthtn the stnct tlme perrod speclfied gtve to SELLER wrttten nottce of dtsapproved ,terns. BUYER shall provtde to  
SELLER perttnent section@) of wrttten tnspectton reports SELLER shall have 10 bustness day@) tn whtch to respond tn wrtting.The 
SELLER, atthelr optlon may cocrect the Items as speclfied by the BUYERS tn thetr letter or may elect not to do so If the SELLER agrees to correct the 
tterns askedfor tn the BUYERS letter, then both parties agree that they will contlnue with the transactton and proceed to clostng Thts will remove the 
BUYER'S inspectton conttngency 
3). If the SELLER elects not to correct the disapproved items, or does not respond in writing within the strict time period specified, then the 
BUYER(S) have the option of either continuing the transaction without the SELLER being responsible for correcting these deficiencies or giving the 
SELLER written notice within 5 business days that they will not continue with the transaction and will receive their Eamest Money back. 
4). If BUYER does not give such written notice of cancellation within the strict time periods specified. BUYER shall conclusively be deemed 
to have elected to proceed with the transaction without repairs or corrections other than for items which SELLER has otherwise agreed in writing to 
repair or correct. SELLER shall make the property available for all Inspections. BUYER shall keep the property free and clear of liens: indemnify and 
hold SELLER harmless from all liability, claims, demands, damages and costs; and repair any damages arising from the inspections. No inspections 
may be made by any governmental building or zoning inspector or government employee without the prior consent of SELLER unless required by local 
law. 
10. LEAD PAINT DISCLOSURE: The subject property h(l is C ]  is not defined as "Target Housing" regarding lead-based paint or lead-based paint 
hazards. If yes. BUYER hereby acknowledges the following: ( a ) BUYER has been provided an EPA approved lead-based paint hazard information 
pamphlet. "Protect Your Family From Lead in Your Home". ( b ) receipt of SELLER'S Disclosure of Information and Acknowledgment Form and have 
been provided with all records, test reports or other information, i f  any, related to the presence of lead-based paint hazards on said property. ( c ) that 
this contract is contingent upon BUYERS right to have the property tested for lead-based paint hazards to be completed no later than 
or the contingency will terminate. ( d )that BUYER hereby h(l waives C ]  does not waive this right, ( e ) that if test results show 
unacceptable amounts of lead-based paint on the premises. BUYER has the right to cancel the contract subject to the option of the SELLER (to be given 
in writing) to elect to remove the lead-based paint and correct the problem which must be accomplished before closing, ( f ) that if the contract is 
canceled under this clause. BUYER'S earnest money deposit will be returned to BUYER. 
11. SQUARE FOOTAGE VERIFICATION: BUYER IS AWARE THAT ANY REFERENCE TO THE SQUARE FOOTAGE OF THE REAL PROPERTY OR 
IMPROVEMENTS IS APPROXIMATE. IF SQUARE FOOTAGE IS MATERIAL TO THE BUYER, IT MUST BE VERIFIED DURING THE INSPECTION PERIOD. 
12. SELLER'S PROPERTY DISCLOSURE FORM: If required by Title 55. Chapter 25 ldaho Code SELLER shall within ten (10) days after execution 
of this Agreement provide to BUYER "SELLER'S Property Disclosure Form* or other acceptable form. BUYER has received the "SELLER'S Property 
Disclosure Form" or other acceptable form prior to signing this Agreement: C] Yes [XJ No C ]  MIA 
13. COVENANTS, CONDITIONS AND RESTRICTIONS (CCB R'S): BUYER is responsible to obtain and review a copy of the CC& R's (if 
applicable). BUYER has reviewed CC& R's. a y e s  [XJ No 
14. SUBDIVISION HOMEOWNER'S ASSOCIATION: BUYER is aware that membership in a Home Owner's Association may be required and 
BUYER agrees to abide by the Articles of Incorporation, By-Laws and rules and regulations of the Association. BUYER is further aware that the 
Property may be subject to assessments levied by the Association described in full in the Declaration of Covenants. Conditions and Restrictions. 
BUYER has reviewed Homeowner's Association Documents: C] Yes C] No @ NIA Association feesldues are $ 
per YEAR a BUYER a SELLER @ NIA to pay Homeowner's Association SET UP FEE of $ Q a andlor property 
TRANSFER FEES of $3 at dosing. 
15. "NOT APPLICABLE DEFINED:" The letters "nla." "NIA," "n.a.," and "N.A." as used herein are abbreviations of the term *not applicable." Where 
this agreement uses the term "not applicable* or an abbreviation thereof, it shall be evidence that the parties have contemplated certain facts or 
conditions and have determined that such facts or conditions do not apply to the agreement or transaction herein. 
BUYER'S Initials ( )( )Date SELLER'S Initials ('h -&)(m Datelo -/:<--/>A 
- 
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PrZOPERTY ADDRESS: 2517 SU.GCER . C E K  HOME DALE ID#: 143 96514- 
16. COSTS PAID BY: Costs In addltton to those listed below may be ~ncurred by BUYER and SELLER unless otherwise agreed herein, or provided by 
law or required by lender, or o ~ e r w ~ s e  tated heretn The below costs wlll be pald as lndlcated Some costs are subject to loan program requirements 
SELLER agrees to pay up to $a of lender required repair costs only. 
BUYER or SELLER has the optlon to pay any lender requtred repalr costs tn excess of Urts amount 
17. OCCUPANCY: BUYER @does o d o e s  not intend to occupy property as BUYER'S primary residence 
$8. FINAL WALK THROUGH: The SELLER grants BUYER and any representative of BUYER reasonable access to conduct a final walk 
through inspection of the premises approximately 5 calendar day(s) prior to dose of escrow. NOT AS A CONTINGENCY OF THE SALE, but 
for purposes of satisfying BUYER that any repairs agreed to in writing by BUYER and SELLER have been completed and premises are in 
substantially the same condition as on acceptance date of this contract. SELLER shall make premises available for the final walk through and 
agrees to accept the responsibility and expense for making sure all the utilities are turned on for the walk through except for phone and cable. If 
BUYER does not conduct a final walk through. BUYER specifically releases the SELLER and Broker(s) of any liability. 
19. RISK OF LOSS: Prior t o  closing of this sale, all risk of loss shall remain with SELLER. In  addition, should the premises be materially 
damaged b y  fire or other destructive cause prior to closing, this agreement shall be void at the option of the BUYER. 
20. CLOSING: On or before the closing date. BUYER and SELLER shall deposit with the closing agency all funds and instruments necessary to 
complete this transaction. Closing means the date on  which all documents are either recorded or accepted by an escrow agent and the sale 
proceeds are available to SELLER. The closing shall be no later than (Date) NOVEMBER 30,2006 
The parties agree that the CLOSING AGENCY for this transaction shall be PIONEER TITLE 
located at 
If a long-term escrow / collection is involved, then the long-term escrow holder shall be 
21. POSSESSION: BUYER shall be entitled to possession a upon dosing or Ddate time DA.M.  P.M. 
Property taxes and water assessments (using the last available assessment as a basis), rents, interest and reserves, liens, encumbrances or obligations 
assumed and utilities shall be pro-rated as of CLOSING 
22. SALES PRICE INFORMATION: SELLER and BUYER hereby grant permission to the brokers and either pa* to this Agreement, to disclose 
sale data from this transaction, including selling price and property address to the local Association / Board of REALTORS, multiple listing service, its 
members, its members' prospects, appraisers and other professional users of real estate sales data. The parties to this Agreement acknowledge that 
sales price information compiled as a result of this Agreement may be provided to the County Assessor Oftice by either party or by either party's Broker. 
23. FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION: Facsimile or electronic transmission of any signed original document, and retransmission of any signed facsimile 
or electronic transmission shall be the same as delivery of an original. At the request of either party or the Closing Agency, the parties will confirm 
facsimile and electronic transmitted signatures by signing an original document. 
- 
- 
BUYER'S Initials ( )( ) Date SELLER'S Initials ( >~g)( )  ate '/?-& 
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PROPERIY ADDRESS: 2517 SUCCER CREEK --A- HOMEDALE - -  ID#: 14196514 
24. SINGULAR AND PLURAL terms each tnclude the other, when approprtate 
25. BUSINESS DAYS & HOURS A bustness day ts here~n defined as Monday through Frtday, 8 00 A M to 5 00 P M tn the local ttme zone 
where the subject real property I$ physically located A bustness day shall not include any Saturday or Sunday, nor shall a business day Include 
any regal holtday rewgntzed by the slate of ldaho as found in ldaho Code 5 73-108 The time tn whtch any act requtred under thts agreement 1s to 
be performed shall be computed by excluding the date of executron and tncluding the last day The first day shall be the day after the date of 
executton If the last day 15 a legal holiday, then the tlme for performance shall be the next subsequent bus~ness day 
26. S E V E W B I L I T Y  In the case that any one or more of the provistons conta~ned In this Agreement, or any appltcatlon thereof, shall be ~nvaltd, 
Illegal or unenforceable In any respect, the valtdlty, legality or enforceahiltty of the remaining provisions shall not tn any way be affected or Impaired 
thereby 
27. ATTORNEY'S FEES: If etther party tntttates or defends any arbttratton or legal actton or proceedtngs whtch are tn any way connected wlth this 
Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover from the non prevailrng party reasonable costs and attorney's fees. includtng such costs and 
fees on appeal 
28. DEFAULT: If BUYER defaults m the performance of thts Agreement, SELLER has the optton of ( 1 )  accepting the Earnest Money as ltquldated 
damages or  (2) pursulng any other lawful right andlor remedy to whtch SELLER may be entitled If SELLER elects to proceed under (1) .  SELLER shall 
make demand upon the holder of the Earnest Money, upon whtch demand sald holder shall pay from the Earnest Money the costs incurred by 
SELLERS Broker on behalf of SELLER and BUYER related to the transactlon. ~ncluding, wlthoul Itmltation, the costs of title Insurance, escrow fees, 
appratsal, credtt report fees, inspection fees and attorney's fees, and said holder shdll pay any balance of the Earnest Money, one-half to SELLER and 
one-half to SELLER'S Broker, provtded that the amount to be pald to SELLER'S Broker shall not exceed the Broker's agreed to commtsslon SELLER 
and BUYER spec~fically acknowledge and agree that if SELLER elects to accept the Earnest Money as ltquldated damages, such shall be SELLER'S 
sole and exclustve remedy, and such shall not be considered a penalty or forfeiture If SELLER elects to proceed under (Z), the holder of the Earnest 
Money shall be entttled to pay the costs tncurred by SELLER'S Broker on behalf of SELLER and BUYER related to the transactton. tncludlng, wlthout 
Itmttatton, the costs of brokerage fee, tttle Insurance, escrow fees, appratsal, credtt report fees, inspection fees and attorney's fees, with any balance of 
the Earnest Money to be held pendlng resolutton of the matter 
If SELLER defaults, having approved satd sale and falls to consummate the same as heretn agreed. BUYER'S Eamest Money depostt shall 
be returned to htmlher and SELLER shall pay for the costs of tctle Insurance, escrow fees, appratsals, credlt report fees, Inspectton fees, brokerage fees 
and attorney's fees, tf any Thts shall not be considered as a walver by BUYER of any other lawful rlght or remedy to whtch BUYER may be entitled 
29. EARNEST MONEY DlSPUTE I INTERPLEADER: Notwithstanding any termination of this contract, BUYER and SELLER agree that in the event 
of any controversy regarding the Earnest Money and things of value held by Broker or closing agency, unless mutual written instructions are received by 
the holder of the Earnest Money and things of value. Broker or closing agency shall not be required to take any action but may await any proceeding, or 
at Broker's or ciosing agency's option and sole discretion. may interplead all parties and deposit any monies or things of value into a court of competent 
jurisdiction and shall recover court costs and reasonable attorney's fees. 
30. COUNTERPARTS: This Agreement may be executed in counterparts. Executing an agreement in counterparts shall mean the signature of 
two identical copies of the same agreement. Each identical copy of an agreement signed in counterparts is deemed to be an original, and all 
identical copies shall together constitute one and the same instrument. 
31. REPRESENTATION CONFIRMATION: Check one (1) box in Section 1 and one (1) box in section 2 below to confirm that in this transaction, the 
brokerage(s) involved had the following relationship(s) with the BUYER(S) and SELLER(S) 
Section 1: 
A. The brokerage working with the BUYER(S) is acting as an AGENT for the BUYER@). 
@ 0. The brokerage working with the BUYER(S) is acting as a LIMITED DUAL AGENT for the BUYER(S), without an ASSIGNED AGENT. 
0 C. The brokerage working with the BUYER(S) is acting as a LIMITED DUAL AGENT for the BUYER(S) and has an ASSIGNED AGENT 
acting solely on  behalf of the BUYER(S). 
0 D. The brokerage working with the BUYER(S) is acting as a NONAGENT for the BUYER(S). 
Section 2 
0 A The brokerage working with the SELLER(S) is acting as an AGENT for the SELLER($). 
@ B. The brokerage working with the SELLER(S) is acting as a LIMITED DUAL AGENT for the SELLER(S), without an ASSIGNED AGENT. 
C. The brokerage working with the SELLER(S) i s  acting as a LIMITED DUAL AGENT for the SELLER(S) and has an ASSIGNED AGENT 
acting solely on  behalf of the SELLER(S). 
D. The brokerage working with the SELLER(S) is acting as a NONAGENT for the SELLER(S). 
Each party signing this document cwiirms hat he has received, read and understood the Agency Disclosure Brochure adopted or approved by the ldaho real estate commission and 
has consented to the relationship confirmed above. In addition, each party confirms that the brokerage's agency office policy was made available for inspection and review. EACH 
PARTY UNDERSTANDS THAT HE IS A "CUSTOMER'AND IS NOT REPRESENTED BY A BROKERAGE UNLESS THERE IS A SIGNED WRITTEN AGREEMENT FOR AGENCY 
REPRESENTATION. 
BUYER'S Initials ( )( ) Date SELLER'S Initials ( )( )  ate /fl ' .yr2 - -L& 
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PROPERTY ADDRESS: 
-- 
2517 SUCCER CREEK 
-- WOMEDALE ID#. - 741% 
32. ENTIRE AGREEMENT: This Agreement contains the enttre Agreement of the part~es respect~ng the matters herem sef forth and supersedes all 
prtor Agreements between the parttes respecttng such matters No warrantres, nctudtng, without Itmitatton, any warranty of habltabtltty, agreements or 
representations not expressly set forth heretn shall be b~ndtng upon e~ther party 
33. TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE IN THIS AGREEMENT. 
34. AUTHORITY OF SIGNATORY: If BUYER or SELLER 1s a corporatton, partnership, trust, estate, or other entlty, the person execut~ng thts 
agreement on ~ts  behalf warrants hls or her authortty to do so and to bind BUYER or SELLER 
35. ACCEPTANCE BUYER'S offer IS made subject to the acceptance of SELLER on or before (Date)- 1017 2106 at (Local Tlme 
In whtch property IS located) 5-00 C]A M @ P M If SELLER does not accept this Agreement w~thin the tlme specified, the enttre Earnest 
Money shall be refunded to BUYER on demand 
36. BUYER'S SIGNATURES: 
0 SEE ATTACHED BUYER'S ADDENDUMtS): (Speclfy number of BUYER addendum(s) attached ) 
BUYER Signature 
- -- BUYER (Print Name} HANK OGD_EN 
Date 
- 
Tlme C~AMBPM Phone It- Cell # 
Address Ckty State ZIP 
E-Mall Address Fax It 
BUYER Signature BUYER (Print Name) MICHELLE HURST 
Date Time OA.M. OP M. Phone # Cell # 
Address City State Zip 
E-Mail Address Fax # 
37. SELLER'S SIGNATURES: 
On this date, lNVe hereby approve and accept the transaction set forth in the above Agreement and agree to carry out all the terms thereof on 
the part of the SELLER 
0 SIGNATURE(S) SUBJECT TO ATTACHED COUNTER OFFER 
0 SIGNATURE(S) SUBJECT TO ATTACHU) ADDENDUM(S) # 
SELLER (Print Name) li!Q/v;iv"i 5 f- f-jJ ;E(
Phone # Cell# 
Address City State Zip 
E-Mail Address Fax # 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
SELLER (Print Name) 
Phone # Cell # 
Address City State Zip 
E-Mail Address Fax # 
CONTRACTOR REGISTRATION # (if applicable) 
This fm is pnnled and distributed by the ldaho Association of REALTORS@, tnc. This form has been designed for and 1s prov~ded only lor use by real estate professionals who are members of the 
National Assodation of REALTORS. USE BY ANY OTHER PERSON IS PROHIBITED. 
Copyright ldaho Association of RWTORS, tnc. All rights resewed 
RE-21 REStMNTtAL PURCHASE AND SALE AGREEMENT PAGE 6 of 6 W. 2006 EDlTlQN 
Printed Using Professional Computer Forms 9. w i n e  Forms Sortware 08/06 
1 t l  
EXHIBIT B 
[<#3r2 
RE-11 ADDENDUM u Y a 2 0 0 6  FDITION ' @sg10F .( 
RE-1 1 ADDENDUM # 3 (1,2,3, etc.) e 
'%zzzz? 
THIS ISA LEGALLY BINDING CONTRACT REX3 THE ENTIRE DOCUMENT INCLUDING ANY ATTACHMENTS IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS 
CONSULT YOUR AmORNEY AND/OR ACCOUNTANT BEFORE SIGNING 
This is an AttDENDUM to the Purchase and Sale Agreement. 
("Addendum" means that the infmal~on betcwv is added matezial for the qreement {such as llsts or d e . 5 ~ ~ 1  
to change correct or reuse the qrmmt {such as madtfrcahon, addit~on or deletion of a tm]) 
PURCHASE AND SALE AGREEMENT DATED: l@-nz-o6 - 10 #. 1slssslr 
--- 
ADDRES: 2517 Succer Creek RD 
- -  ---- --- - - 
m = a m  53mRFr 
--- --- - - --A- 
SEUR(S): 5 . C .  GRIFFITH AND BONNIE M .  PORTER 
- - ---- - 
The undersrgned parties hemy agree as follows; 
I .  To ex tend  t h e  c l o s ~ n g  Co on o r  be fo re  12-08-06 
-- -- 
32 To the extent the terms of this ADDENDUM modify or conflict with any pmvisions of the Purchase and Sale Agreement induding all prior 
33 Addendums of Counter Offers, these terms shall control. All other terms of the Purchase and Safe Agreement including all prior 
34 Addendums or Counter Offers not modified by this ADDENDUM shall remain the same. Upon its execution by both parties, this 
35 agreement is made an integral part of the aforementioned Agreement 
38 
37 BUYER: Date: 
- 
38 BUYER: Date: 
$9 SELLER: mte: /2 - /-- 0 6 
'0  SELLER m e :  / d,-OsC-i>& 
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tly: Pet" t?k?&'tbu 
< ) r  1 
EXHIBIT C 
5680 East Frankl~n Road, Su~ce 150 ! Nampa, Idaho 
83687 / (208) 465 6655 
2006 130~17 WARRANTY DEE11 
I-ol Value Recelved Ron~ve M Poner, an tinmanled woman and Dennis C Grlffith, an i i n ~ n a ~ r ~ e d  man 
i x ~ e ~ n a f r e ~  fentd to 3s G~anror ,  does he~eby grant balgam, sell, uaimni and convey unto 
) l e n ~ \  Ogden, an unmarr~ed man and M~chel le  R Hurst an ilnmail~ed woman 
her c ~ n a h e ~  refelled 10 as Gran~ee whose C I I I T P ~ I  addipss 
5 
- ------ - 
the follow~ng d e s c ~ ~ b e d  plemlses, to-w~t 
SEE EXHIBIT ii ATTACHED HERETO A N D  MADE A PART HEREOF 
To HAVE A N D  TO HOLD the satd piemises, ~ i ~ t h  the11 appu~xenances unto the sard Grantee, h ~ s  he~r s  
and assigns foreve! And rhe satd Glantor does hereby covenant to and wlth the sald G~antee ,  that Grantor 
15 rlie ownel In fee snnple of s a ~ d  plemlses, that s a ~ d  ptennses ale free from ail encumbrances except cutrent 
year5 raves lebles, and assessments, and except U S Patefit resetvattons, resti Ictions, easements of record 
and easements v ~ s ~ b l e  upon the premises, and that Granror w ~ l l  watianr and defend the same from all cla1n1s 
whatsoever 
Dated: November 30, 2006 
Stare of IDAI-I0 
County of CANY ON 
SS. 
i. iL LC 
On this day of & 2006, before me, the unqg;ugp$; a N o l a y  Public, in and for raid State, personally 
appeared Dennis C. Griffith %Fm$"jor identified ro me on the basis of satisfactory 
dence, to be  the person(s) whose name is/are &\& t e t t l t  & $ & i n  instrument and acknowledged to me that 
a s h e l t h e y  execured the same, 
~ ~ / , o ~ A k ,  f *\ 
: a : -*- : : 
HAND AND OFFICIAL (SEAL) 
Restd~ng at: C ; ~ l m b i o n  Expiras: 3/10/09 Commission Expires: 
STATE O F  IDAHO COUNTY O F  CANYON 
On this 4th day of December in the year o f2006 ,  before me, the t~ndersipned, a Notary Pt~blic in and for 
said State, pel-sonally appeared Bonnie M.  Porter known or identified to !vie to be the person(s) whose 
namefs) islare subscribed to the within instrument. and acknowledged to me that helshelthey executed the 
I 
My commission expires: 3/10/09 
A parcel of land bettig tho Northwest Quar ter  of the Southwest Quar te t ,  See t~on  17, 
Townshtp 3 North, Range 5 West, B.kl , Owyhee County, Idalto, and more partrcularly 
described as follows. 
BEGINNING A r A 5/8" iron pln rnarlc~ng the  No1 thwest cot iler of the Northwest Quar t e r  of  
the Southwest Quar ter ,  Sec t~on  17, T3N, R5W, B M , Owyhee C o t ~ ~ ~ t y ,  Idalto, satd Iron p111 
being the R E A L  POINT OF BFGlNNINC and more par t~cular ly  dese r~bed  as follows. 
thence 
South 89"?8'35" t. s5t l,336 39 leet along the Nor the~ ly  boundary of the 5a1d No1 thwest 
Quar ter  of the South%rest Quar ter ,  Scc t~on  17, to a brsss cap rnarli~ng the Northeast corner 
of the Northwest Quar ter  of the Sou th~ le s t  Quar ter ,  s a d  S e c f ~ o n  17, thence l eav~ng  s a ~ d  
Northerly b o u n d a ~  v 
Sou t l~  0°58'JO" West 1,30' 49 feet along the Essteily boundary to .r 5/8" !roll p111 
rna rk~ng  the Southeast cor11e1 of the Northwest Qua1 ter oftlte Southwest Quar ter ,  s a ~ d  
Seetrort 17, thence leavrllg the  sdrd Eastrrib boundar? of s a ~ d  Northivest Quar ter  of the 
Southwest Quartel 
North 89"JS'OI" West 1,331 29 feet along IheSoutherlv boundarv of the s a ~ d  Northwest 
Q~ts t t er  of the Soutlt\vest Q u . t ~ t r r ,  to n 5/S" !lo11 p ~ ~ t  mark~rtg  the Soutltwest corner  of the 
bald Northwest Quar t e r  of the Southwest Qu'krter, satd Sectlon 17, thence leavlng satd 
Southerly boundar) 
North 0'45'07'' E ~ S I  1,314.98 feet to the POINT O F  BEGINNING 
RON R. SHEPHEm 
HAMILTON, MlCHAELSON & HILTY, LLP 
Attorneys at Law 
1303 12th Avenue Road 
PO Box 65 
Nampa, ID 53653-0065 
(208) 367-4479 Telephone 
(208) 467-3058 Facsimile 
ISB Yo. 6593 
FILED 
-- A . M . ~ P M .  
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF O W H E E  
1 
HENRY OGDEN, an unmarried man; and, ) Case No. CV06-5807M 
MICHELLE HIRST, an unmarried woman, 1 
1 
Plaintiffs, ) 
1 
VS. 1 NOTICE OF APPEARANCE 
) Fee Category: I. 1 .a 
DENNIS C. GIUFFITH, an unmarried man; and ) Fee: $58.00 
BONNIE M. PORTER, an unmarried woman, 1 
) 
Defendants. 1 
TO: THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT, and to KEVIN E. DINIUS, attorney 
of record for the Plaintiffs, HENRY OGDEN and MICHELLE HURST: 
YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that RON R. SHEPHERD, of the firm of 
HAMILTON, MICHAELSON & HILTY, LLP, has been retained by, and hereby appears for 
DENNIS C. GRIFFITH and BONNE M. PORTER, Defendants above named in the above 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE - Page 1 
entitled action, and that all future conespondence and pleadings are to be directed to the 
undersiped at the address s t forth above. 4 
DATED this 7) day of December, 2006. 
HAMETON, MIGHA&SON & HILTY, LLP 
s I \ 
RON R. SHEPHERD 
Attorneys for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on the day of December, 2006, I caused a true copy of the 
foregoing Notice of Appearance to be served by the method indicated below, and addressed to 
the following: 
KEVIN E. DB\3IUS ( ) U.S. Postage, Prepaid 
White Peterson, P.A. ( ) Hand Delivered 
5700 E. Franklin Road, Ste. 200 p-$Facsimile 
Nampa, Idaho 83687 ( > Other 
Legal Assistant 
NOTICE OF APPF A R  A k T r F ;  - P , , ~  3 
FILED 
- A.M.W!fl .  
ROK R. SHEPHERD 
HAMILTON, MICWAE1,SON & WILTY, LI,P 
Attorneys at Law 
1 303 12th Avenue Road 
PO Box 65 
Nampa, ID 83653-0065 
(208) 467-4479 Telephone 
(208) 467-3058 Facsimile 
IS13 No. 6593 
JAN Q 4 2007 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF O W H E E  
1 
HENRY OGDEN, an unmarried man; and, 1 Case No. CV06- 5 807M 
MICHELLE WURST, an unmarried woman, 1 
) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
1 
VS. ) ANSWER AND DEMAND 
) FOR JURY TRIAL 
DENNIS G. GRIFFITH, an unmarried man; and ) 
BONNIE M. PORTER, an unmarried woman, 1 
1 
Defendants. 1 
The above named Defendants, DENNIS C. GRIFFITH and BONNIE M. PORTER, 
through their undersigned counsel of record, hereby submit the following Answer to the 
Complaint previously filed and served in this action. The Defendants admit, deny, and allege as 
follows: 
3' u 
ANSWER AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAI, - P a w  1 
FIRST DEFENSE 
I. 
The Defendants deny each and every allegation of the Complaint that is not specifically 
admitted herein. 
II. 
The Defendants admit the allegations contained in paragraphs 2-8,12,13,14 and 42 
(inclusive where separated by " - "1. 
111. 
The Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraphs 15, 18-2 1, 23-29, 3 1-34, 36- 
39 and 42-44 (inclusive where separated by" - "). 
IV. 
Defendant lack sufficient knowledge to admit or deny the allegations contained in 
paragraphs 1 and 9, and on that basis deny the same. 
v. 
Answering paragraph 10, Defendants recognize their signature on the Addendum #3 and 
acknowledge they could have affixed their signature to such Addendum. Defendants were 
provided several documents while at Pioneer Title to which they fixed their signature but do not 
have an independent recollection of signing the Addendum. Defendants deny the validity and 
enforceability of Addendum #3 whether Defendants signed it or not. 
ANSWER AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - Page 2 2 ;. 
VI. 
Ar~swering paragraph 16, Defendants lack sufficient knowledge to admit or deny whether 
Plaintiffs remain ready, willing and able to perfom under the Contract, and on that basis deny 
the same. Defendants deny that a Contract exists between the parties. Defendants admit that 
Defendants refuse to sell the subject property to Plaintiffs. 
VII. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs' Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
VIII. 
THIRD DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs failed to perform all of their conditions and covenants of the Contract prior to 
November 30,2006 as required under the Contract. As such, the Contract is no longer valid, 
and Defendants are excused from performing under the Contract. 
IX. 
FOURTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs' causes of action are barred under the equitable doctrines of laches, waiver and 
estoppel. 
X. 
FIFTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs' causes of action andlor prayers for relief are barred under the doctrine of 
unclean hands andor in pari delicto. 
XI. 
SIXTH DEFENSE 
Addendurn if3 was procured through fraud in that Plaintiffs and or Plaintiffs' agents 
falsely represented to Defendants that Plaintiffs had fillfilled all conditioned precedent to 
Defendants performartce of the Contract. Based upon such false information Defendants 
proceeded to sign closing documents in order to avoid being in breach of the Contract. 
Addendum #3 to the Contract was presented to Defendants without Defendants being specifically 
advised of the Addendum and while Defendants were provided multiple other documents to sign 
at closing. Plaintiffs and/or Plaintiffs' agents knew prior to November 30'" that Defendants did 
not want to extend the closing date and yet Plaintiffs' andlor Plaintiffs' agents conspired to 
fraudulently procure a signed extension from Defendants after the original Contract had already 
expired and was no longer valid. 
XI1 . 
SEVENTH DEFENSE 
Defendants signed Addendum #3 under duress. Defendants did not want to extend the 
Contract, but did so due to the wrongful act or conduct of Plaintiffs or Plaintiffs' agents. 
Plaintiffs or Plaintiffs' agents advised Defendants that Defendants were in breach of the Contract 
as of December 1, 2006, because Plaintiffs had performed all conditions precedent to Defendant 
performance on or before the original closing date of November 30, 2006. This was not true. In 
light of Plaintiffs' or Plaintiffs' agents' misrepresentations and other misconduct, Defendants felt 
they had no means of relief other than to follow through with the sale of the property. 
XI11. 
EIGHTH DEFENSE 
Defendants\ignatures on Addendum #3 were the product of undue influence from 
Plaintiffs' and/or Plaintiffs' agents, Defendants were compelled to sign the addendum by deceit 
of Plaintiffs and/or Plaintiffs' agents. But for the deceit of Plaintiffs andior Plaintiffs' agents, 
Defendants would not have signed Addendum #3. 
XIV. 
NINTH DEFENSE 
Addendum #3 is invalid and unenforceable for failure of consideration. 
XV. 
TENTH DEFENSE 
Defendants strongly assert they did not intend to sign Addendum #3 or otherwise extend 
the underlying Contract beyond November 30, 2--6. Nevertheless, even if Defendants' 
signatures on Addendum #3 are found to be valid, such signatures constitute a mere offer to 
extend the Contract, which offer was not accepted by Plaintiffs until, if at all, aRer Defendants 
revoked such offer. 
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS 
Defendants have been required to retain the law firm of Hamilton, Michaelson, and Hilty, 
LLP, to defend this action. Defendants are entitled to an award of costs and attorney fees 
pursuant to the paragraph 27 of the Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement between the parties 
as well as I.R.C.P. 54(d) and 54(e), Idaho Code $9 10-1210, 12-101, 12-120, 12-121, 12-123, and 
any other contractual provision, statute, rule or regulatiorl providing for an award of attorney fees 
and/or costs in this action. 
P M Y E R  FOR RELIEF 
W H E m F O m ,  Defendants pray judgment against the Plaintiffs as follows: 
1 .  For the Plaintiffs' Complaint to be dismissed and for Plaintiffs to take nothing 
thereunder; 
2. For Defendants to be awarded their reasonable costs and attorney fees incurred 
herein; and 
3.  For such other and further relief as the Court deems reasonable. 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Defendants hereby respectfully request, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 38, a jury trial on all issues 
triable of right by jury. 
AMENDMENTS/COUNTERCLAIMS/THIm PARTY COMPLAINT 
Defendants hereby expressly reserve their right to amend this Answer and lor to file a 
counterclaim or Third Party Complaint. 
DATED this day aii)ecember. 2006. 
HAMILTON, MICHAELSON & HILTY, LLP 
RON R. SHEPHEFUI- 
Attorneys for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
1 HEREBY CERTIFY that on the a@ day of December, 2006, 1 caused a true copy 
of the foregoing Answer and Demand for Jury Trial to be served by the method indicated below, 
and addressed to the following: 
Kevin Dinius ( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Wl~ite Peterson, P.A. ( ) Hand Delivered 
5700 East Franklin Road, Suite 200 
Nampa, Idaho 83687-7901 
n'3 THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DfSTRXCT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWWEE 
j 
HENRY OGDEN, an m a r r i e d  man; and, ) 
MICHELLE HURST, an unmarried 1 Case No. CV 2006-05807*M 
woman, 1 
Plaintiffs, 
1 
1 
1 MEMORANDUM DECISlON 
-vs- 1 AND ORDER ON CROSS- 
) MORONS FOR S U N M m Y  
DENNIS C. GRIFFITH, an unmarried 1 SUDGMENT 
man; and, B O W E  M. PORTER, 
an unmari.ied woman, 
) 
1 
1 
Defendants. ) 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing on cross-motions for 
summary judgment on July 13,2007. Plaintiffs appeared through their counsel of record, 
Kevin D. Dinius and Shelli D. Stewart. Defendants appeared in person and through their 
attorney of record, Ron R. Shepherd. 
The Court having heard and carefully considered the arguments of counsel, the 
affidavits and briefs filed in support of and in opposition to the cross-motions for 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON CROSS-MORONS FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 1 
4 2 
summary judgment together with the file md record in this case, and good cause 
appearing, the Court finds and concludes as follows. 
This s t i o n  arises fiom a Real Estate Pwchase and Sale Agreement wherein the 
Plaintiffs agreed to purchase and the Dekndmts agreed to sell a parcel of real property 
situated in Owyhee County, Idaho, for the sum of $500,000. Plaintiffs assert causes of 
action for breach of contract, injunction and specific performance. Defendants have 
answered denying Plaintiffs' claims and asserting various affirmative defenses. Both 
parties seek the award of attorney fees together with their costs. 
STANDAmS FOR SUMMARY WDGMENT 
Summary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings, depositions, admissions, 
and afidavits on file show that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. I.R.C.P. 56(c); City of Idaho 
Falls v. Home lndern. Co , 126 Idaho 604, 606 f 1995). At all times, the burden of 
proving the absence of a genuine issue of material fact rests upon the moving party. G di 
M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 1 19 Idaho 5 14,517 (1991). 
In considera~on of the motion, the court must liberally construe the facts and 
inferences contained in the existing record in favor of the party opposing the motion. 
Born v. Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539, 541 (1 991).' To withstand a motion for summary 
judgment, the non-moving party's case must be anchored in something more solid than 
' Both parties have requested a jury trial in this case. Thus, the limited exception to the 
application of this rule where the matter is submitted on cross-motions for summary judgment 
predicated upon common evidentiary facts and where the matter is to be tried to the court without 
a jury does not apply. See Riverside Development Co. v. Richie, 103 Idaho 5 15, 5 19 ( 1  982). 
mMORAI\TP)UM DECISION ANID ORDER ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR 
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speculation. EAtf~rds  v Conchemco Inc , 1 11 Idaho 55 1, 853 (Ct, App. 1986). A mere 
seixxtilla of evidence 1s not enough to create a genuine issue. Id. The party opposing the 
motion for summary judgment may not merely rest on the allegations contained in the 
pleadtngs, rather, evidence by way of affidavit or deposition must be produced to 
contradict the sssertions of the moving party. Ambruse v. Buhl Sch Disf. #412, 126 
Idaho 58 I ,  854 (Ct. App. 1995). 
The existence of disputed facts will not defeat summary judgment when a party 
fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to his 
case, and on which he will bear the burden of proof at trial. Garzee v. Barkley, 12 1 Idaho 
771, 774 (Ct, App. f 992). Facts in dispute cease to be "material" facts when the party 
having the burden of proof at trial fails to establish a prima facie case. In such cases, 
there can be "no genuine issues o f  material fact," because a complete failure of proof 
concerning an essential element of the non-moving party's case necessarily renders all 
other facts immaterial. Id. at 774 citing Celotex Corp. v. Cafretr, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 
(1986). This rule facilitates the dismissal of factually unsupported claims prior to trial. 
Id. at 774. Summary judgment dismissing a claim is appropriate when the party having 
the burden of proof fails to submit evidence to establish an essential element of the claim. 
See Nelson v. City of Rupert, 128 Idaho 199,202 (1996). 
FTNDXX\IGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Plaintiffs' Motion for S u m w  Judgment 
The Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement (hereailer "the agreement") 
provided that the transaction was to close on or before November 30, 2006, and further 
provided that time was of the essence. Plaintiffs' predicate their motion for summary 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR 
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judgment upon Addendum No. 3 to the ngreetllent extending the closing date until 
December 8, 2006, and assert that they were ready, willing and able to perfom on or 
before December 8, 2006. Addendum No. 3 contains a typewitten date of November 
27,2006 and was signed by Defendant Bonnie Poner on December 4,2006. Addendm 
No. 3 bears what is purportedly the signature of Defendant Dennis Griffith with a date of 
December 1, 2006. Addendum No. 3 was not signed by either Plaint~ff. Botlt 
Defendants appeared at the title company on the dates opposite their names on 
Addendm No. 3 and signed the closing papers including a warranty deed conveying the 
property to the Plaintiffs Thereafter, on December 6,  2006, and before Plaintiffs 
executed the closing documents, Defendants notified the title company that the sale 
would not take place and requested that the warranty deed be returned to them. The title 
company complied and this action followed. 
At his deposition, which is before the Court by afiidavit, Mr. Griffirh denied that 
the signature on Addendum No. 3 was his signature. The closing agent testified at her 
deposition that Mr. Griffith did sign Addendum No. 3 on the date indicated. As noted 
above, the Court is required to liberally construe the facts and iderences contained in the 
record in favor of the party opposing summary judgment. The Court's function on 
summary judgment is thus different fiom those cases where the Court is the fact finder 
and determines the weight and credibility of the witnesses and the inferences to be drawn 
there from. Applying the standards for summary judgment to the record before the Court 
on Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, the Court finds and concludes that there is a 
genuine issue of material fact as to the signature of Mr. Griffith, which precludes 
summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR 
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Defendants assert that they are entitled to summary judgment on a number of 
theories, including: breach of contract by the Plaintifi by failing to close on or before 
November 30, 2006 as provided in the ageement; lack of consideration; md, lack of 
mutuality of obligation for the reason that Addendum No. 3 was not signed by the 
Plaintifls. 
Idaho's Statute of Frauds provides that an agreement for the sale of real property 
is invalid, absent a note or memorandum signed by the party to be charged. I.C. 9- 
505(4); Wolske Bros, Inc. v. Hudspeth Sawmill Co, 116 Idaho 714, 715 (Ct. App. 1989). 
For land sale contracts, the minimum requirements are typically the parties involved, the 
subject matter thereof, the price or consideration, a description of the property and all the 
essential terms of the agreement. Lawrence v. Jones, 124 Xdaho 748, 750-5 1 (Ct. App. 
1993). 
A written contract for the sale of real estate may be modified by a subsequent 
oral agreement. Prairie Development Co. v Leiberg, 15 Idaho 379, 391 (1 908). To 
establish a subsequent oral agreement modifiing a written contract for the sdc: of real 
estate, the evidence must be clear and satisfactory. Id. An oral extension of time to 
perform a written purchase agreement does not violate the statute of frauds, if no other 
material terms change, and if the extension agreement is made before the underlying 
written contract expires. Kelly v. Hodges, 1 1 9 Idaho 872, 875 (Ct. App. 1991). 
Consideration includes action by the promisee which is bargained for and given in 
exchange for the promise Lettunich v. Key Bank Nut. Ass In., 14 1 Idaho 362,368 (2005). 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR 
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Constderation may also consist of a detriment to the promisee or a benefit to the 
promissor. Id 
Waiver is the intentional xelinquishent of a k n o w  right. It is a voluntary act 
and implies election by a party to dispense with something of value or to forego some 
right or advantage which he might at his opt~on have demanded or insisted upon. Crouch 
v. Bischofi 78 Idaho 364, 368 (1.956). The existence of waiver ordinarily is a question of 
fact. Riverside Development, 103 Idaho at 518. An intent to waive a right may be 
estabiished by conduct. Id. at 520. 
Applying that standard for summary judgment to the record before the Court, as 
discussed above, the Court further finds and concludes that there are genuine issues of 
material fact, which preclude smmary judgment in favor of the Defendants. 
Therefore, 
ORDER 
XT IS HEREBY ORDEREiD, and this does ORDER, that Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Summary Judgment be, and is hereby DENIED. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDEWID, and this does ORDER, that Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment be, and is hereby DENIED. 
DATED: AUG 10 2007 
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CERTIMCATE OF SERVICE 
I WEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Menorandm 
Decision and Order on Cross-Motions for Swrnmary Judgment were mailed to the 
fof lowing persons this day of August 2007. 
Kevin E. Dinius 
ShelIi B. Stewart 
WHITE PEERSON, P.A. 
5700 E. Franklin Rd., Suite 200 
Nampa, ID 83687-790 1 
Ron R. Shepherd 
HAMILTON, MCHAELSON & WILTY, LLP 
P 0. Box 65 
Nampa, ID 83653-0065 
Charlotte Sherbm, 
Clerk of the District Court 
Deputy Clerk 
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CHAQLOm-E WERBURN, CLERK 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTNCT C O m T  OF TEE TlXRR J U D I C N  DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHU, IN ANXI FOR THE GOWTY OF OWYEEE 
HENRY OGDEN, an mar r ied  
Man and MICELLE WRST, 
An w m e d  woman, 
DENNIS 6. GRIFFITH, an 
Unmarried man and BONNUE M. 
PORTER, an unmarried woman, 
Defendants. 
) 
1 
) 
1 CASE NO. CV 06-005807M 
1 
) ORDER WFER[UNG CASE 
1 TO fclEDlATION 
) 
1 
1 
) 
1 
1 
1. This civil case is referred to mediation pursuant to Z.R.C.P. 16(k). 
2. The parties shall consult with each other and shall within thirty (30) days of the 
date of this Order select a person to act as mediator and report their selection to the court. 
3. The initial mediation session shall take place as soon as possible or within thrrty 
(30) days of the selection or appointment of the mediator. Plainti@ s counsel shall co-ordinate 
h c  ~~1ecuoz-i of the mcdiator and the ~ l c h c d u l i ~ ~  o f  mediatian. 
4. ed parties or their agents with MI au&ority to sede, together with the 
aaomeys responsible for handling the lrial in this case are ordered to be present for the entire 
mediation conference pursuant to 1.K.C.P. 16(k)( 10) unIess oxherwise ;t:excust;d by ~utdiator or 
the Court upon a showing of good cause. 
5.  W i h  seven (7) days following the last mediation session, rhe mediator or the 
parties shall advise the court, with a copy to the parties, onty as to whether the case has, in 
whole or in part, settled. If the case is settled by mediation, within twenty-eight (28) days of a 
mediated final settlement, plaintiff shall dismiss the underlying action with or \jr,ithout prejurlice 
as the parties agree. 
6 .  The mediator selected or appointed shall be compensated at his or her regular 
fees and expenses, which shall be clearly set forth in the infomation and materials provided to 
the parties. Unless other arrangements are made among the parties or ordered by the court, the 
interested parties shall be responsible for a prorate share of the mediator's fees and expenses. If a 
mcdiator is not paid, the court, upon motion of  the mediator may order payment. 
/ 
Thomas J. Ryan 
District Judge 
ORDER 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 
> ss 
COmTY OF C M O N  1 
I E E B Y  CERTEY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was 
fonvafded to the followiag: 
Ron R. Shepherd 
M L T O N ,  MG 
Attorneys at 1 ,aw 
1 303 12' Avenue R o d  
P. 0. Box 65 
Nampa, 1D 83653-0065 
Kevin E. Dinius 
WTTE PETERSON, P.A. 
5700 E. Franklin Road, Ste 200 
Nmpa, ID 83687 
Either by depositing the same in the U.S. mail, first class postage prepaicl, or by personal 
service. 
DATED this 1 I r L  day of January, 2008. 
CHARU3l-E SHERBURM 
-t 
Clerk of the District Couft 
S(f21l 'a  (,&')l%&b 
by Deputy Clerk of the Court 
ORDER 
E-4 THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, n\r AND FOR THE COWTY OF O W H E E  
1 
HENRY OCDEN, an w m i e d  man: and ) Case No. CV 2006-5807*M 
MICHELLE HURST, an unmarried woman, ) 
Plaintiffs, 
1 
1 MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
) ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION 
-vs- 1 FOR SUMMARY JWGMENT 
1 
DENNIS C. GRXFFXTH, an unmarried man; ) 
and BONNIE M. PORTER, an unmarried ) 
woman, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
The above-entitred matter came on regularly for hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion for 
S m r n q  Judgment on February 8, 2008. Plaintiffs appeared through. their counsel of record, 
Kevin Dinius. Defendants appeared though their counsel of record, Ron Shepherd. 
The Court having heard and carehlly considered the arguments of counsel, the affidavits 
and briefs fijed in support of and in opposition to the notion together with the file and record in 
this case, and good cause appearing, the Court finds and concludes as follows 
MEMOMNDUM DECISXON AND ORDER 
ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On January 7, 2008, Plaintiffs filed their second Motion for Summaw Judgment together 
with a supporting aEdavit and a supporting memorandum agGnst the defindants for all claims 
in the Complaint coruisting of breach of contract anrl b r e d  of the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing and seeking m injunction, specific performance, and declaratory judgment. 
On January 28, 2008. Defendants filed their Memormdum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Second 
Motion for Sumary  Judgment. Plaintiffs filed their Reply Memorandum on February 1, 2008. 
Following the hearing on February 8,2008, both parties filed Supplement& Memorandms. 
This action arises &om a Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreerner~t, hereinafter the 
"Contract", wherein the Plainti% agreed to purchase and the Defendants agreed to sell a parcel 
of reai property situated in Owyhee County, Idaho, for the sum of $500,000. On summary 
judgment, Plaintiffs assert that closing on the property was extended fi+on November 30, 2006 
until December 8, 2006 and that they were prepared to Eund the loan on December 7, 2006. 
Defendants contend that closing was not extended to December 8, 2006 and therefore, they 
pulled the wmmty deed from the title company on December 6, 2006 for Plaintiffs' failure to 
time1 y close on November 30,2006. 
RELEVANT FACTS SET FORTH IN 
TEE PLEAJDINGS & AF'FIDAVXTS 
The basic facts in this case are not in dispute. On October 13, 2006, the parties entered 
into the Contract which contained the following provisions in part: 
20. CLOSING: On or before the closing date, BUYER and SELLER shall 
deposit with the closing agency all h d s  and instruments necessary to complete 
this transaction. Closing means the date on which all documents are either 
recorded or accepted by an escrow agent and the sale proceeds are available 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 2 
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to SELLER, The closing shall be no later that NOVEMBER 30,2006. 
*** 
33. TIME XS OF THE ESSENCE IN THIS AGEUEEMENT. 
Closing did not occur on November 30, 2006. Thereseer on December 1, 2006, Defendant 
Griffith signed the closing doctiments, including Addendm No. 3 which provides in relevmt 
pact: 
The undersigned parties hereby agree as follows- 
I .  To extend the closing to on or before 12-08-06. 
To the extent the terms of this ADDENDUM modify or conflict with any 
provisions of the Purcfrase and Sale Agreement including all prior Addendurns or 
Counter Offers, these terns shall control. All other terms of the Purchase and 
Sale Agreement including all prior Addendwns or Counter Offers not modified by 
this ADDEmUM shall remain the same. Upon its execution by both parties, this 
agreement is made an integral part of the aforementioned Agreement. 
Previously, there was a disputed issue of material fact on whether the signature on Addendum 
No. 3 was the genuine signature of Defendant Griffith. The Court ruled at the hearing on this 
motion that there was no longer an issue of material fact and that the signature in question was 
that of the defendmt. Defendant Griffith signed Addendum No. 3 on December 1, 2006 and 
1)efendant Porter signed it on December 4,2006. Neither of the Plaintiffs' signatures appears on 
the document. On December 6 ,  2006, Defendants retrieved the original warranty deed from 
Pioneer Title. 
Thereafter, Plaintiffs filed suit asserting claims of breach of contract, and breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and seeking an injunction, specific performance, 
and declaratory judgment. Defendants raised multiple defenses including duress, undue 
influence, and expiration of the contract and Addendum No. 3. Plaintiffs responded by asserting 
that Defendants waived thek right to enforce the closing date of the contract by signing 
Addendum No. 3. 
M E M O W D U M  DECISION AND ORDER 
ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
STANDArn OF rnVXEVV 
Summary judment is appropriate where the pleadings, depositions, admissions arid 
affidavits on file show that there are no geriuine issues of material fact and that the moving party 
is entitled to judment as a matter of law. 1.R.C.P. 56(c); Cify oj-Idaho fills v Home Indemnip 
Co , 126 Idaho 604, 606 (1995). At all times, the burden of proving the absence of a genuine 
issue of xnateriai fact rests upon the moving party. G & M F'arnzs v Funk Iri-rigarion Co., 119 
Idaho 514,517 (1991). 
In consideration of the motion, the court must liberally construe the facts and inferences 
contained in the existing record in favor of the party opposing the motion. Born v. Sudweeks, 
1 19 Xdaho 539, 54 f  ( 2  991). To withstand a motion for s m a r y  judgment, the non-moving 
party's case must be anchored in something more solid than speculation. A mere scintilla of 
evidence is not enough to create a genuine issue. Edwarh v. Co~chemco k c . ,  11 1 Idaho 851 
(Ct. App. 1986). The party opposing the motion for sumnary judgment may not merely rest on 
the allegations contained in the pleadings; rather, evidence by way of affidavit or deposition 
must be produced to contradict the assertions of the moving party. 1R.C.P 56(e); Ambrose I? 
Buhl School Disz. #412, 126 Idaho 581 (Ct. App. 1995). 
LAW 
-
Breach of Contract 
A breach of contract is non-performance of any contractual duty of immediate 
performance. Idaho Power Co. v. Cogeneration, hc., X 34 Xdaho 738, 746-747 (2000). It is a 
failure, without legal excuse, to perform any promise, which forms the whole or part of a 
contract. Id. The burden of proving the existence of a contract and fact of its breach is upon the 
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plaintiff, and once those facts are established, the defendmt has burden of pleading and proving 
uffimative defenses, which Iegdly excuse performance. Id 
When the latlguage of a contract is clear and unmbiguous, its interpretation and legal 
effect are questions of law. Infermountain Eye and Laser Centers, P.L L C. v. Miller. 142 idaho 
21 8, 222-223 (2005). An unmbiguous contract will be given its plain meaning. Id The 
p u p a e  of inte~reting a contract is to determine the intent of the contracting parties at the time 
the contract was entered. Id In determining the intent of the parties, this Court must view the 
contract as a whole. Id. If a contract is found mbiguous, its interpretation is a question of fact. 
Id. Mether  a conbact is mbiguous is a question of law. Id. 
It is well settled that where no time for performance is established in the agreement, the 
law implies that perfommce must occur within a reasonable time. Ujdur- v. Bzonapson, 126 
Xdabo 6,9 (Ct. App., 1.994). However, a different rule applies to the parties' contract where time 
is deemed, expressly or implicitly, to be "of the essence." Id. Thus, where the pa-ties make time 
of the essence in setting a deadline for payment, strict compliance with such deadliiie is required. 
Id. 
General principles of contract law require that a contract modification, like the formation 
of any contract, must be supported by vaIid consideration. Great Plains Equipment, lnc. v. 
Northwest Pipeline Corp., 132 Idaho 754,769 (1999). It is well established that a promise to do, 
or the doing of, what one is already bound by contract to do, is not valid consideration. Id. 
Conversely, the doing by one of the parties of something that he is not legally bound to do 
constitutes consideration for the other's promise to modify the terms of the original agreement. 
Id. 
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Waiver and Duress 
A waiver is the intentional relinquis;imeit of a know right. Crouch v. Bi,rchufl 78 Idaho 
364,368 (1956). It is a voluntary act and implies election by a party to dispense with somed~ing 
of value or to forego some right or advantage wtri~h he might at his option have demanded and 
insisted upon. Id The existence of waiver ordinarily is a question of fact, and if there is m y  
substantial evidence in the record to support a waiver it is for the trier of fact to determine 
whether the evidence establishes such a waiver. Riversrde Development Cu, v Ritehie, 703 
Idaho 5 15,5 18 (1 982). Waiver is foremost a question of intent; and in order to establish waiver, 
the intention to waive must dearly appear. id. at 120. Intent to waive a right may, however, be 
established by conduct. Id. 
To be voidable on the grounds of duress, an agreement must not only be obtained be 
means of pressure brought to bear, but the agreement itseIf must. be unjust, unconscionable, or 
illegal. The defense of duress cannot be predicated upon demands which are lawful, or the threat 
to do that which the demanding party has a legal right to do. Generaily, the dernand by one party 
must be tvronghl or unlawful, and the other party must have no means of immediate relief from 
the actual or thxeatened duress other than by compliance with the demand. The aRnnative 
defense of duress may be established only by clear and convincing evidence. Liebelt v. Liebelt, 
f 18 Idaho 845,848 (Ct.App. 1990). 
In this case, the Contract between the parties is unambiguous. The closing date was to 
occur no fater than November 30,2006. A "time is of the essence" clause was also contained 
within the Contract. It is undisputed that neither party performed before November 30,2006 and 
therefore, the contract expired by its own terms. 
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One day after the closing deadline on December 1, 2006, Defendant Criffittl signed 
Addendm No. 3 with Defendant Porter's signature following his on Decernber 4, 2006. 
Addendm No. 3 is also unmbiguous and required the execution by both. parties in order to 
become an integrd part of the Contract. The Plrrintiffs did not sign Addendum No. 3 and 
therefore, i t  never became part of the Contract by its own terns. 
However, the Plaintiffs raise the issue of waiver by asserting that the Defendants waived 
their rights to claim that pawent was due on November 30 by signing Addendum No. 3. 
Plaintiffs further argue that Defendants waived their nght to claim that Plaintiffs breached the 
Contract by failing to make the funds available on November 30. Plaintiffs assert that when they 
obtained the necessary funding on December 7, that they did so in reliance on the Defmdants' 
alleged waiver. 
Xf there is any substantial evidence in the record to support a waiver, it is for the trjer of 
fact to determine whether the evidence establishes such a waiver. In this case, Defendant 
GriRith testified at his deposition that he told his agent that he did not want to sign an extension, 
that he told the closing agent he was not going to sign an extension, and that the closing agent 
did not explain my of the documents. (Dennis C. GriEth, January 19, 2007, pages 70 and 88). 
Defendant Griffith stated in his affidavit that when approached by his agent about signing an 
Addendum to extend the closing, Defendant Griffitth advised him that under no circumstances 
would he agree to delay or extend the closing. (05/11/07, 7 16). He also stated that at no time 
prior to December 5& or 6" was he aware of or advised that a document extending the closing 
was included in the closing documents. (05'1 1/07, 18). 
Defendant Grifith's agent, Pete McArthur, testified in his deposition that the Defendants 
never said that they wanted to sign an extension. (Pete McArtbur, April 20, 2007, page 39). 
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Cmie Redoviarl front Pioneer Title testified that she did advise Defendant C~iffith &at 
Addendm No. 3 would extend the closing to December 8, 2006 and that she did not force him 
to sign any documents. ( C h e  Redovian, Aprif 10. 2007, pages 38 and 46). 
The Defendants argue that PlaintiEs' c i a  of waiver fails because the signatures were 
obtained under duress. Specifically that agent McArlfiur tkreatened a lawsujt against the 
Defendants if they failed to sign Addendum #3. PlaintiEs respond by claiming that there is not 
an actionable claim of duress because the alleged threats were not wrongful or unlawful. 
However, there appears to be a material dispute of fact in this regard. If Mckrthw threatened to 
sue Griffith md Porter if they did not sign the time extension in Addendum #3, he would not 
have had a good faith basis to make that theat. The Contract was clear and unambiguous that 
the transaction was to close on or before November 30, 2006 and that time was of the essence. 
Consequently, if it can be proven that Defendants' signatures on Addendum #3 was the result of 
duress, the claim of waiver fails. 
Plaintiffs further argue that even if the signatures of the Defendants were made under 
duress, this defense cannot be used against the Plaintiffs because there me no facts in the record 
that the Plaintiffs in my way caused the duress. Any duress caused was by the Defendants own 
agent, Mc~r t f~ur ,  and that should not be visited upon the Plaintiffs. However, the remedy sought 
by the Plaintiffs in this case is specific performance. This argument is more specifically 
discussed below in the Court's discussion of the equitable remedy of specific performance. 
This Gou~t finds that there is substantial, but conflicting, evidence in the record to support 
the claim of waiver and that it is for the trier of fact to determine whether the evidence 
establishes such a waiver. 
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Breach of the wied Govenaxlt of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
The implied covenant of good faith and fajr dealing is a covenant implied by law in the 
parties' contract. In'ul?o Power Co. v. Cogeneration, lnc , 134 Idaho 738, 750 (2000). It arises 
only regarding terms agreed to by the parties. Tayior v Brow??irag, 129 Idaho 483,490 (1996) 
(citing Idaho First N a i f  Bank v Bliss Valley Foods, 12 1 Idaho 266,288 (1 99 1 )). The covenant 
requires that the parties perfom, in good faith, the obligations imposed by their agreement. 
tefrzrfiich v. Key Bank k t .  Assr#, 141 Idaho 362,368 (2005). 
As neither party has specifically addfessed this claim, the Court will not address it at this 
time. 
Specific Perfommce 
Specific pedormmce is an extraordinary remedy developed by courts of equity to 
provide relief when the Iegal remedies are inadequate. Hancock v. Dusenberry, 1 I0 Idaho 147, 
152 (Ct. App., 1986). In contracts for the sale or lease of land, courts presume that the aggrieved 
party does not have an adequate remedy at law and is entitled to specific performance. Id, This 
presumption rests on the premise that a specific tract o f  land is unique and impossible of 
duplication, Id. This presumption, however, can be overcome by a showing that the tract of land 
in a given case is not unique. Wood v. Simonson, 108 Idaho 699, 702 (Ct. App., 1985). Wide 
discretion is afforded the trial court to determine whether damages is an adequate remedy in 
contracts concerning sale of real property, and specific per.fonnance is never a matter of absolute 
right. Id. 
In this case, there has been no assertion that the land involved is not unique. Based on 
the presumption that a specific tract of land is unique and impossible of duplication and noting 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 9 
ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
&at it is within cbe discretion of the Court to determine whether dmages  are an adequate 
remedy, the Court finds that if Plaintrffs are able to prove waver, that the remedy of specific 
pexfommce is appropriate. 
Conversety, if the Defendants are successful in proving that their signatures were 
obtained under duress, even if that duress was caused by their agent, this Court belieses that it 
would be inequitable to allow the Plaintiffs to demand specific pe r f amme .  A more adequate 
remedy is monetary damages against the party or parties causing duress. 
Therefore, 
ORDER 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, and this does ORDER, that the PlaintiffsWotion for 
S m q  Judgment is DENIED. 
DATED: 1 0%' #--- 
Thomas J. Ryan 
District ~ u d &  
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GERTIFICAE OF SERVICE 
1 HEREBY CERTIFY &at a true and comct copy of the foregoing Memorandum 
laintiffs7 Motion fur Summary Jrldgnent is forwarded to the folJawing 
ay of F e b m y ,  2008. 
Kevin B. Dinius kw 
Shelli D. Stewart d b b - q + ~ i  
White Peterson, P.A. 
5700 East Fr;mkXin Road, Suite 200 
Nanrpa, ID 83687-7901 
Ron R- Shepherd 3~5-d Hamilton, Michaelson & Wlty, LLP q b ? ~  - 
P.O. Box 65 
Nampa, ID 83653-0065 
Charlotte Sherbwn 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
Deputy Clerk 
MEMORAVDUM DECISION ANT> ORDER 
ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTlON FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
RON R. SHEPHEm 
ISB No. 6593 
HAMILTON, MICHAELSON & HILTY, LLP 
Attorneys at Law 
1303 12th Avenue Road 
PO Box 65 
Warnpa, ID 83653-0065 
(206) 467-4479 Telephone 
(208) 467-3058 Facsimile 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTFUCT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
HENRY OGDEN, an unmarried man and, ) Case No. GV 06-5807M 
MICHELLE HURST, an unmarried woman, ) 
) MOTION FOR LEAVE TO 
Plaintiffs, ) WITHDRAW 
VS. 
1 
) 
DENNIS C. GRIFFITH, an unmarried man; 1 
and BONNIE M. PORTER, an unmarried ) 
woman, 
) 
1 
Defendants. 
HAMILTON, MICHAELSON & HILTY, LLP, attorneys of record for the above-named 
Defendants, DENNIS C. GRIFFITH and BONNIE M. PORTER, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 1 l(b)(2), 
hereby move for the entry of an order permitting HAMILTON, MICHAELSON & HILTY, LLP 
to withdraw as counsel of record for the above named Defendants. Defendants' last known 
address is: 
25 17 Succor Creek Rd. 
Hornedale, Idaho 83628 
This motion is supported by the affidavits, pleadings and evidence of record, together 
with the Affidavit of Ron R. Shepherd in Support of Notion for Leave to Withdraw. 
This motion is also based upon the papers, pleadings and records on file herein. 
DATED this day of March, 2008. 
HAMILTON, MICHAELSON & HILTY, LLP 
RON R. SHEPHED 
Artorneys for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ay of March, 2008, 1 caused a true copy of the 
foregoing MOTION FOR LEAVE TO WITHDRAW to be served by the method indicated 
below, and addressed to the following: 
Kevin E. Dinius 
Shelli D. Stewart 
WHITE PETERSON, P.A. 
5700 E. Franklin Road, Ste. 200 
Nampa, Idaho 83687 
Dennis Gri ffith 
Bonnie Porter 
25 1 7 Succor Creek Rd. 
Hornedale, Idaho 83628 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage, Prepaid p Delivered 
( Facsimile 
( ) Other 
Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Certified MaillRetum Receipt 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Facsimile 
( ) Other 
Kevin F Dinit14 
Sheili D. Steulm 
WHITE PETERSON, P.A. 
5700 East Franklin Road, Suite 200 
Narnpa, Idaho 836&7-790 1 
Telephone: 1208) 466-3272 
Facsimile: (208) 466-4405 
lSB No. 5974,7459 
ked@whifepefersnn cowl 
ssre~~urr@rvhitepeferson. corn 
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL, DlSTRlGT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN ANTI  FOR THE COLNTY OF O W E E  
H m R Y  OGDEN, an unmarried man; and, 
MICHELLE HURST, an unmarried wornm, 
DENNIS C. GRIFFITH, an unmarried man; 
and, BONNIE M. PORTER, an unmmicd 
woman, 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) CASE NO. CV 2006-5807"M 
1 
) MOTION TO ENFORCE 
) SETTLEmN'I' AGHEKMKN'I' 
) 
) 
) 
1 
COME NOW, Plaintiffs HENRY OGDEN and MICHELLE HURST, by and through 
their cnt~nxel nf record, the law firm of White Peterson, P.A., and hereby file this ibf~iotion to 
Erijbrce Serilemeni Agreemen1 seeking an order requiring The Defendants to comply with the 
settlement agreement entered into by and between the parties on March 5, 2008. 
MOTION TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT. 1 
F"-% 
.ip. 
Fgk c 
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Plainti@$ agreed to release all claims against Defendants in exchange for $40,000.00. See 
Ron Shepherd March 5 ,  2008 letter, attached as Exhibit A to the Affidavit of Kevin E. Dinius in 
Support of Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement j"Dinius Aff."). Defendants a p e d  to 
execute a promissory note and deed of trust against the subject real property to secure the 
$40,000 00 obligation. Id 
After some revisions by both parties, on M ~ c h  26, 2008, Defendants' counsel 
transmitted the final proposed deed of trust and promissory note to Plaintifs' counsel in which 
Defendants agreed to pay the $40,000.00, plus 6% interest per annum, on October 1, 2008. See 
Ron Shepherd March 26, 2008 ernail, Exhibit B to the Dinius Ail?. Plaintiflskounsel approved 
the final proposed promissory note and deed of trust. See Kevin Dinius March 26, 2008 email, 
Exhibit C to the Dinius Afi. 
I-lowcvcr, to datc, Dcfcndzrllts havc faifcd and rcfuscd to cxccutc tfic proillissoiy note and 
deed of trust. 
Plaintiff respectfully moves this Court for an Order as follows: 
1. Far enforcement o f  the: Settlement Agreement; and, 
2. For Plaintiffs' costs and attorney fees expended in pursuing this motion. 
O U T ,  ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED. 
DATED this 3rd day of April, 2008. 
WHITE PETERSON. P.A. 
By: 
fhelli D. Stewart 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVlCE 
I hereby crsrtilji that on this 3rd day o f  April, 2008,I causcd to be served a huc and cortect 
copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below to the following: 
Run Shcphtrd a US Mail HAMll TON, MTCHAET4SON Rr HlLTY Ovcs~~ight Mail 
1303 1 2 ' ~  Ave. Rd. El Hand Delivery 
Nmpa, ID 83 653 -0065 a Facsimile - No. 467-3058 
cmN:\Work\O\Ogdcn. Hcnry 22396lNon-Discovery\Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreemcnt.doc 
MOTION ?T) ENFORCE SETTI.EMF"NT AGRFFMFNT - 3 65 
<$2* 
~*~*-e 
%&* 
F 1 LE b!3.056 04/03 ' 48 1 6 : 42 " : WH I TE PETERSON 
Kevin E. Uinius 
Sl-tetli D. Stewart 
W I T E  PETERSON, P.A. 
5700 East FranMin Road, Suite 200 
Narnpa, Idaho 83687-790 1 
Tolephnne- (308) 466-9777 
Facsimile: (208) 466-4405 
1Sl3 No. 5974,7453 
ked@-cvhrrepererson. corn 
-s.srewarr@~vhi~epererson. corn 
FILED 
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Artorneys for Plaintiffs 
n\T THE T)T.STRTCT CT)I.IRT OF THF THIRD .-(1.TnfClAT. DTSTRTCT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
HENRY OGDEN, an unmarried man; and, 
MlCHEtLE HURST, an unmarried woman, 
Plaintiffs, 
D'ENNTS C. GRIFFITH, an unmarried man; 
and, BONNIE M. PORTER, an unmarried 
woman, 
Defendants. 
1 
) 
) CASE NO. CV 2006-5807*M 
1 
) Ati%lJIAVI'I' 01F' KEVIN E. DINIU'S 
) IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO 
) ENFORCE SETTLEMENT 
) AGIUEEMENT 
1 
) 
1 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: SS. 
County of Canyon ) 
KEVIN E. DINIUS, being first duly sworn, deposes and says as fofollows: 
1. I am one of the attorneys of record for the Plaintiffs in the above-entitled action, 
AFFIDAVIT OF KEVIN E. DINIUS IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT 
AGREEMENT - I 6 G 
b&%ze ggg 
*dA* 
F I LE I.l~.056 041 03 '08 16 : 42 I 'WHITE PEIERS0P.J PAGE 61 ti3 
and m&c this Affidavit on the basis of my own persod knowledge a&or  belief. 
2. Attached hereto a3 Exhibit "X'iis n truc and corrcct copy of  Ron Shcphcrd's 
March 5,  2008 letter setting folth the terms of the agreement entered into by the parries and their 
respective attorneys. 
3. Attached hereto as Exhibit "B" is a true and correct copy of Ron Shepherd's 
March 26, 2008 ernail with the anached final proposed dsed of tmt  and prominsory notc. 
4. Attached hereto as Exhibit "C" is a true 8nd correct copy of my March 26, 2008 
email approving the final proposed deed of trust and promissory note. 
5. To date, Defendants have failed and refused to execute the promissory note and 
deed of trust. 
FURTHER, YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NAUtiHT. 
DATED this 3" day of April, 2008. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 3'd day of April, 2008. 
AFFIDAVIT OF KBVW E. DINIUS IN SUPPORT OF MOTlON TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT 
AGREEMENT - 2 
' I  
<@2Z 
f&&% 
-%fl&~ 
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GERTIFIGakTE OF SERVICE 
1 hereby certify that on this 31d day of April, 2008,l cawed ra be served a me and correct 
cnpy o f  the foregoing document by the method indicated below to the following: 
Ron Shepherd IT3 US Mail HAMILTON, MICHAELSON 8r HILTY Overnight Mail 
1303 12" Ave. Rd. IT3 Hand Delivery 
Nampa, ID 83653-0065 Fa~sirnilc - No. 467-3056 
cmiW:\Work\O\Ogden, Henry 2239Won-DiscovcryLZfftdavit of KED rc Motion to Enforce Senlement Agreement.doc 
AFFIDAVIT OF KEVlN E. DiNIUS IN SUPPORT OF MOTlON TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT 
AGREEMENT - 3 
-; S 
TON, IMX U O N  O EL'lY, LLP 
A ~ O ~ E Y S  AT LAW 
1303 - I Z ' A E ~ R O A D  
P.O. BOX 65 
NAMPA, DAkiV 83653-0065 
March 5,2008 
Mr- Kevin Dinius 
XvZIITE FlZIER3OP.r 
5700 E. F m  Iid. Ste. 200 
Nampa, Idaho 83687 
Re: Ogii~w'Hw~k v. Cfr~fltfJPor-ter 
Dear Kevin: 
7312s letter 'wiU our a d  setthmnt agreement reached today in the above-referend 
matter. 
We agreed t-o sat* this matter for payment fiom my clicats to your clients in the ax~~ount of
%4Q.000.00, which ~ O W T  consists of repayment of tbe $14000.00 ~ 8 W 3 t  money, plus 
$30,000.00 towd  your &eatsT costs and fees incurmi in the above-mfermoad fitigSrtiarz 
Payment will be made by my clieats sxwutmg a promissory note secured by tt deed of aust 
agaimt &e sub- real groper&. The tams of the promimry note are chat my clients will be 
oblieted f~ pay $40,000.00 to your clients, plus six pwcmt (6%) interest thereoa, within six (6) 
months k r n  the daze the d o c ~ a ~  are Wid  
Upon exeaxtion of Nth promissory mte and deed of tm$ your clients will dismiss tbe 
abov~efercaced matter with pzdudice and wirh all partits baring their own costs and 
aaomeys' fern. Additionaily, this 1sw firm has agreed to subordinate its attorney fee Iien on the 
subject proparty so as to put your clients' deed of- &ad o f  this law firm's lien. AU pards 
understand W bare -is a fkst murrgage on the subje& property, and that such first; mortgage 
rer&n in place ahead of your clients' deed of trust. 
'Ihe release of Iis pendens is a c i a l  because my clients need to obtain a loan, secured by tbe 
subject property, ia order YO pay your clients off. My olisntr canuot obtain such loan with the 
13s pendess of record, 
&??y 
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Mr. Kwh BMm 
& ~ k  5,2008 
Paga 2 
I\ 
Finally, hplied in the m e m a t  is that all pardes wit1 wt in good Mth to execute all 6 0 w e n ~ s  
and i ?s necassq to give &W to &is $8d&netat ~ e m e n z .  
Plsase coam me i diately if you bdieve this letter snimta the essential t e r n  of om 
s d a e n t  wment, 1 will pnspm a pmrnissoxy note, deed of trust a d  s u b o r w o n  
sgrmrn~et withia the week unless 1 hear o-str: &m YOU -diatelg. I wodd request 
you pparr:  a ~ ~ e ?  of lis pend8fls md pmvide that to me, ts aswell as a sripddon and prop& 
orda for d i e s a l .  
Please oonwczt m e  with any cpsrium you m y  have. 
SON & BIL'IY, LLP 
PAGE 10, 18 
From: Ron Shepherd /RonS@iZNAMPAtAW.COM] 
Sent: Wednesday, March 26,2008 9:59 AM 
To: K e v ~ n  E Din~us 
Cc: Aaron Seable 
Subject: OgdeniHurst v Griffittl and Poner 
Attachmanb: PROMNOTE - final docx: Deed of Trus - final.docx 
Kevin: 
A~rached are the OGT dud Prorrt. Nuke we dis~uhsrrf. If t i le r1tct.1 wilf, yuur dpprovdl I will gel illy ~ l i e ~ t l j  ~ ig t~d lur~ t  
thereon. 
Thanks, 
Ron 

<;p) 
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property may be reasonably necessary, the specific enumerations herein not excluding the 
general. 
2 .  To appear in and defend any action or proceeding pworting to affect 
the %curiry hereof or the fighrs or powers of Beneficiary or Trustee; and to pay dl costs 
and expenses, including cost of evidence of title and artorney's fees in a reasonabfe sum, in 
any such action or proceeding in which Beneficiarp or Trustee may appear. 
3. Ta pay, at least re11 day:, befurt; delir~yucacy all twcs and trsscssmcncs 
affecting said property, when due, all encumbrances, charges and liens, with interest, on 
said property or any part thereof, which appear to bc prior or supcrior hcrcto; all costs, fccs 
and expenses of this Tmst. 
4. Should Orantor fail to make any payment or to do any act as herein 
provided, then Beneficiary or Trustee, but without obligation so to do and without notice to 
or demand upon Grantor and without releasing Grantor from any obligation hereof, may: 
make or do the s m e  in such manner and to such extent as either may deem necessary to 
protect the security hereof, Benefieiwy or Trustee being authorized to enter upon said 
property fctr such purposes; appear in ~tnd defend any action or proceeding purporting to 
affect the security hereof or the rights or powers of Beneficiary or Trustee; pay, purchase, 
contest or compromise any encumbrance. charge or lien which in the judgment of either 
appears to be prior or superior hereto; and, in exercising any such potvers, or in enforcing 
this Deed of Trust by judicial foreclosure, pay necessary expenses, employ counsel and 
pay his reasonable fees. 
B. TT IS MUTUALLY AGREED THAT: 
1. By accepting payment of any sum secured hereby after its due date, 
'Beneficiary does not waive the right either to require prompt payment when due of all 
other sums so secured or to declm default for f i lwe  so to pay. 
2. At any time or from time to tune, wlthout liability therefore and 
without notice, upon written request of Beneficiary and presentation of this Deed and said 
note for endorsement, and without affecting the personal liabiliry of any person for 
payment of the indebtedness secured hereby, Trustee may: reconvey all or any part of said 
property; consent to the making of any map or plat thereof; join in granting any easement 
thereon; or join in any extension agreement or any agreement subordinating the lien or 
chmgc hcrcuf. 
3. Upon written rcqucst of Dcncficiary stating that all suius sccurcd 
hereby have been paid, and upon surrender of this Deed and said note to Trustee for 
cancelintion and retention and upon payment of its fees, Trustee shall reconvey, without 
warranty, the pro erty then held hereunder. The recitals in any reconveyance executed 
under this deed o f nust o f  any matters or facts shall be conclusive proof of the truthfulness 
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thereof. The grantee in such reconveyaslce may be described as "the person or persons 
legally entitled thereto." 
4. Upoil default by Oriulrur i e  ytly1ric;ri~ uf wly iudc;bt~dncss secured 
hereby or in perfomance of any agreement heretmder, all sums secured hereby shall 
imrncdiatcly bccornc duc and payable at the option of thc Bcncficiary. In thc cvc~tt of 
default, Beneficiary shall execute or cause the Trustee to execute a written notice of such 
default and of his election to cause to be sold thc hcrcin dcscribcd propcrty to satisfy the 
obligations hereof, and shall cause such notice to be recorded in the office of the recorder 
of each county wherein said real property or some part thereof is situated. 
Notice of sale having been given as then required by law, and not less than the time then 
required by law having efapsed, Trustee, triithout demand on Grantor, shali sell said 
property at the time and place fixed hy it in said notice of sale, either as a whole or in 
separate parcels and in such order as it may determine, at public auction to the highest 
bidder for cash in lawful money of the United States, payable at time o f  gale. T n ~ ~ t e a  <hall 
deliver to the purchaser its deed conveying the property so sold, but without any covenant 
or warranty express or implied. The recitals in such deed of any matters or facts shall be 
conclusive proof of the truthfulness thereof. Any person, including Grantor, Trustee, or 
Beneficiary, may purchase at such sale. 
After deductin all costs, fees and expenses of Trustee and of this Trust, including cost of 
evidence of tit k e and reasonable counsel fees in connection with sale, Trustee shall apply 
the proceeds of sale to payment o f  all sums expended under the terms hereof, not then 
repaid, with accrued interest at eight per cent per annum; all other sums then secured 
hereby; and the remainder, if any, to the person or persons legally entided thereto. 
5. This Deed applies to, inures to the benefit of, and binds all parties 
liereto, their heirs, legatees, devisees, administrators, executors, successors and assigns. 
The term Beneficiary shall mean the holder and owner of rhe note secured hereby; or, if the 
note has been pledged, the pledgee thereof. In this Deed, whenever the context so requires, 
the masculine gender includes the feminine and/or neuter, and the singular number 
it~cludcs tllc yltuaf . 
6 .  If L o r  any part of the property secured hci-cby is sold or tsixisfcrcd by 
Grantor without Beneficiary's prior written consent, Beneficiary may, at Beneficiary's 
option, declare all the s w n s  due under thc promissory notc sccurcd by this Dccd of Trust to 
be immediately due and payable. If Beneficiary exercises the option to accelerate, 
Beneficiary shjtl mail Grantor notice of ao~ocelerution which shall provide a period of not 
less than 30 days from the date the notice is mailed within which Grantor may pay the 
suns declared due. If Grantor fails to pay such sums prior to the expiration of such period, 
Beneficiary may, without further notice or demand on Grantor, invoke any remedies 
permitted hy thic Deed of  Tnlcr, the Promissory Note, and by law. 8. Trustee is not 
obligated to notify any party hereto of pending sale under any other Deed of Trust or of 
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any action or proceeding in which Grmtor, Beneficiary or Trustee shall be a party unless 
brought by Trustee. 
7. In the event of dissolution or resignation of the Trustee, the Beneficiary 
may subst~tute a trustee or trustees to execute the trust hereby created and when any such 
subsrirution has been filed for record in the office of the Recorder of the county in which 
the propeny herein described is situated, it shall be conclusive evidence of the appointment 
of such trustee or trustees, and such new trustee or trustees shall succeed to all of the 
powers and duties ol the uus tcc or kustces named herein. 
Rcyucst is lxercby madc that a copy of m y  Notice of Dcfault md a copy of atly Notice of 
Sale hereunder be mailed to the Grantor at his address hereinbefore set forth. 
BONNIE M. PORTER DENNIS C. GRIFFITH 
25 17 Succor Creek Rd. 25 17 Succor Greek Rd. 
Homedale, Idaho 83628 Wornedale, Idaho 83628 
STATE OF IDAHO 1 
) ss. 
County of . . 'I
On this day of March, 2008, before me the undersigned, a Notary Public in 
and for said Sfate personally appeared DENNIS C. GRIFFlTH, knom or identified to me 
to he the person whose. name ic  s~thscriherl tn the within insrn~rnent, and acknnwledgeA tn 
me that he executed the same. 
IN WlWESS wE-EWOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official 
scal thc day and year in this ccrtificatc first above written. 
.. 
NOTARY PUBLIC FOR IDAHO 
Residence: 
My Co~i~missiolz Expires: 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) 9s. 
County of ) 
On this day o f  March, 2008, before me: the ui~ctr;rsig~ied, a Notaly Public in 
and for said State personally appeared BONNIE N. PORTER, known or identified to me 
to be the person whose name is subscrittcld tu tlie withill iilstiu~~ent, and acknowlcdgcd to 
me that she executed the same 
IN WITNESS WHEEOF,  I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official 
scal the day and year in this certificate first above written. 
NOTARY PUBLIC FOR IDAHO 
Residence: 
My Commission Expires: 
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FOR VALUE FECEIVED, DENNIS C. GHFFITH, an u n m ~ e d  man, and BONNIE C. 
PORTER, an umarried woman, whose address is of 2517 Succor Creek Road, Homedale, 
Owyhee County, Idaho, promise to pay to the order of HENRY OCDEN, asl u m i e d  man, and 
MICHELLE HURST, an m a r r i e d  woman, of Atlanta, Fulton County, Georgia, the principal 
sum of FORTY THOUSAND AND NOllOO DOLLARS ($40,000.00), with interest thereon at 
six percent (6.0%) per m u m  from April 1,2008, until paid in hll. 
Principal and interest to be paid as follows: 
All remaining principal and accrued interest shall be due and payable in full on October 
1,2008. 
If, however, the maker of t h s  Note does not pay on or before said maturity date, the 
Holder may charge interest at the above mentioned rate for so long as the balance remains 
unpaid. 
ln the event oi default hereunder, andlor in the performance of Grantor's obligations 
under Deed of Trust given to secure payment ot: this Note, time being af the essence hereof, the 
holder of this Note may without notice or demand declare the entire prlnclpal sum then unpaid, 
a)yr;tlicr with accruccl inlerest ihttreon, immediately due and payable. 
In the cvcllt of commcnceinefit of suit to enlurcc: payment of this Note, the undersigned 
agrees to pay such additional sum as attorney's fccs as thc C o ~ t t  iil such action may adjudge 
reasonable. 
This Note shall be governed as to validity, interpretation, construction, effect and in all 
other recpectq hy the laws and decisions of the State of Idaho. 
PROMISSORY NOTE - Page 1 
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Principal and interest on this Notc are payable in such currency of the United States of 
Arnerica as at the time of paymenr is legal tender for the payment of public and private debts. 
Advance or other additional payments rnay he made nn this Note ~t any time. Each 
payment shztll be applied first to the payment of accrued interest, and second to the payment of 
principal. 
This Notc is stcwzd by  a Deed oCTrust of even dare herewith. 
Should the propefty described in the Deed of Trust securing this Note be sold or 
conveyed by the Maker herein, their heirs or assigns, prior to the maturity of this Note, then the 
entire sum of principal and interest shall become immediately due and payable. 
DENNIS C. G'RIFFITH 
BONNIE M. PORTER 
DUE: Ocrober 1 ,  2008 
PROMISSORY NOTE - Page 2 
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From; Kevin E Oinius 
Sent: Wednesday, March 26,2008 10 36 AM 
To: 'Ron Shepherd' 
CG: C~ndy Mackey 
Subject: RE: OgdenJHurst v Gr~ffith and Porter 
Ron: These will work. Once your d~ents' execute the note and deed of trust, please get me copies. Also, ptease provide 
me the original subordrnation agreement. 
Thanks. 
Kevin E. Dinius 
WHITE PETERSON, P.A. 
5700 F Franklin Rd . Ste 3bt200 
Narnpa, ID 83687-7901 
208 666 9272 (Telephone) 
208.466.4405 (Facsimile) 
Confidentiality Notice: This email message may contain confidential and privileged information exempt from disclosure 
under applicable taw. If you have received this message by rnisrake, please notify us immediately by replying to  this 
message or telephoning us, and do not review, disclose, copv, or distribute this message. Thank ycrlt. 
. . - - -. - -  .. .--~,-......-....-.--------.-.----.- &&" ---..-... - - .----- - - ~ .-,,. 
From: Ron Shepherd [mailto:RonS@NAMPW,COM] 
Sent: Wednesday, March 26, 2008 10:22 AM 
To: Kevin E. Dinius 
Subject: RE: Ogden/Hurst v. Griffith and Porter 
They are in word, you just need to update your software. O Here they are in the old Word format. 
- ------ * - -  - .. - - - - 
Fram: Kevin E. Dinius [mailto;ked@WHZTEP~RSONNcom] 
Sent: Wednesday, March 26,2008 10: 18 AM 
To: Ron Shepherd 
Subject: RE: Ogdcn/Hurst v. Griffith and Porter 
Please sena them To me In word - I cannot open the attachments 
Kevin E. Uinius 
WHITE PETERSON, P.A. 
5700 E. Franklin Rd., Ste. #ZOO 
Nampa. ID 83687-7901 
208.466.9272 (Telephone) 
208.466.4405 (Facsimile) 
Confidentiality Notice: This ernail message may contain confidential and privile~ed information exempt from disclosure 
under applicable law. If you have received this message by mistake, please notify us immediately by replying to this 
message or relephonlng us, and do nor revlew, disclose, copy, or dlsrrlbute thls message. Thank you. 
. . .. ...... "." . ^._.__^____l_l-^.^_ ^ ~ - ~ ^ . . - - ~ ~ ^ ~ ^ . I  .... -- -,-..-I., ... . -' 
From: Ron Shepherd [mailto:RonS@NAMPALAW,COM] 
Sent: Wednesday, March 26, 2008 9:59 AM 
To: Kevin E. Dinius 
-- 
- .  
EXHIBIT C 
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IN THE DISTmCT C O m T  OF THE TITTm JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF D M O ,  TT\J AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
HENRY OGDEN, an m ~ e d  man, 
and MICHELLE HURST, an 
unmarried woman, 
VS. 
DENNIS C. GRTFFITI-I, an 
unmarried man, and 
BONNLE M. PORER, an unmarried 
woman, 
Defendants. 
1 
) CASE NO. CV 2006-05807- 
1 
) MEMORANDUM DECISION RE: 
) PLANTIFF'S MOTIOfl 
On February 25, 2008, this Court filed its Memorandum Decision upon plaintiffs' second 
motion for summaty judgment. Shortly hereafter, the plajntiEs filed a motion to reconsider 
~r qqmr t~d  hy affidavit- containing further deposition testimony of defendant Griffith . On March 
4, 2008, thc partics caused a Memorandum of Stip~tlated Facts to be filed. The Court has takcn 
into consideration the motion to reconsider, the briefs in support and opposition thereto as well 
as the supporting affidavits, deposition testimony and stipulated facts and hereby clarifies its 
decision as follows: 
Waiver and Dtgess 
In this case, the Contract between the parties is wmbiguous. The closing date was to 
occur no Iater than Novcrnber 30, 2006. A "time is of the essence" clause was also contained 
within the Contxact. Jt is undisputed that neitt~er party perfomed before November 30,2006 and 
therefore, the conlract cxpircd by its own terns. 
One day after the closing deadline on December I ,  2006, Defendant Griffith signed 
Addendum No. 3 wit11 Defendant Porter's ssignatwe following his on December 4, 2006. 
Addendum No 3 is also unambiguous and required the execution by both pparties in order to 
become an integral part of the Contract. The Plaintiffs did not sign Addendum No. 3 and 
therefore, it never became part of the Contract by its own terms. 
However, the Plaintiffs raise the issue of waiver by asserting that the Defendants waived 
thcir rights to claim that payxuellt was due u11 Nvvember 30 by signing Addendum No. 3. 
Plaintiff$ further argue that Defendants waived their right to claim that Plaintiffs breached the 
Contract by failing to make the funds available on November 30. Plaintiffs assert that when they 
obtained the necessasy funding on December 7, that they did so in reliance on the Defendants' 
alleged waiver. 
A waiver is the intentional relinquishent of a known right. Crouch v. Bischog 78 Ida110 
364,368 (1956). i t  is a voluntary act and implies election by a party to dispense wit11 something 
of value 01- trj fo~egu SVUIG; right ur advantage which he might at his option have demanded and 
insisted upon. id. The existence of waiver ordinarily is a question of fact, and if there is any 
substantial evidence in the record to support a waiver it i s  for the trier of fact to determine 
whether the evidence establishes such a waiver. Riverside De~~elopmenl Co. v. Ritcl?r'e, 103 Idaho 
5 1 5, 5 15 (1 982). Waiver i s  foremost a question of intent; and in order to establish waiver, the 
intention to waive must clearly appear. Id at 120. Intent to waive a right nay, however, be 
established by conduct. Id. 
En this case, Griffith had become concerned that he w s  selling the propem at too low of 
a price prior to thc November 30 closing. His concerns were the result of consulttl~ions he had 
with three diEerent real estate agents. (See Stipulatcd Fact No. 7). Dcfcndant Porter was told 
by agent McArthur on November 27, 2006 that thc plaintlfls wanted to cnter into Addendum #3 
as they could not make the money for the subject property available by November 30. (Scc 
Stipulated Fact Nos. I 1  and 12). Porter was advised and did consult attorney Ed Schiiler about 
Addendum #3. [See Stipulated Fact No. 14). GrifEtb dso knew about the request for an 
extension at least as of the morning of November 30. (See Deposition of Dennis Cmfitb, pg. 
70, lines19 - 21 and pg. 71, lines 4 - 5). Later on November 30, Grif'fith consulted with anoll~er 
real estate agent and with his nttornliy Ron Shepherd. (Scc Stipulatcd Facts Nos. 18 and 19). 
The next day, Cr.iEth signed Addendm #3. Based upon the above facts, the court concludes 
that Cirifiith eitl~er knew what his options were regarding the signing of the extension by vixtue of 
the legal advice he and Porter had obtained, or he should have known. For this reason, the Court 
finds that waiver has been established by his conduct of signing. The same is true of defendant 
Porter upon her act of signing on December 4,2006. 
The Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' claim of waiver fails because the signatures were 
nhtairxed under dtwess. Specifically that agent McA&w thrcatcncd n lawsuit against tllc 
Defendants if they failed to sign Addendum f 3 .  Plaintiffs respond by claimkg that there is not 
an acrionabfe claim of duress because the alleged tltreats were not wrongfit1 or unlawful. 
FTowevcr, &the appears to be a material dispute of fact in this regard. If McAnhur threatened to 
sue Griffith and Porter if they did not sign the time extension in Addendum W3, he would not 
hate had a good basis to m&c that threat The Conb-act was clear and unambiguous that 
tbc &ansaction was to closc on or before Novcmber 30, 2006 md that time was of the essence 
Consequently, if it can be proven that Defendants' signatures on Addendun #3 was the result of 
duress, the claim of waiver f;tiis. 
To bc voidable on the grounds of durcsa, an agmement r~-tust not oidy be obtair~crl by 
means of pressure brouat to bear, hut the agreement ~tself must be unjust, unconscionable, or 
illegal. The defensc of duress cannot bc predicated upon demands whch are Iawf3uI, or the threat 
ro do that which the demanding party has a legal ngl~t o do. Generally, the demand by one party 
must be wrongkl or unla*l, and the other party must have no rneans of immediate relief from 
the actval or threatcncd duress other than by compliance with the demand. The affirmative 
defense of duress may be established only by clear and convincing evidence. Liebelt v. Liebelt, 
1 1 8 Tdahn 845, X4X (Ct App. 1990) 
This Court finds that there is substantial, but conflicting, evidence in the record to support 
the claim of duress and that it is for the trier of fact to determine whether the cvidence establishes 
that the signatures on Addcrlclurrl M3 were made under duress. 
specific Performance 
Specific performance is an extraordinary remedy developed by courts of equity to provide 
relief when the legal remedies are inadequate. Hancock v D?~.c~nbevry, 1 10 Idaho 147, 152 (Ct. 
App., 1986). In contracts for the sale or lease of land, courts presume that the aggrieved party 
does not have an adequate remedy at law and is entitled to specific performance. Id This 
presumption rests on the premise that n spccific tract of land is uniy~te ard impossjble of 
duplication. Id. This presumption, however, can be overcome by a showing that the tract of land 
g;4* 
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in a given case i s  not unique. W o d  v ,Srrnov2son, 108 Idaho G99, 702 (Gt. App., 1985). Widc 
discretion is al't'orded the trial court, to deternine whether damages is an adequate remedy in 
contracts concerning sale of real property, and specific performance is never a matter of absolute 
right. fd 
In this casc. thcrc has been no assertion that the land involved is not unique. Based on the 
prcswption that a specific tract of land is unique and impossible of duplication and ~~o t ing  that it 
i s  within the discretion of the Court to determine whether damages are an adequate remedy, the 
Court finds that if Plaintiffs arc able to provc waivcr, that the remedy of specific performance i s  
appropriate. 
Conversely, if the Defendants are successfbl in  proving that their signatures were 
obtained under duress, even if that duress was caused by their agent, this Corn believes that i t 
would be inequitable to allow the Pln~ntifl's to demand specific pedormanoe. A more adcquatc 
remedy is monetary damages against thc pat-ty or parties causing duress. 
n~erefore, the Court's previous Order dcnying Plaintiffs Motion for Summar~j Judgment 
stands. This Mcmormdum Decision merely clarifies the earlier dccision with conside~ation of 
the new material submitted by the parties. 
DATED: $]q, 0% 
District Court 
1 HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum 
Derjsinn a r d  r)rder on Pta~nti-ffs' Motion for Srimmarv Judmet~t is fonvarded to the following 
persons on this 1 7% day of April. 2008. 
Kevin E. Dinius 
Shelli D. Stewart 
White Peterson, P.A. 
5700 East Franklin Road, Suite 200 
Nampa. ID 83657-7901 
Ron R. Shepherd 
Hamilton, Michaelson cR: Hilty. LT,P 
P.O. Box 65 
Nampa, ID 83653-0065 
Charlotte Sherburn 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COUTiT 
Deputy Clerk 
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RON R SHEPHEW 
ISB No. 6593 
FXAMILTON, MICHAELSON & EHLTU, CLP 
Atton~eys at Law 
1 3 03 12th Avenue Road 
PO Box 65 
Wampa, ID 83653-0065 
(208) 467479 Telephone 
(208) 467-3058 kacsimile 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THJ3 D I S W C T  COURT OF THE THIRD J U D I C M  DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN ANI) FOR TM3 COUNTY OF OWHEE 
HENRY OGDEN, an unmarried man and, ) Case No. CV 06-5807M 
MICHELLE HURST? an unmarried woman, ) ) ORDER ALL0 WING 
Plaintiffs, ) W1THDRAWA.L OF COUNSEL 
VS. 
DENNIS C. CRIFFITXJ, an t~married man; ) 
and BONNIE N- PORTER, an unmarried 1 
woman, 1 1 
Defendants. 
THJS MATTER came on regularly for hearing in the above-entided court at 1 :30 p.m., 
on the - /+day of kfr: \ 2008, upon the Motion for Leave ro Withdraw heretofore filed. and 
served in this action by Ron R. Shepherd of the law firm oEHamilton, Michaelson & Nlty, LLP, 
attorney for the Defendants, Dennis C. Grifith md Bonnie M. Porter (hereinahr "Defendants"). 
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The Court, having reviewed the records and pleadings on file in this action and having 
determined that due and proper service of notice of the motion has been given in the manner 
provided by law, and good cause appeiu-ing for tire granting of said motion: 
NOW. TF-XEEFOU, IT  IS OmERED and this does hereby O m E R  that the law firm 
of Ilmilton, Michocfson & Hilty, LL,P be pemitted to withdratv as counsel for the T'lefenifants 
effective immediately and; 
IT  IS FURTBER 0ICI)ERED that within twenty (20) days from the date hmeof, the 
Defendants appoint another altorney or attorneys to appear for them, or in the alternative, appear 
in person by filing a written noticc with the court stating how they will proceed without an 
attorney. No further proceedings can be had in this action which will affect the rights of the 
Defendants for a period of twenty (20) days fiom the date of this order. 
IN THE EVENT OF THE FAXLURIE OF THE DEFENDANTS TO SO APPEAR 
AND ADVISE THE COURT WITHIN TWENTY (20) DAYS, SUCH FAILURE SHALL 
BE SUFFICIENT GROUNDS FOR THE ENTRY OF AN ORDER ENTERING 
DEFAULT AGAINST THE DEFEIVDANTS UPON TRE COMPLAINT FTLEI) HJ3REXN 
BY TIm PLAINTWFS, AND GRANTING THE WLXEF SOUGHT IN THE 
COMPLAINT AS AGAINST SAID OEFEND-LINTS WITHOUT FURTEER NOTICE TO 
THE SAID DEFENDANTS. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Ron R. Shepherd, Uamilton, Michaelson Rr: Hitty, 
LLP, shall immediately, upon entry of this Order, serve the same upon Defendants pursuant to 
the requirements of Rule 11(b)(3) of the lclaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and that said attorney 
shall file an affidavit with this court setting forth the steps taken to give such notice. 
DATED this - (q*dny of  March. 2008. 
Diatrict Judge 
CLERK'S CERmFICATE: OF SERVICE 
1 hereby certify that on the 1 1 ~  day of l ) ? a Y i / ?  2008,1 caused a true copy of the 
foregoing ORDER ALLOWmG WITHDRAWAL OF COUNSEL to be served by the method 
indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Kevin E. Diai~rs ( U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
SheIli I). Stewart 
I.f 
( ) Hand Delivered 
WITIE PETERSON. P.A. ( ) Facsimile 
5700 E. Franklin Road, Ste. 200 ( ) Other 
Nampa, Idaho 83687 
Kon R. Shepherd ( / ' ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
HNLIILTON, MICHAELSON 62 ( ) Certified MailReturn Receipt 
I-IILTY, LLP ( ) Hand Delivered 
1301 1 2th Avenue Road ( ) Facsimile 
PO Box 65 ( ) Other 
Narnpa. ID 83653-0065 
CHARLOTTE SHERBURN 
O ~ h e e  Cuutjty Clcrk 
By: ~ e p u t f ~ l e r k  
'&gp& 
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Kevin E. Dinius 
Shell! L3. Stewart 
WHITE PETERSON, P. A. 
5700 East Franklin Road, Suite 200 
Nampa, Idaho 83687-7901 
Telrpfnonr: (208) 466-9272? 
Facsimile: (208) 466-4405 
r s ~  NO. 5974,7359 
D E ? P U ? ~  Clerk 
ked@tvhireperer.ron. corn 
,s.sleruarf(~whrfepe~ersa~z. corn 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
XN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE TWRn TC_IDICIAL DlSTlRlCT OF 
TI IE STATE OF IDA1 10, IN AND FOR TI IG COUNTY OF OWYl IEE 
HENRY OGDEN, an unmarried man; and, ) 
MICHELLE HWRST, an unmarried wornan, ) 
) CASE NO. GV 2006-5807"M 
Plaintiffs, 
) MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
-vs- ) JUDGMENTMOTION TO 
) ENFORCE SETTLEmNT 
T3ENNTS (3. GRli'FFliTH, an unmarried man; ) AGREEMENT 
and, BONNIE M. PORTER, an unmarried 
woman, 
) 
) 
Defendants. ) 1 
COME NOW, Plaintiffs HENRY OGDEN and MICHELLE WRST, by and through 
their counsel of record. the law firm of White Peterson, P.A., and hereby file this Morion for 
S1,mmar)~ -h~dgmenrlMoiion fn Enforce .Setrlernenr Agreement seeking an order rqitiring the 
Dcfcndants to comply with the scttlcmcnt agrccrncnt entered into by and between the pmie3 on 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY YUDCMENTIMOTION TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT AGREEMPNT - 
2% 
%* *: 
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Plaintiffs agreed to release all clain~s against Defendants in exchange for $40,000.00. See 
Ron Shepherd March 5, 2008 letter, attached ss Exhibit A to the Affidavit of Kevin E. Dinirrs in 
Support of Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreernent ("Urnius Aff."). Defendants agreed to 
execute a promissory note arid deed of trust against the subject real property to secure the 
$40,000.00 obligation. Id 
After some revisions by both parties, on March 26, 2008, Uefendanrs' couxlsel 
transmitted the final proposed deed of trust and promissory note to Plaintiffs' counsel in which 
Defendants agreed to pay the $40,000.00, plus 6% interest per annum, on October 1, 2008. See 
Iton Shcpherd March 26, 200S ernail, Exhibit B to the Dinius Aff. Plaintiffs' counsel appmved 
the final proposed promissory note and deed of trust. See Kevin Dinius March 26, 2008 email, 
Exhibit C to the Dinius Aff. 
IIowcvcr, to date, Defendants have failed and refused to execute the promissory note and 
deed of trust. 
Plaintiff respectfully moves this Court for an Order as follows: 
1 For enforcement of the Settlement Agreement; and, 
2. For Plaintiffs' costs and attorney fees expended in pursuing this motion. 
ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED. 
DATED this 17 '~  day of April, 2008. 
WHITE PETERSON, P.A. 
BY: f T G -  
Kev' E. Dinius 
90. 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY IUPGMFNTIMOTlON TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT - 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 17"' day of  Aprrl, 2008, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below to the following: 
Dennis Griffith 
Bonnie Porter 
25 1 7 Succor Creek Rd. 
Hornedale, Idaho 83628 
US Mail 
a Cwiifiecl Pvislil - Rctuni Rcccipt Rcqucsted 
Hand Delivery 
a Facsimile - No. 
for HSl'E PE'I'EKSON, P.A. /" 
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FILED 
Kevin E, Dinius 
Shelli D. Stewart 
W H R E  PETERSON, P.A. 
5700 East Franklin Road, Suite 200 
Nampa, Idaho 83687-7901 
'Tclcphonc: (208) 466-9372 
Facsimile: (208) 466-4405 
ISB No. 5974,7459 
ked@whitepeterson. corn 
ssrewarl@whitepeter.~on. corn 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE 'THIRD J1 Jl3lCTAf, DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, lT-4 AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
I-IENRY OGDCN, an unmarried man; and, 1 
MICHELLE HURST, an unmarried woman, ) 
) CASE NO. CV 2006-5807*M 
Plaintiffs, ) 
) APFIDAVLT OF KEVIN E. DlMUS 
-VS- ) IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
) SUMMARY IUDGMENTIMOTION 
DENNIS C .  GRIFFZTH, an unmarried man; ) TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT 
and, BONNIE M. PORTER, an unmarried ) AGREEMENT 
WU111~1, 
Defendants. 
1 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO } 
: SS. 
Cntlnty of Canyon ) 
KEVIN E. DINIUS, being first duly sworn, deposes and says as follows: 
1. I a n  oilc of the anorncys of record for the Plaintiffs in the above-entitled ~c t i an ,  
AFFIDAVIT OF KEVIN E. DINIWS IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY WDGMENTIMOTION TO 
ENFORCE SETTLEMENT 
AGREEMENT - 1 t , >  
, % 
and make this Affidavit. on the basis of my own personal howledge and/or belief. 
2,  Attached hereto as Exhtbit "A" is a [rue and correct copy of Ron Shepherd's 
March 5, 2008, letter setting forth the terms of the agreement entered into by the parties and their 
respective anorneys. 
3 Attached hereto as Exhibit ‘%" is a true and correct copy of Ron Shepherd's 
hlarch 26,2008, amail with the attached final proposed deed o f  rnxr and promissory note. 
4. Altacl~cd lrercto a Exhibit "C" i s  a truc and correct copy of my March 26, 2008 
email approving the final proposed deed of trust and promissory nore. 
5. To date, Defendants have failed and refused to execute the promissory note and 
deed of trust. 
FURTHER, YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT. 
DATED this I 7th day of April, 2008. 
CI --R 
SIJBSCNBED AND SWORN to before me this 17" day of April, 3M8. 
AFFIDAVIT OF KEVIN E. DINlUS IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT/MOTION TO 
ENFORCE SETTLEMENT 
AGREEMENT - 2 
,/'-* 
FILE hlo .27? 04/17 '08 16 : 1  k s J i ~ I T t  FETERsflH 
I hereby certify rhar nn rhi.; 17' day of April. 2008, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of  the foregoing dncurnenr by the method indicated below to the following: 
Dennis Griffith 
Donnic Porter 
25 17 Succor Creek Rd. 
Homedale, Idaho 133628 
a US Mail 
a Ccl-tified Mail - Rcturn Receipt Requested 
Hand Delivery 
[ZS Facsimile - No. 
crn/W:\\hiork\O\Ogden, Hcnry 22396iNan-Discovcry\riffidavif of KED re MSJMotion to Enforce Senlemcnr Agreement.doc 
AFFlR AVIT OF KEVIN E. DlNI1.f.C: 1N St 1PPC)RT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENTlMOTION TO 
ENFORCE SETTLEMENT 
AGREEMENT - 3 9 4 
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TON, m C m T X O N  & K&W, LIZ 
AL-lUmEyS AT LAW 
1303 - 12' AVl3lT.E ROAD 
P 0. SOX 65 
NRMP& IDAHO 8653-0065 
UMX OLSON 
BRYAN T A m  
KBIRY ELm MICWrnLSON 
COf.l(fEIKAM- vO3'r 
Re: Ogdew%fur& v. GrBfWPorter 
Tlsis. letter will O C ) ~  out orat settlement s g r m t  rreacbed today in the above-rekmd 
IImwx. 
We agrreeKf ID settle tbis matter for payment from my clients to your clicnn ia thc amount of 
yu).OOO.OO, which amount comis~ of repayment of rhe $10,000.00 earnest money, plus 
$3OP000.00 toward your clients' cosb and fees h~~nrgd in the abuvs-referenced titigadon. 
Payment will be made by my clients executing a promissory note m e d  by a deed of mrsr 
qph% the subjeot rcol prop-. The terar of the promissory n m  are fhat my clients will be 
obligated to pay $afi00.00 m your cjients, plus sh percent (6%) himest thmon, within six (6) 
months fiam nhe dsrtrs .Clu: documcnt3 atg Wizad .  
Upon exwuxfon of su& promissory note sad deed o f  rmsr your clie~ts will d i m b s  the 
above-mferaced mmr with prejudhe and with all partics bearing their own oosts and 
aaomeys' fees. Additionally, rhis law firm has a p e d  to subordinate its attorney fee lien on the 
subject property so as to put your *ientsY deed oftrusr ahead of this law Am's  lien All panis 
understand tha? there is a fust mortgage on the subJect pn-,pt:rty, and thnt suoh frrst mortgage will 
remain in place &-=.ad of yow olients' deed of trust. 
Thc relesse of lis pendens is crucial because my cliez1~ necd to obtain a loan, secured by 
subject propsly, in arder to pay your cliits off. My clients camor obtain such lo- witb the 
lb p&s o f  record, 
Finafly, implied in the 
and i m e n t s  m s  
mi-tm t%ss=dd 
settlement age~metzt X wiU prepare a dkxh of fx-U& 
ape~nea WtIh week urltoss f hau; 
you prepare a release of lis pendens and pmvido that to me, as well a4 a sdputatim and pmposed 
ader for dismksd- 
P h e  coatact me with any qw~iLi~~, YOU may bvo.  
SON a; mm, LLP 
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From: Ron Shepherd [RonE;@NAMPAMW COM] 
'ent: Wednesday, March 26,2008 9:59 AM 
, 0: k v t n  E. Oinius 
Cc: Aaron Seable 
Subject: OgdenlMurst v Grifiith and Potter 
A t t d ~ l t ~ ~ ~ e t t t s .  PROMNOTE finsl.docx; Deed of l rus  - final.dacx 
Kevin: 
Attached are the DOT and Prom. Note we discussed. If the meet with your approvat I will get  my citents' stgnarure 
thereon.  
Thanks, 
Ron 
&g@a 
FAX : 1 &&&y1664.405 
DEED OF TRUST 
THIS DEED OF TRUST, d e  this day of April, 2008, between DEWIS C. 
CHFFITH, an unmanied man, and BUmE C. t"ORTER, an w a n i e d  woman, 
hereinafter collectiveZ referred to as G W T O R ,  whose address is of 25 17 Succor Creek 
Road, Homedale, uryhee County, Idaho; 
hereinaner 
B 
called TRUSTEE, whose addresi 
is 
and HENRY OGDEN, an unmarried man, and MICmLLE HURST, an unmanikd 
Woman, ot Atlanta, Fulton County, Georgia, hercii~tsn~r czlllcctivcly rcfcrrcd to as 
BENEFICIARY, whose address is c/o White Peterson, PA, 5700 Franklin Road, Ste. 200, 
Nampa, Idaho 83687. 
WITNESSETH: "Iliat Clmtor does hcrcby irrevocably GRANT, BARGAIN, 
SELL AND CONVEY TO TRUSTEE IN TRUST, WITH POWER OF SALE, that 
prupcrty iu thc County of Owyhcc, State of Idaho, deccribed as follows, and containing nnt 
more than forty (40) acres: 
See Exhibit "A," attached hereto and made a part 
hersof by this reference. 
Together with all sppu~nances  and water rights. For the purposes of this 
Agreement, the term "water rights" means any and all rights to use ground or surface water 
on the Property, whether evidenced by any permit, license, transfer, order, exchange, 
cfaim, decree or otherwise, or pk~rslrant n any lease or other agreement.. For the Pupase 
of Securing payment of the indebtedness evidenced by a promissory note, of even date 
herewith, expc.11tp.d by Grantor in the sum of FORTY THOUSAND DOLLARS AND 
NO/! 00 DOLLARS ($40,000.00), Einal payment due October 1,2008. 
A. To protect the security of this Deed of Tntst, Grantor agrees: 
1. To keep said property in good condition and repair; not to remove or 
demolish any building thereon; to complete or restore promptly and in good and 
workmanlike manner any building which may be constructed, damaged or destroyed 
thereon and to pa when due all claims for labor performed and materials fiunished 
therefore; to comp r y with all laws affecting said property or requiring any allcrx~iorls or 
irn rovements to be made thereon; not to commit or permit waste thereof; not to commit, P su fer or permit any act upon said propeny in violat3on of law, to cultivate, irrigate, 
fertilize, fumigate, prune and do all other acts which from the character or use of said 
DEED OF TRUST - Page 1 of 5 
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propeay may be reasonably necessary, the specific enwerations herezn not excluding the 
general. 
2. To appear in arid defend any action or proceeding purporting to afEect 
the security hereof or the nghts or powas of Beneficiary or Trustee; and to pay all costs 
and expenses, including cost of evidence of title and aL.tomey1s fees in a reasonable sum, in 
any such action or proceeding in which Beneficiary or Tmstee may appear 
3 To pay, at least ten days before delinquency all l iucz ;~  arid sl;isessllrcl-rts 
affecting said property, when due, all encwnbraslces, charges and liens, with interest, on 
said property or any part thereof, which appr=ar iu bt; ptiul or suptlior hereto; all costs, fccs 
and expenses of this Trust. 
4. Should Grantor fail ta make any payment or to do any act as herein 
pi ovided, then Bcncficiary or Trustcc, but without obligation so to do and without notice .lo 
or demand upon Grantor and without releasing Grantor from any obligation hereof, may: 
rnakc or do thc same in suoh manner and to such extent as either may deem necessary to 
pmtect the security hereof, Beneficiary or Trustee being authorized to enter upon said 
property for such purposes; appear in and defend my action or proc-eeding pt~rpnrfine; tn 
affect the security hereof or the rights or powers of Beneficiary or Trustee; pay, purchase, 
contest o r  compr~mise. any encnmhrance, charge or lien which in the judment of either 
appears to be prior or superior hereto; and, in exercising any such powers, or in enforcing 
this Deed of T n ~ t  hy judicial foreclosure. pay necessary expenses. employ counsel .and 
pay his reasonable fees. 
B. IT IS MUTUALLY AGWED THAT: 
1. By accepting payment of any sum secured hereby after its due date, 
Beneficiary does not waive the right either to require prompt payment when due of all 
other sums so secured or to declare default for failure so to pay. 
2. At any time or l'rom tune to time, wsEhout liability therefore and 
without notice, upon written request of Beneficiary and presentation of this Deed and said 
note for endorsement, and wthout affecting the personal liability of any person for 
payment of the indebtedness secured hereby, Trustee may: reconvey all or any part of said 
property; consent to the making of any map or plat rherwf; join in graliki~~g i f t ~ y  tseinci~t 
thereon; or join in any extension agreement or any agreement subordinating the lien or 
change hereof. 
3. Upoil ,wiittt;n I-cqucst of Dcneficiary stating that all 3ums secured 
hereby have been paid, and upon surrender of this Deed and said note to Trustee for 
ceu~cclttirion and rctcntion nnd upon payment of its fees, Trustee shall reconvey, without 
warriinty, the property then held hereunder. The recitals in any reconveyance executed 
undcr this deed of trust of any matters or facts shall be conclusive proof of the tnlthfi11ne.s~ 
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thereof. 'i'he grantee in such reconveyance may be described as "the person or persons 
legally entitled thereto. " 
4. Upon default by Grantor in payment of any indtbtcllacs~ secured 
hereby or in pedomance of any agreement hereunder, all sums secured hereby shall 
Immediately become due and payable at the option oC ht; Bcrieficiaxy. h the cvcnt of 
default, Retieficiary shall execute or cause the Trustee to execute a written notice of such 
default and of his election to wusc to br: suId die liercin dcs~ribcd property to satisfy thc 
obligations hereof, and shall cause such notice to be recorded in the office of the recorder 
of each county whcrcin stiid real pcupckty or sonic part thereof is situated. 
Nuticl: of s d c  having been given as thcn rcquircd by law, and not less than the time then 
required by law having elapsed, Trustee, without demand on Grantor, sMI sell said 
property at the time and plnoe fixed by it in  aid notice o f  sate, either as a whole or in 
separate parcels and in such order as it may determine, at public auction to the highest 
bidder for cash in fa& money of the United States, payable at time of csle Trimtee shall 
deliver to the purchaser its deed conveying the property so sold, but without any covenant 
or  warranty express or implied The: recitalc in such deed of any matters or facts shall be 
concittsive proof o f  the truthfulness thereof. Any person, including Grantor, Trustee, or 
Beneficiary, may purchase at such 'sale. 
After deducting all costs, fees and expenses of Trustee and of this Tmst, including cost of 
evidence of title and reasonable counsel fees in connection with sale, Trustee shall apply 
the proceeds of sale to payment of all sums expended under the terms hereof, not then 
repaid, with accrued interest ar eight per cent per annum; all other sums then secured 
hereby; and the remainder, if any, to the person or persons legally entitled thereto. 
5. This Deed applies to, inures to the benefit of, and binds all parties 
hereto, their heirs, legatees, devisees, admnlstrators, executors, successors and assigns. 
The term Beneficiary shall mean the holder and owner of the note secured hereby; or, if the 
note has been pledged, the pledgee thereof. In this Deed, whenever the conbxi so rcyuir~s, 
the masculine gender includes the feminine andlor neuter, and the singular number 
includes the plural. 
6.  If all or miv utir 1 uf t l i ~  property sccw-u-cd hereby is sold or transfcmd by 
Grantor without Beneficiary's prior written consent, Beneficiary may, at Beneficiary's 
option, dcdiirc all tlte sulr~s duc mdcr the promissory notc sccurcd by this Deed of T m t  to 
be immediately due and payable. If Beneficiary exercises the option to accelerate, 
Beileficiary shall mail Grantor notice of acceleration which shall provide a period o f  not 
less than 30 days from the date the notice is mailed within which Grantor n a y  pay the 
sums dcclnrcd due. I f  Grmtor fails to pay such sums prior to the expiration of such period, 
Beneficiary may, without W e r  notice or demand on Grantor, invoke any remedies 
permitted by this Deed of Trust, the Promissory Note, and by 1~w.  8 Tnvxfe~, is not 
obligated to notif'y any party hereto of pending sale under any other Deed of Trust or of 
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any action or proceeding in which Grmtor, Beneficiq or 'I'rustee shall be a party unless 
brought by Trustee. 
7. In the event of dissolution or resignation of the Trustee, the Beneficiay 
rnay substitute a trustee or trustees to execute the ~ u s t  hereby created and when any such 
substiturion has been filed for record in the oftice of the Recorder of the county in which 
the property. herein described is situated, it shall be conclusive evidence of dlc tippuitlh~~e~~t 
of such trustee or trustees, and such new trustee or trustees shall succeed to all of the 
powers and duties of the rwree or uzrsrees named hcrci~i. 
Requesr. Is hereby made Lhat a ~ u p y  of a t ~ y  Noticc of Default and a copy of any Norice of 
Sale hereunder be mailed to the Crantor at his address hereinbefore set forth. 
BONNIE M. PORTER DENNIS C. GRIFFITH 
25 17 Succor Creek Rd. 25 17 Succor Creek Kd. 
Homedale- Idaho 83628 Hornedale, Idaho 83628 
STATE Ok' IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of .I 
On this . day of March, 2008, before me the undersigned, a Notary Public in 
and for said State personally appeared DENNIS C. GRIFFITH, known or identified to me 
to be the person whnne name is subscribed to the within instrument, and acknowledged to 
me that he executed the same. 
IN WI'INESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and &xed my official 
seid tl~c day and ycar in this certifionte first above written. 
NOTARY PUBLIC FOR IDAHO 
Residence: 
My Commission Expires: 
"SEAL 
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STATE OF ~ D A W O  ) 
') ss. 
County of ) 
On this day of March, 2008, before me tbe undersigned, a Notary Public in 
and for said State personally appeared 230WIE N. PORTER, known or identified to me 
to be the person whose n m e  is subscribed to the within instrument, and acknowledged to 
me that  he executed the same. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have heremto set my hand and aftixed my official 
seal the day and year in this certificate first above written. 
"SEAL 
NOTARY PUBLIC FOR IDAHO 
R~sidonoo: 
My Commission Expires: 
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mMISSORY NOTE 
FOR VALUE WCEI-VED, DEWIS G. GRIFFITH, m unmarried man, and BONNIE C. 
PORTER, an umarried woman, d o s e  address is of 2517 Succor Creek Road, Homedafe, 
Owyhee County, Idaho, promise to pay to the order of HENRY OGDEN, an unmarried man, md 
MICHELLE NflRST, an unmarried wnman, of Atlanta, Fulton County. Georgia, the principal 
sum of FORTY THOUSAND AND NOllOO DOLLARS ($40,000.00), with interest thereon at 
slx pcrccnt (6.0%) pcr a n n u  from April 1,2008, until paid in full. 
Principal and inrerest ro be paid as litllows: 
All remaining principal and accrued interest shafl be due and payable in full on Oclobcr 
1, 2008. 
If however, the maker of this Note does not pay on or before said maturity date, the 
~ o l d h r  may charge interest at the above mentioned rate for so long as the balance remains 
unpaid. 
In the event of default hereunder, andor in the performance of Grantor's obligations 
under Deed of Trust given to secure payment of this Note, time being of the essence hereof, the 
holder of this Note may without notice or demand declare the entire principal sum then unpaid, 
together with accrued interest thereon, immediately due and. payable. 
Tn the event of commencement of suit to enforce payment of this Note, the undersigned 
agrees to pay such additional sum as attorney's fees as the Ccrttrt in s~rcb actinn may adjudge 
rcasoaablc. 
This Note shall bc guvt=i.iled as to validity, interpretation, construction, effect and in all 
other respects by the laws and decisions of the State of Idaho. 
PROMISSORY NOTE - Page 1 
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Principal and interest on this Note are payabl'e m such cunency of the United Sates ot' 
Arnenca as at the time of payment 1s kgal tender for the payment of public and private debts. 
Advance or other additional payments may be made on &is Note at any rime. Each 
payment shall be applied firsr to the pawent  of accrued interest, and second to the payment of 
princtpal. 
T h ~ s  Nutc i s  sccurcd by a Dccd of Tlust of cvcn d a t ~  ha-cwitl~. 
Should the propcrty dcscribcd in thc Dccd of Trust securing this Notc bc sold or 
con~eyed by the Maltsr herein, their heirs or assigns, prior to the maturity of this Note, then the 
entire sum of principal and interess shall become immediately due and payable. 
DUE: October 1 ,  2008 
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From: 
'.snt: 
, '0 : 
Cc: 
Subject: 
Kevln E Otnrus 
Wednesday. March 26.2008 ?O 36 AM 
'Ron Shepherd' 
Ctndy Mackey 
RE OgdenlHurst v. GriRth#and Porter 
Ron: These wilt work Once your clients' execute the note and deed of trust, please get me copies. Also, please provide 
me the origlnal subord~natiorl ayreerr~etil 
Thanks, 
Kevin E Dinius 
WHITE PETERSON, P.A. 
5700 E. Franktin Rd . Ste. #200 
Nampa, tD 83687-7901 
208.466.9272 (Telephone) 
208.466.4405 (Facwmile) 
Confidentiality Notice: This email message may contain confidential and priviieged Information exempt from disclosure 
under applicable law. If you have received this message by mistake, please notify us immediatety by replying to this 
message or telephoning us, and do not review, disclose, copy, or distribute this message. Thank you. 
. . . - -. . 
From: Ron Shepherd [mailto:RonS@NAMPAUW,COM] 
Sent: Wednesday, March 26, 2008 lO:22 AM 
Ta: Kevin E, Dinius 
Subject: RE: OadenlHur~t v. Grlfflth and Porter 
They are  in word, you just need to update yoor soft war^ 0 Hprp they are in the aid Word format. 
"- .-- -.-.--.--A ----....-. ---- -----.------- ...,.----- 
From: Kevin E. Dinius [mailto:ked@WH~PflERSON.~m] 
Sent: Wednesday, March 26, 2008 10:18 AM 
To: Ron Shepherd 
Subject: RE: OgdenjHurst v. GrifTith and Porter 
Please send them to me in word - I cannot open the attachments. 
Kevin E. Oinius 
WHITE PETERSON, P.A. 
5700 E. Franktin Rd., Ste. #200 
Nampa, ID 83687-7'301 
208.466.9272 (Telephone) 
208.466.4405 (Facsimile) 
Confidentiality Notice: Thir email message may contain confidential and privileged information exempt from disclosure 
under applicable law. If you have received this message by mistake, please notify us immediately by replying to this 
message ur talephoning us, and do not review, disclose, copy, or distribute this message. Thank you. 
......-..,.-.-.,.,.,,.+---~....--- . ." *..--,--" .-....-.----------------..- " "- - "-~-.-- -.- . - ..... 
From: KOn shepherd [mallKO:ROnS@NAMPAUtW.COM] 
Sent; Wednesday, March 26, 2008 9:59 AM 
To: Kevln E. Oinlus 
*@%ks 
&$%@ 
**.- 
- s Fl LED 
R. Wade Curtis 
BELNAP, CURTIS & WILLIAMS, PLI ,G 
1401 Shoreline Drive, Suite 2 
Post Office Box 7685 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
Telephone: (208) 345-3333 
Fax No. : (208) 345-446 1 
ISB kf 1485 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN TIIE DISTRZCT COURT OF TlPE TIIIRD DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
HENRY OGDEN, an unmarried man; and ) 
MICHELLE BURST, an unmarried woman, ) 
) Case No. CV 2006 5807 M 
Plaintiff, 1 
) NOTICE OF APPEARANCE 
-VS- ) FOLLOWING WITHDRAWAL 
) OFCOUNSEL 
DENNIS C. GRIFFITH, an unmarried man; ) 
and BONNIE M. PORTER, an unmarried ) 
woman, ) 
Defendant. 
) 
1 
'I 
TO: m V 1 N  E. DINIUS: 
COMES NOW, the undersigned attorney, R. Wade Curtis of the firm of Belnap, Curtis 
& Williams, PLLC, and enters an appearance on behalf of the Defendants, Dennis C. Griffith 
and Bonnie M. Porter, in the above captioned case. 
This Notice of Appearance is conducted upon the Court continuing the hearing 
currently set for May 30, 2008. It is counsel's daughter's wedding on Friday, May 30, 2008. 
If this Court does not continue the hearing, then the Defendants file this Notice of Appearance 
Pro-Se. 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE FOLLOWING WITHDRAWAL OF COUNSEL -- Page 1 
7 0'; nRPIZlAlA I 
Defendants request that the Court reset the hearing with regard to this matter to the next 
available date convenient to the Court and counsel. Mr. Curtis' unavailable dates are attached. 
fL 
DATED This b day of May, 2008. 
- 
B$NAP,/C WILLIAMS, PLLC 
Attorney for Defendants 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE FOLLOWING WITHDRAWAL OF COUNSEL -- Page 2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attomey in the state of Idaho, resident of and 
with my office in Boise, Idaho, that I served a copy of the following described pleading or 
document on the attomey(s) and/or individual(s) listed below by hand de or by mailing, 
with the correct postage thereon, a true and correct copy thereof, the h day of May, 2008. 
Document Served: NOTICE OF APPEARANCE 
MAILED 
FAXED (208) 466-4405 
HAND DELIVERED 
[ ] OVERNIGHT DELIVERY 
Attorney(s) and/or Individuals Served: 
Kevin E. Dinius 
White Peterson, P.A. 
5700 East Franklin Road, Ste. 200 
Narnpa, Idaho 83687 
R W A D E  CURTIS 
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Kevin F ninitts 
RIOmOW D W S  
5680 E. Frddin Rd., Suite 220 
N m p q  Idaho 83687-7901 
Telephone: (208) 475-2200 
Facsimile: (208) 475-220 1 
ISB No. 5974 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
M THE DISTRICT COURT OF TEE THIRD .lUDICIAL UISTKTC"2 Ok' 
nKE STAm OF IDAHO, ln\T AND FOR 'RE C O m Y  OF OWYHEE 
E N R Y  OGDEN, an married man; and, 1 
MICHELLE HURST, azz unrnded woman, ) 
) CASE NO. CV06-580m 
Plaintiffs, ) 
) NOTICE OF S U B S m m I O N  OF 
-vs- ) COUNSEL 
) 
DENNIS C, GWFITH, an unmarried man; ) 
an4 BONNIE M. PORTER, an unmarried 
woman, 
) 
1 
Defendants, ) 1 
TO THUE MOVE-ENTITLED COURT AND TO COUNSEL OF RECOm: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GWEN, pursuant to Rule 1 l@) of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure that Morrow Ljinius hereby substitutes as counsel of record for the plaintiffs in the 
above-entitled action in the place of White Peterson, P.A., and hereby enters its notice of 
appearance on behalf of the plaintiffs in all matters set forth above. 
NOLTCE OF SUBSRTUTION OF COUNSEL - I 
1 Kevin E. Diaius 
MOmOW D m S  
5680 E. F-in Rd., Sujte 220 
Nmph ID 83687-7901 
208-475-2200 @hone) 
208-1.75-220 1 (facsimile) 
kdinius@morrow~us.com 
DATED this day of May 2008. 
WWITE PETERSON, P.A. 
By: 
Todd A. ~ossmanf/ 
Wi&&awing Attorneys 
5 6 4  
DATED this do day o f  May 2008. 
L 
By: 
~ e y 6  E, Dinius 
~ubstiolte Attorney 
NOtcrCE OF SUBSTITUTlON OF COUNSEL - 2 
I20 
CERTXFlGAm OF SERVICE 
1, rhe undersigned, hereby cestfi b t  on &the of May, 2008, a true and correct; 
copy of the above and foregokg document was sewed upon the following by: 
R Wade Cwtis PIP BELNAP CURTIS 
P.O. Box 7685 
Boise, ID E13707 
US MaiI 
EL3 Overni&t Mail 
U ~ i m d  Delivery 
• FacshiIe No. 345461 
ROW DLNIUS 
NOITCE OF SUBSTfTUTlON OF COUNSEL - 3 
R. Wade Curtis 
BELNAP, CURTIS & WILLIAMS, PLLC 
1401 Shoreline Drive, Suite 2 
Posr Office Box 7685 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
Telephone: (208) 345-3333 
Fax No. : (208) 345-4461 
ISR # 1485 
MAY 2 3 20M 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
HENRY OGDEN, an unmarried man; and ) 
MICHELLE HURST, an unmarried woman,) 
) Case No. CV 2006 5807 M 
Plaint iff, 1 
) DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN 
-vs- ) OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' 
) MOTION TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT 
DENNIS C. GRIFFITH, an unmarried man; ) AGREEMENT 
and BONNIE M. PORTER, an unmarried ) 
woman, ) 
Defendant. 
COME NOW the Defendants Dennis C. Griffith and Bonnie M. Porter, by and through 
their attorney of record, R. Wade Curtis, of the firm of Belnap, Curtis & Williams, PLLC, 
pursuant to Rule 56 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and hereby submits their 
Memorandum in opposition to the Plaintiffs' Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement. 
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO 
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I 1 2 n ~ ~ l i t ~ a r n r  
Defe~ldants' opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement is based 
on al l  of the records and files of this case, to include the Affidavits of Dennis C .  Criffith and 
Bonnie M . Porter, contemporaneously filed herewith. 
Defendants request oral argument on their opposition to the Motion. 
STANDARD FOR REVIEW 
Generally, a motion to enforce a settlement agreement is treated by the Court as a 
motion for summary judgment, and it  is proper only when there are no genuine issues of 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure. When considering a motion for summary judgment, all facts must be 
liberally construed in favor of the party opposing the motion, and all reasonable inferences 
from the record must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. Anderson v. Ethington, 103 
Idaho 658, 651 P.2d 923 (1982). When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court 
must look to the "totality of the motions, affidavits, depositions, pleadings and attached 
exhibits," not merely portions of the record in isolation. Petricevich v. Salmon River Canal 
Co., 92 Idaho 865, 452 P.2d 362 (1969). A mere scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt as 
-
to the facts is not sufficient to withstand summary judgment. Corbridge v. Clark Equipment 
Co., 112 Idaho 89, 730 P.2d 1005 (1986). If the record contains conflicting iderences or 
-
reasonable minds might reach separate conclusions, summary judgment is denied. G&M 
Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 808 P.2d 851 (1991). 
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In McCvrkle v. The Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co., 2005 Slip - 30251, 112 P.3d 
- -- 
838 (2005) the Supreme Court stated: 
We first note that sumarq.  judgment under I.R.C.P. 56(c) is proper only 
wher~ there is nu genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law. . . . When assessing a motion for summary 
judgment, all controverted facts are to be liberally construed in favor of the 
nomoving party. Furthermore, the trial court must draw all reasonable 
inferences in favor of the narty resisting rhe motion. G & M Farms v .  Funk 
1 --- -- - 
Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 517, ~ O R  P.2d 851. 854 (1991); Sanders v .  Kuna 
Joint School Dist., 125 Idaho 872, 874, 876 P.2d 154, 156 (Ct. App. 1994). 
The party moving for summary judgment initially carries the burden to 
establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that he or she is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Eliopulos v. Knox, 123 Idaho 400, 404, 
848 P.2d 984, 988 (Ct. App. 1992). The burden may be met by establishing the 
absence of evidence on an element that the nonmoving party will be required to 
prove at trial. Dunnick v. Elder, 126 Idaho 308, 3 1 1, 882 P.2d 475, 478 (Ct. 
App. 1994). Such an absence of evidence may be established either by an 
affirmative showing with the moving party's own evidence or by a review of all 
the normloving party's evidence and the contention that such proof of an element 
is lacking. Heath v. Honker's Mini-Mart, Inc., 134 Idaho 71 1, 712, 8 P.3d 
1254, 1255 (Ct. App. 2000). Once such an absence of evidence has been 
established, the burden then shifts to the party opposing the motion to show via 
further depositions, discovery responses or affidavits, that there is indeed a 
genuine issue for trial or to offer a valid justification for the failure to do so 
under I.R.C.P. 56(f). Sanders, 125 Idaho at 874, 876 P.2d at 156. 
The United States Supreme Court, in interpreting Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 56(c), which is identical in all relevant aspects to I.R.C.P. 56(c), 
stated: 
In our view, the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of 
summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against 
a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an 
element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the 
burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be "no genuine issue as to 
any material fact," since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential 
element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts 
immaterial. The moving party is "entitled to judgment as a matter of law" 
because the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an 
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO 
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3 1 4  
esser~tial element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof. 
C 
- 
, 477 U.S. 3 17, 322-23 (1986) (citations omitted). The 
language and reasoning of Ceiotex has been adopted in Idaho. Dunnick, 126 
Idaho at 312, 882 P.2d ar 479. 
STATUS OF THE CASE: 
On the eve of the parties' trial, counsel for the Plaintiffs and counsel for the Defendants 
entered into a settlement agreement. This agreement is evidenced solely by the exchange of 
letters attached as exhibits to the Affidavit of Kevin Dinius, attorney for the Plaintiffs. There 
is no document signed by either of the Defendants indicating their agreement with the 
settlement proposed by their attorney, Ron Shepherd. 
FACTS OF W E  CASE: 
The Plaintiffs' Motion is supported only by the self serving statement of Ron Shepherd 
that he had authority to propose and enter into a settlement agreement. 
The Defendants in their Affidavits deny ever giving Ron Shepherd any authority to 
make any settlement on their behalf. 
There is no evidence before the Court by which the Court can assert what, if any, 
authority Ron Shepherd had with regard to proposing, negotiating or entering into any 
settlement with the Plaintiffs. 
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO 
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LEGAL ANALYSIS: 
Before the Court may enforce the settlement agreement, the Court must first assert 
what, if any, authority Ron Shepherd possessed. Second, the Court rnust then determine if the 
settlement recited in the exchange of comunication comported with Ron Shepherd's authority. 
The matter of an attorney's authority to settle a clients lawsuit is expressly set forth in 
the case of Caballero v. Wikse, 140 Idaho 329, 92 P.3d 1075 (2003). 
In that case, David Wikse was an employee with the Idaho Department of Health and 
Welfare. The State terminated Wikse's employment on August 15, 1996. As a classified 
employee, he was terminable only for cause. The parties agreed to have D. Duff McKee 
mediate. During the mediation the parties reached a global settlement. 
As the Court set forth the facts: 
Jim Jones (Jones), Wikse's attorney, the attorneys for the State and the 
individual defendants met with McKee on November 9, 1998, to go over the 
"ground rules" for the mediation. One rule was that each party would have 
someone with settlement authority in attendance throughout the mediation. 
The mediation session began at 9:00 a.m. on December 4, 1998. The 
attendees included: McKee; Wikse; Jones; Jean Goodenough (Goodenough), a 
deputy attorney general for the Department of Human Services; Merlyn Clark 
(Clark), a special deputy attorney general retained by the State to handle the 
Wikse-related litigation; Dean Christian, a deputy attorney general specializing 
in employment litigation; and Linda Caballero (Caballero), director of the 
Department of Health and Welfare. The attendees met to begin the mediation 
process and McKee went over the ground rules again. After preliminary 
discussions to identify the issues, Wikse and Jones went to a separate room. 
McKee shuttled back and forth between the rooms with proposals and 
counter-proposals. 
By noon the parties had reached an accord regarding the non-monetary 
issues: (1) Wikse would not be reinstated; instead, the State would pay money 
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO 
ENFORCE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT -- Page 5 
damages; (2) the State wouId write a letter of exoneration for Wikse; (3) the 
State would credit Wikse with sufficient additional service to vest in the Public 
Employee Retirement System of Idaho (PERSI). The parties then began 
negotiating a financial settlement. Wikse and Jones had discussed a minimum 
setttement of $227,000, of which Wikse would receive $170,000 and Jones 
would take $57,000 in attorney fees. Jones told McKee that their opening offer 
for a monetary settlement was $450,000. McKee transmitted the offer to the 
State which returned a counter proposal of $150,000. 
The parties continued bargaining throughout the afternoon. Sometime 
after 4:00 p.m. the parties neared a monetary settlement. Their positions were 
between $10,000 and $20,000 apart. During this time, Wikse left the room 
where he and Jones were discussing proposals. Wikse entered the room in which 
the State's attorneys and Caballero sat, the same room in which the parties met 
at 9:00 a.m. Wikse picked up his briefcase and, possibly, a coat and left the 
room. Thereafter, the State proposed a monetary settlement of $205,000, and 
Jones countered with an offer of $210,000. The State agreed to split the 
difference and offered $208,000. Jones told the State, through McKee, that 
$208,000 was an agreeable figure. Jones then looked for Wikse but could not 
find him. 
Jones and the State's attorneys met in a courtroom. The State's attorneys 
expressed concern over Wikse's absence. Nonetheless, the discussion of the 
specifics of the settlement continued, e.g., how many checks the State would cut 
to pay the settlement and to whom the checks would be payable, how PERSI 
contributions would be allocated between Wikse and the State, and who would 
draft the settlement agreement and stipulations to dismiss the three suits at issue. 
Jones and the State's attorneys agreed that Clark would draft the paperwork. 
Clark drafted the documentation and had the State cut the checks 
necessary to complete the settlement agreement. Shortly after December 4, 
1998, Jones advised Wikse of the terms at which the State and Jones had 
arrived. Wikse wanted an accountant and another attorney to review the terms. 
Jones called Clark and indicated that Wikse was concerned about the terms. On 
December 17, 1998, Clark forwarded the settlement documents to Jones. On 
January 5, 1999, Jones wrote Clark. The letter stated in part, "[Wikse] now tells 
me that he is unable to settle on the mediation session terms. He wishes to 
proceed with the ongoing litigation . . . . [He] tells me that he does wish to be 
reinstated by the [State] and regrets any inconvenience caused by the delay while 
he considered the terms of the settlement. " 
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The State took the position that a valid oral settlement agreement had 
been reached on December 4, 1998. Consequently, the State and individual 
officials, CabalIero, Gary Harr, Dana Thorne, and Tom Klum (collectively 
respondents), filed this action against Wikse seeking specific perfomance of the 
alleged oral settlement agreement. 
. . . [TJhe court found that when Wikse left, he said to Jones "words to 
the effect 'I'm leaving, Jim, you handle it.'" The court concluded that Wikse's 
departure and words granted actual authority, both express and implied, to Jones 
to compromise the cases. The court further found that, even if Jones lacked 
actual authority to settle the cases on Wikse's behalf, Wikse vested Jones with 
apparent authority. The district court also found that there was sufficient 
agreement and consideration to give rise to a valid settlement agreement. 
Therefore, the court ordered specific performance of the agreement on the terms 
reached by Jones and the State's attorneys at the mediation. 
An Attorney Must Have Expressed Or Implied Actual Authority To 
Cornpromise A Client's Claim; Apparent Authority Is Insufficient. 
"The relationship between an attorney and client is one of agency" in 
which the client is the principal and the attorney is the agent. Muncey v. 
Children's Home Finding and Aid Soc. of Lewiston, 84 Idaho 147, 151, 369 
P.2d 586, 588 (1962). An agent may bind a principal if the agent has actual 
authority. Actual authority is that authority a principal expressly grants to an 
- - 
agent or impliedly confers on an agent because it is usual, necessary, and proper 
to achieve the object of the express authority granted to the agent. Bailey v. 
Ness, 109 Idaho 495, 497, 708 P.2d 900, 902 (1985) (citing Clark v. Gneiting, 
95 Idaho 10, 12, 501 P.2d 278, 280 (1972)). Even in the absence of actual 
authority, an agent generally may bind a principal if the agent is cloaked with 
apparent authority. Apparent authority arises when "the principal 'voluntarily 
places an agent in such a position that a person of ordinary prudence, conversant 
with the business usages and the nature of a particular business, is justified in 
believing that the agent is acting pursuant to existing authoriry.'" 12. (quoting 
Clark, 95 Idaho at 12, 501 P.2d at 280). However, the doctrine of apparent 
authority is inapplicable if the action taken by the agent is compromising the 
principal's claim. Rather, an agent needs actual authority, express or implied 
actual authority, to compromise a principal's claim. See Muniz v. Schrader, 115 
Idaho 497, 500, 767 P.2d 1272, 1275 (Ct. App. 1989) (citing Cameron Sales, 
Inc. v. Klemish, 93 Idaho 45 1, 463 P.2d 287 (1970)); see also Storey v. U.S. 
Fidelity & Guar. Co. of Baltimore, Maryland, 32 Idaho 388, 392, 183 P. 990, 
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991 (1919). Jones could only bind Wikse to a settlement agreement if faacts 
support the legal conclusion that Jones had actual authority to do so. 
Whether express or implied authority exists generafly presents a question 
of fact. Muniz, 1 15 Idaho at 500, 767 P.2d at 1275 (citing Bevercombe v. 
Demey & Go., 40 Idaho 34, 42, 231 P. 427, 430 (1924)). 
In Muniz, the Idaho Court of Appeals described express authority and 
evidence necessary to prove express authority: 
Express authority refers to that authority which the principal has 
explicitly granted the agent to act in the principal's name. The declarations of an 
alleged agent, standing alone, are insufficient to prove that the principal has 
conferred such authority. However, the authority of the agent to act for and on 
behalf of his principal does not have to be established by direct or positive 
proof, but may be inferred from dealings, circumstances, acts and conduct. 
Furthermore, in a case where the evidence is conflicting, or different reasonable 
interpretations may be drawn from the evidence, the question of the nature and 
extent of the authority of an agent is one of fact to be determined by the trier of 
fact. Id. 
The representations of the agent, Jones, alone are insufficient to prove 
that Wikse expressly granted Jones actual authority. See id. However, the 
representations made by Jones and McKee, in combination with inferences 
"from dealings, circumstances, acts and conduct, " constitute substantial, 
competent evidence supporting a finding of express actual authority. 
In the present case there is no evidence of any express or implied actual authority 
except the self serving statement of Rob Shepherd in the letter which the Plaintiffs claim is the 
settlement agreement. Ron Shepherd merely recites in the claimed settlement letter that the 
letter embodies the agreement that he and opposing counsel had negotiated. There is no 
statement in the letter that implies that Ron Shepherd had the authority, express or implied, to 
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agree to the negotiated agreement. The letter in and of itself contemplates that the parties 
needed to reach an agreement as to the senlement documents and execute those documents. 
A settlement agreement cannot be established by the agents own clairn of authority. 
The Defendants deny that they gave Ron Shepherd any authority whatsoever, or if he did have 
authority, the settlement exceeded his express authority. 
CONCLUSION: 
Therefore, this Court ought to deny the Plaintiffs' motion to enforce any settlement 
agreement. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF: 
The Defendants pray this Court deny the Motion and set the matter for trial and award 
to the Defendants attorney fees and costs. S b 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 
& WILLIAMS, PLLC 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
-- 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the of May, 2008, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the above and foregoi by the method indicated below, and 
addressed to the following: 
MAILED 
FAXED -- (208) 475-2201 
[ 1 HAND DELIVERED 
[ 1 OVERNIGICIT DELIVERY 
Attorney(s) and/or Individual(s) Sewed: 
Kevin E. Dinius 
Morrow Dinius 
5680 East FranWin Road, Sre. 220 
Nampa, Idaho 83687 
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R .  Wade Curtis 
BELNAP, CURTIS & WILLIAMS, PLLC 
1401 Shoreline Drive, Suite 2 
Post Ofice: Box 7685 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
FILED 
/I&.; id. J?". 
MAY 2 3 21308 
De7uty C,k;k 
Telephone: (208) 345 3333 
Fax No. : (208) 345-4461 
ISB # 1485 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
HENRY OGDEN, an unmarried man; and ) 
MICHELLE MURST, an unmarried woman,) 
) Case No. CV 2006 5807 M 
Plaintiff, ) 
1 AFFIDAVIT OF BONNIE M. PORTER 
-VS- ) 
1 
DENNIS C. GRIFFITH, an unmarried man; ) 
and BONNIE M. PORTER, an unmarried ) 
woman, 
Defendant. 
STATE O F  IDAHO 
) ss. 
County of Ada ) 
I, Bonnie M. Porter, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states: 
I .  I am a Defendant in the above captioned case. 
AFFIDAVIT OF BONNIE M. PORTER -- PAGE 1 
2. I am over the age of twenty-one (21) years and I am competent to testify as to the 
matters contained in this Affidavit which is made of my own personal knowledge and belief. 
3.  During the course of the litigation of this case on three (3) different occasions, 
Dennis and I ,  had offered to return the buyers' their $10,000 earnest money or in the 
alternative, that they could purchase the property on the terms as set in their offer. 
4. A Strategy Meeting was scheduled by Ron Shepherd for March 4, 2008. 
5 .  Dennis Griffith and I arrived at Ron's office around 10:OO a.m. on that date. 
6. Present at this meeting were Ron Shepherd, his paralegal Bruce, Dennis and 
myself. 
7 .  Ron stated to us that he had a telephone conference the previous day with Judge 
Ryan. Ron told us that Judge Ryan told him that he, Judge Ryan, was going to rule against us 
on the issue of waiver because we had signed Addendum #3. Ron stated that he believed 
Judge Ryan was wrong and that it was a very appealable issue. 
8 .  Dennis was angry and questioned Ron about the fact that he had told us all along 
that we were going to easily prevail in a jury trial, now he says we are going to lose. Dennis 
angrily wanted to know how we got blind-sided by this waiver issue? Ron's paralegal then 
inquired of Ron why we didn't go ahead with the duress argument. Dennis also argued that 
because of the terms contained in Addendum # I  we signed after the November 30th date. Ron 
dismissed both Bruce's and Dennis' pleadings as unimportant and ineffective. 
AFFIDAVIT O F  BONNIE M. PORTER -- PAGE 2 
9. Ron then stated that this was the time to make a settlement offer. Ron insisted that 
we (Dennts and I) make art offer of settlement. 
10. Dennis responded by stated to Ron, "what happerled to Dinius' reply in open court 
to Judge Ryan request of what remedy they were seeking, that they wanted specific 
performance. We understood that the Plaintiffs wanted to buy the property. 
1 I .  Dennis and I told Ron that we were willing to sell the property to the Plaintiffs as 
per the original contract and that we would give them fifteen (15) days to fund the original 
purchase price. 
12. At that point, Ron replied that if we wanted to hang onto the place that you might 
want to offer them a cash offer if we wanted to keep the property. 
13. I told Ron that I did not want to make the Plaintiff's a cash offer. I wanted the 
Plaintiffs to stick with their original offer to pay us $500,000 for the property, less the 
$20,000 earnest money. 
14. Dennis asked Ron how much money did they want. Ron stated that he, being 
Dinius, had mentioned $35,000. 
15. Dennis then commented that in order for us to pay them $35,000.00, we would 
have to refinance the farm or  take out a second mortgage on the farm. 
16. Ron stated he would discuss offers with opposing counsel and, if in agreement, Ron 
would put a letter together for our approval or signatures. 
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17. We understand that Ron prepared a letter dated March 5 ,  2008, by which he 
communicated with Mr. Dinius the subject of his and Mr. Dinius negotiations. 
18. Ron did not show me that lerrer. Ron had not discussed with me the contents of the 
letter, I never gave Ron any authority to enter into any agreement as set forth in the letter. 
19. Ron in the letter merely recites that he and Mr. Dinius had negotiated certain terms, 
but that a final agreement was to be created and executed by the parties. 
20. The afternoon of the Strategy Meeting Dennis telephoned me and told me that Ron 
wanted to offer $48,000.00 as a settlement. I rejected that offer. Dennis and I discussed the 
fact that we would go to trial the next day. 
21. At approximately 5:00 p.m. that evening, I received a phone call from Ron, which 
I believed also had Ron's paralegal listening in on the conversation. During this call, Ron told 
me  that Dennis had agreed to the settlement offer of $40,000.00. I explained to Ron that I was 
not happy offering $35,000.00 or $40,000.00, and that I would prefer to just let the Plaintiffs 
purchase the property. Ron then advised me that I should retain my own attorney due to my 
conflict of interest, in that I wanted to sell the property, and Dennis wanted to keep it. I told 
Ron that if Dennis had approved payment to the Plaintiffs of $40,000 that I would have to go 
along if we could get a loan. 
22. I explained that I was not interested, nor could I afford, to hire my own attorney. 
23. Ron told me at that point that he would prepare papers for Dennis' and my 
signatures of Approval on the Settlement. 
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24. At no time, did I authorize Ron Shepherd to offer $40,000.00 payment in 
settlement. 
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT. 
DATED this day of May, 2008. 
Bonnie M. Porter 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me the undersigned Notary this 3 \ day of 
L 
May, 2008. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at h i s e ,  Idaho 
My Commission Expires: (, - q-  ) a, 
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I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the within and foregoing 
documents to be served by the method indicated below on the attorney(s) and/or individual(s) 
t 
listed below. the a day of May, 2008. 
Document Served: AFFIDAVIT OF BONNIE PORTER 
% MAILED [ FAXED -- 475-2201 
[ j HAND DELIVERED 
[ j OVERNIGHT DELIVERY 
Attomey(s) andlor Individuals Served: 
Kevin E. Dinius 
Morrow Dinius 
5680 East Franklin Road, Ste. 220 
Nampa, Idaho 83687 
R. Wade Curtis 
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It. Wade Curtis 
BELNAP, CURTIS & WILLIAMS, PLLG 
1401 Shoreline Drive, Suite 2 
Post Office Box 7685 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
Telephone: (208) 345-3333 
Fax No.: (208) 345-4461 
ISB # 1485 
Attorneys for Defendants 
":! ED 
r I -  / 4 -- P hl' 
MAY 2 3 2008 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
HENRY OGDEN, an unmarried man; and ) 
MICHELLE HURST, an unmarried woman,) 
) Case No. CV 2006 5807 M 
Plaintiff, 1 
) AFFIDAVIT OF DENNIS GRIFFITH 
-vs- 1 
1 
DENNIS C. GRIFFITH, an unmarried man; ) 
and BONNIE M. PORTER, an unmarried ) 
woman, ) 
Defendant. 
STATE O F  IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Ada ) 
I, Dennis Griffith, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states: 
1. I am a Defendant in the above captioned case. 
AFFIDAVIT OF DENNIS GRIFFITH -- PAGE 1 
2. I arn over the age of twenty-one (21) years artd I am competent to testify as to the 
matters contamed in this Affidavit which is made of my own personal knowledge and belief. 
3 .  A Strategy Meeting was requested, or even deinanded, by Ron Shepherd and was 
set for March 4, 2008. 
4. Bonnie Porter and myself arrived at Ron's office at about 9:30 to 10:00 a.m. on the 
date the meeting was set for. 
5. Present at this meeting was Ron Shepherd, his paralegal whose name I believe is 
Bruce, Bonnie and myself. 
6 .  Ron stated that Judge Ryan had told him on a telephone conference the previous day 
that he was going to rule against us on the issue of waiver because we had signed Addendum 
#3. 
7.  Ron then stated and demanded for us ( b n n i e  and I) to make an offer of settlement. 
We agreed, and decided to offer to let them buy the property as per the contract and agreed to 
give them fifteen ( 2 5 )  days to fund the original offer. 
8. At that point, Ron requested a second cash offer if we wanted to keep the property. 
Bonnie stated that she would prefer that they perform on their original offer. I then asked what 
had happened to the Plaintiffs telling Judge Ryan when asked what remedy they were seeking, 
and why Mr. Dinius replied in open court that the Plaintiff's want "specific performance 
only". Ron stated that it would be beneficial to make a cash offer as an alternative. 
AFFIDAVIT OF DENNIS GRIFFITH -- PAGE 2 
9. I asked Ron what amount they wanted, and Ron said that they would accept 
$35,000.00 
10. 1 then commented that in order to give $35,000.00, that we would have to 
refinance or take our a second mortgage on the farm. 
11. Ron had told us  all along that we were going to easily prevail in a jury trial, now he 
says we are going to lose. I angrily wanted to know how we got blind-sided by this waiver 
issue? Ron's paralegal then inquired of Ron why we didn't go ahead with the duress argument. 
I also argued that the Addendum #1  was why we signed after the November 30th date. Ron 
dismissed both Bruce's and my pleadings as unimportant and ineffective. 
12. Ron stated he would discuss offers with opposing counsel and, if in agreement, 
wouid put a letter together for our approval or  signatures. 
13. The Strategy Meeting concluded at about 11:30 a.m. and I went to work and 
Bonnie went home as it was her day off. 
14. At 4:00 p.m. that same day, Ron called me at work and said that the Plaintiffs had 
accepted the $35,000 offer, but wanted more money. I responded by asking Ron if he meant 
that the Plaintiffs did not want the property, and he replied that the Plaintiffs wanted 
$50,000.00. I quickly denied the counter offer, by saying no. 
15. Ron asked me if I wanted to bump my $35,000 offer and I replied that if I could 
borrow $35,000 that I could borrow $40,000. I said it is all contingent upon us getting a loan 
against the farm. Ron hung up the phone at that time. 
AFFIDAVIT OF DENNIS GRIFFITH -- PACE 3 
16. A few mlnutes later, Ron called back, stating that the Plaintiffs would accept 
f3R.000.00. I told Ron no again. Ron then hung up the phone again. 
17. At this time I called Bonnie and d~scussed with her my conversations with Ron. I 
told her that they wouId settle for $48,000.00- She said no. I told her that I had said no. 
18. Again, a few minutes later, Ron called back and explained to me that the Plaintiffs 
would take and accept $40,000.00. I reiterated to Run that we would have to get a loan on the 
farm before we could agree to any amount. Ron then hung up. 
19. It is my understanding that Ron then called Bonnie. 
20. At no time, did I authorize Ron Shepherd to offer to the Plaintiffs that Bonnie and I 
would pay $40,000.00 in settlement. 
21. Sometime after March 5, 1 received a copy of Ron's March 5th letter. Two days 
later Brenda, one of Ron's paralegals called me and wanted to know when I was going to come 
in and slgn the agreements. 1 told her that I was not about to agree to the offer as Ron wrote it 
in the letter and that we were in the process of applying for a loan on the property. Several 
days later Bruce called. I told Bruce that we felt like we had been hit by a train. That our 
payment, if any, was contingent upon us getting a loan. We had been turned down for a loan. 
22. It was never mentioned to me that the Plaintiffs would provide a loan to us. I would 
never agree to the Plaintiffs providing a loan. 1 would only accept a loan from a mortgage 
company or  bank. 
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1 "(: 
CERTIRCATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the within and foregoing 
documents to be served by the method indicated below on the attorney(s) and/or individual(s) 
1S1/ listed below, the a day of May, 2008. 
Document Served: AFFIDAVIT OF DENNIS GRIFFITH 
- 111-2201 
[ ] WAND DELIVERED 
[ ] OVERNIGHT DELIVERY 
Attomey(s) and/or Individuals Served: 
Kevin E. Dinius 
Morrow Dinius 
5680 East Franklin Road, Ste. 220 
Nampa, Idaho 83687 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, EN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYI-IEE 
HENRY OGDEN, an unmarried man; and ) Case No. CV-2006-05807-M 
MICHELLE WURST, an unmarried woman, ) 
Plaintiff, 
) 
) 
FINDINGS OF FACT & 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW UPON 
) PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO 
ENFORCE SETTLEMENT 
-vs- 
) 
DENNIS C. GRIFFITH, an m a r r i e d ;  ) 
and, BONNIE M. PORTER, an unmarried ) 
woman, 1 
Defendants. 
This matter came on for evidentiary hearing upon the Plaintiffs' Motion to Enforce 
Settlement Agreement on June 26,2008. The defendants were present for the evidentiary hearing, 
the plaintiffs were not present.. Appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs, Henry Ogden and Michelle 
Hurst, were Kevin Dinius and Shelli Stewart Stuart, attorneys at law. Appearing on behalf of the 
defendants, Dennis Griffith and Bonnie Porter was Wade Curtis, attorney at law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT & CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
UPON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT 
STANDARD OF MVIE\V 
In Goohan  v. Lothrop, 143 Idaho 622, 15 1 P.3d 8 18 (2007), the Idaho Supreme Court 
held that when a district court considers a motion to enforce a settlemeclt agreement, and it 
considers material outside of the pleadings, it must treat the motion as one for summary 
judgment. In taking testimony at the evidentiary hearing, this Court ctearly considers material 
outside of the pleadings. 
S m a r y  judgment is approptiate where the pleadings, 
depositions, admissions and affidavits on file show that there are 
no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. I.R.C.P. 56(c). "All 
disputed facts are to be construed liberally in favor of the non- 
moving party, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from 
the record are to be drawn in favor of the non-moving party." 
Sprinkler Irrigation Co. v. J o h ~  Deere Ins., 139 Idaho 691, at. P. 
695-696, 85 P.3d 667 (2004). S m a r y  judgment is inappropriate 
where "reasonable people could reach different conclusions or 
draw conflicting inferences from the evidence" regarding a 
genuine issue of material fact. tYalange v. Renchar, 136 Idaho 192, 
195, 30 P.3d 970,973 (2001). 
Goodman, supra at p. 626. 
FIMDINGS OF FACT 
1. Prior to the trial of this matter the Plaintiffs filed a Motion -For Summary Judgment 
and the Court entered its Memorandum Decision and Order on February 25, 2008. Immediately 
thereafter, the Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Reconsider the Court's decision. The Court received 
and reviewed the briefing submitted in connection to the motion to reconsider. 
On or about March 3, 2008, the Court conducted a telephone status conference with 
Kevin Dinius and Ron Shepherd, attorneys for the parties. During that telephone conference, 
which was conducted in chambers and not made a part of the record, the Gourt clarified its ruling 
in the memorandum decision. That clarification was later documented in this Court's 
Memorandum Decision Regarding Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider filed on April 17, 2008. 
Therein, the Court made the determination that by signing Addendum Number 3 to the Purchase 
and Sale Agreement, the Defendants waived their right to claim that the Plaintiffs breached the 
contract by failing to make the h d s  available on November 30'. In order for the Defendants to 
be successfbl at the trial, they would have to prove they signed Addendum 3 under duress. 
FINDINGS OF FACT & CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
UPON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT 
2. In the morning hours of Mach 5, 2008, atrorney Ron Shepherd contacted his 
clients and requested that they meet with him to review this most recent decision of the Court. 
At this strategy meeting Mr. Shepherd, his clients and Mr. Hendricks, the paralegal assigned to 
the case, discussed the prospects of prevailing at trial and the prospects of settlement. 
Eventually two possible settlement alternatives were reached. The first alternative was to 
simply go forward with the sale of the property to the Plaintiffs. The terms of that proposal are 
as set forth in Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 5 to the June 26, 2008 evidentiary hearing. The second 
alternative would allow the Defendants to keep the property by paying a sum certain to the 
Plaintiffs and that said payment would be fitnded by a loan collateralized by the property. 
Defend- Griffith felt that such a loan would be easily obtainable within a six month period. 
The mount agreed upon at the morning meeting of March 5,2008, was $35,000 to be paid to the 
plaintiffs. 
4. Mr. Shepherd made these alternative offers to the Plaintiffs following the 
meeting. The alternative offers, as set forth in Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 5 to the June 26, 2008 
evidentiary hearing, reflect the issues discussed by the parties attending the meeting on March 5, 
2008. The terms set forth in paragraphs two through six of alternative number two were 
communicated, at least as to their essential elements, to the Defendants. Specifically, that the 
Defendants would not be required to pay for a period of six months, and that there would need to 
be a release of the lis pendens in order to accomplish the goal of the Defendants obtaining a loan 
in the amount agreed upon. At least one witness, Mr. Hendricks, indicated that the issue of an 
interest amount was discussed. In addition, it appears that the issue of a deed of trust being 
executed by the Defendants was discussed. This Court finds as a matter of fact that actually 
incorporating, as a term and condition of settlement, the idea of a deed of trust further protected 
the defendants and was an appropriate term and condition of the settlement. 
7. Later in the day on March 5, 2008, attorney Ron Shepherd communicated with 
both Dennis Griffith and Bonnie Porter in separate telephone calls. There was a witness to those 
telephone calls who testified that Mr. Griffith agreed to a settlement amount of $40,000, up 
$5,000 from the previously offered $35,000. The witness, Mr. Wendricks, prepared a written 
memorandum of that discussion which is contained in Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 13 to the June 26, 
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UPON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT 
2008 evidelrtiary heming. Exhibit 13 states that defendants Griffith and Porter agreed to pay 
$40,000, within six months of the agreement, at an interest rate of six percent, the payment to be 
secured by a deed of trust. The law firm of Hamilton, Michaelson & Hilty, LLP agreed to 
subordinate its lien on the properry to the deed of trust. Plaintiffs Ogden and Wurst agreed to 
dismiss the suit with prejudice. It was understood that Griffith and Porter would be obtaining a 
loan to pay the $40,000 and the lis pe~derls was to be released sirnultmeously with closing on 
the loan. 
8. Mr. Griffith recalled that at the meeting held on the morning of March 5,2008, he 
was confident he would be able to obtain a loan of $35,000 within a six month period. Bonnie 
Porter remembered Griffith's confidence. When attorney Shepard contacted Griffith later in the 
day about a counteroffer to settle for $40,000, Griffith replied '"hat if 1 could borrow $35,000 
that I could borrow $40,000." See paragraph 15 to Affidavit of Dennis Griffith filed May 23, 
2008. It was this statement to Shepard that caused him to assume that he had been granted 
authority to settle the case for the $40,000 amount. It was not until several weeks later when 
Dennis Griffith evidently lost his employment that concern arose as to ability to obtain a loan. 
9. Both Mr. Griffith and Ms. Porter understood when they left the meeting March 5 
that they had agreed to make an alternative offer of $35,000 to keep the property and that they 
would have a six month period in which to obtain a loan. 
FINDINGS OF LAW 
1. The Court has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this action. 
2. The matter of an attorney's authority to settle a client's lawsuit is expressly set 
forth in the case of Caballero v. Wike, 140 Idaho 329 (2003). In Caballero, the Idaho Supreme 
Court noted that an attorney must have express or implied actual authority to compromise a 
client's claim and that apparent authority is insufficient. Id at 332. "'The relationship between 
an attorney and client is one of agency' in which the client is the principal and the attorney is the 
agent." Id (quoting Muncey v. Children 's Home Finding and A i d  Soc. Of Lewiston, 84 Idaho 
147, 151, 369 P.2d 586, 588 (1962)). The issue of apparent authority is not applicable in this 
case so the Court will not discuss it. The direct issue is whether or not the principal, Dennis 
FINDINGS OF FACT & CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
UPON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT 
aiffi th and Ronnie Porter, expressly granted or impliedly conferred upon Ron Shepherd, their 
attorney, actual authority to settle this case. 
3. The amount of evidence required to prove the actual authority needed to settle a 
case is directly discussed by the Idaho Court of Appeals in Muniz v. Schr~der, 11 5 Idaho 497, 
767 P.2d 1272 ( 1  989). The Muniz, the Court explained: 
The declarations of an alleged agent, standing alone, are 
insufficient to prove that the principal has conferred such authority. 
Clark v. Gneiting, 95 Idaho 10,501 P.2d 278 (1972). However, the 
autfiority of the agent to act for and on behalf of his principal does 
not have to be established by direct or positive proof, but may be 
inferred from deaIings, circumstances, acts and conduct. White v. 
Donex 82 Idaho 217,221,35 1 P.2d 380,382 (1960). Furthermore, 
in a case where the evidence is conflicting, or different reasonable 
interpretations may be drawn from the evidence, the question of 
the nature and extent of the authority of an agent is one of fact to 
be determined by the trier of fact. 3 AM.JUR.2D, Agency 5 373 
(1 986). 
1 1 5 Idaho at 500-0 1. 
ANALYSIS 
This Court finds that when Griffith and Porter left the meeting on March 5, 2008, they 
had expressly granted actual authority to Shepard to make two alternative offers of settlement to 
the plaintiff. Those offers are documented in Plaintiffs Exhibit 5 to the evidentiary hearing. 
One of the alternatives was to pay $35,000 within six months of the date of the agreement in 
return for dismissal of the case. Later that same day, Dennis Griffith granted an extension to that 
authority allowing Mr. Shepherd to offer $40,000 to effectuate the settlement. This offer was 
conveyed by Mr. Shepherd to the plaintiffs through their counsel and it was accepted. 
Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Criffith and Porter, the Court finds that 
Griffith's own affidavit in opposition to the motion to enforce the settlement agreement states 
that when informed that the plaintiffs' counter offered to dismiss their claims for a payment of 
$40,000 he told Shepard, "if I could borrow $35,000 that I could borrow $40,000." The only 
reasonable interpretation to be drawn from this evidence is that Shepherd had at least implied 
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actual authority to settle this matter for $40,000 which he communicated in his scco~ld letter of 
March 5,2008, marked as Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 6 to the June 26,2008 evidentiary hearing. 
Therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, and this does ORDER, that Plaintiffs' Motion to Enforce 
the Settlement Agreement is GRANTED. 
DATED: 1/25/08 
-r 
Thomas J. Ryan I 
District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HERt;BY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed or 
delivered to the following persons on this 
Kevin E. Dinius 
Monrow Dinius 
5680 East Franklin Road, Ste. 220 
Nampa, Idaho 83687 
R. Wade Curtis 
Belnap, Curtis & Willims, PLLC 
1401 Shoreline Drive, Suite 2 
P.O. Box 7685 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Deputy clerk- 
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AI'LEN B. ELLIS 
ELLIS, BROWN & SI-IEILS, CI1AR'I 1<ICEL9 
Attumeys-at-l-aw 
707 North 8th Street 
P.O. Box 385 
Boise, Idaho 8370 1 -03 58 
(208) 345-7832 (Telephone) 
(208) 345-9564 (Facsimile) 
ISB No. 1626 
FILED 
, I L~ .~ ._~~ .  
SEP 0 2 2008 
Deputy Clerk 
Attomeys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISl'RIC-T COlJRT 01: I'HE T1IIKD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAIfO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
Henry Ogden, an uilrnarried man; and ) 
Michelle t-Iurst, an unmarried woman, ) 
Plaintiff, Case No. CV 2006-5807*M 
V .  1 SUBSTITUTION OF ATTORNEY 
) 
Dennis C. Griffith, an unmarried man; 1 
and, Bonnie M. Porter, an unmarried 
woman, 
) 
1 
1 
Defendant. ) 
TO: The clerk of the above-entitled court and to the attorney of the plaintiffs, Kevin 
Dinius: 
YOU AND EACH OF YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED That Wade Curtis, Belnap Curtis, 
hereby withdraws as attorney of record for the plaintiff Dennis C. Criffith, in the above-entitled 
action, and that Allen B. Ellis, Ellis, Brown & Sheils, Chtd., 707 North 8" Street, P.O. Box 388. 
Boise, Idaho is hereby substituted therefor and by tice appears herein. 
DATED this day of August, 200 r") 
SUBSTJTUTION OF ATTORNEY - 1 
CERII IFICA7 F 01 SIIRVICE 
A I HEREBY C.FR711FY that on the tl_? dity of August. 2008. 1 caused to be served a true 
-- 
arid correct copy of the ihrcgoing by the mctliod indicated beion. and addressed to the following 
Mr. Kevin E. Dinius 
Monow, Dinius 
5680 E. Franklin Road, Suite 220 
Narnpa, Idaho 83687 
U.S. Mail 
Hand Delivery 
Overnight Mail 
X Facsimile 
- - 
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Kevin E. Drnius 
Shelli D. Stewart 
MORROW DNIUS 
5680 East Iyriurklin Road, Sultc 220 
Mampa, Idaho 83687-7901 
Telephone: (208) 475-2200 
Facsimile: (208) 475-2201 
ISE3 Nos. 5974,7459 
Minius@mor~owdin Jus. corn 
ss~ewarf@mor~nwdin~u.r corn 
Altorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 'TI-IF, TI-TIRD JlJDTCIAL DISTRlCT OF 
TI-lC STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR I'X-IE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
HENRY OGDEN, an unmamed man; and, ) 
MICEIET,J-,E HURST, an unmarried woman, ) 
) CASE NO. CV 2006-5807"M 
Plaintiffs, ) 
) JUDGMENT 
-VS- ) 
1 
T)F;NNIS C. CRIFFI'I'H, an unmarried man; ) 
and, BONNIE M. PORTER, an unmarried 1 
woman, ) 
Defendants. 1 
TI-11s MATTER HAVING COME before the Court lbr hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Summary ludgmentnVfotion to Enforce Settlement Agreement on June 26, 2008, and the Couvt 
havi.ng entered its Findings of Fact & Conclusions of taw Upon PlaintiEs' Motion to Enforce 
Settlement Agreeinei~t on July 25,2008: 
ORIGINAL 
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IT IS H E S U Y  ORDERED AND TI-XIS DOES O W E R  that Judgmetlt is entered in 
favor of Plaintiffs and against tlze Defc~~dmts in accordance with Rule 56 of the Idaho Rulcs of 
Civil Procedure and pursuant to tllc Court's !:indings of Fact & Conclusions of Law Upon 
PlaintiEss' Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement entered on July 25,2008. 
WHEREFORE, by virtuc of the law and by reason of the premises aforesaid. IT IS 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that said Plaintiffs do have and recovcr from said 
Defendattts ( I )  thc sum of $40,000.00, plus accrued interest on said sum at the rate or  6% pcr 
anilum from March 26, 2008, to be paid on or beforc October I ,  2008; (2) Dcfcndants shall 
execute a promissory note and deed of trust to secure payment; (3) Plaintiffs shall dismiss thc 
suit with prejudice; and (4) Plaintiffs shall release their lis pendens on the Property. 
a 1 
6 5&t#t** br MADE AND ENERED t h i s q d a y  of Aupwt. 2008. 
4 ~ 7  4- 
Judge Thorn&?~~an 
JUDGMENT 2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hcrcby cenjfy h a t  on this qf6 day of August. 2008,I caused to bc sc~vcd a truc and 
correct copy of Lhc foregoing document by thc rncthod indicated below to thc followii~g: 
Kevin E. Dinius 
M O ~ O W  DnurrJs 
5680 E. Franklin Rd., Suite 220 
Nampa, ID 836137 
R. Wade Curtis 
B,EI,NAP, CURTIS & W I L L J A M S  
P.O. Box 7685 
.Boise, ID 83702 
c??I US Nail 
Ill Overnight M a i l  
Flilnd Delivcry 
T"i Facsimile - No. 475-220 1 - 
US Mail 
Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivcry 
Facsimile - No 345-446 1 
:2 
3 4 i & i  i lmv1 
Deputy Clerk 
JUDGMENT - 3 
' % A "  
AL,l,EN H. EI,I,IS 
ELIAS, UItOWN & SHEILS, CHARTERIZD 
Attorney s-at-Law 
707 North 8th Street 
P.O. Box 388 
Boise. Iclaho 8370 1-0388 
(208) 145-7832 ('l'elephonc) 
(208) 345-9564 (Facsimile) 
FILED 
SEP t 5 2008 
CHA.RLOJ~E WERBURN, CLERK (-q &im( ,L\q&------ 
Deputy Clerk 
ISB No. 1626 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN TI IE DISTRICT COURT OF TI-IE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
Iienry Ogden, an unmarried man; and 
Michelle Hurst, an unmarried woman, 
Plaintiffs. 
Dennis C. Criffith, an unmarried man; 
and, Bonnie M. Porter, an unmarried 
woman, 
Defendants. 
1 
) 
) 
'J Case No. CV 2006-5807*M 
) 
) MO'TION TO DISALI,OW 
) COSTS AND FEES 
1 
1 
j 
1 
Come now defendants, through their attorney of record, and move the Court for an order 
disallowing plaintiffs claimed costs and attorney fees set forth in their Motion for Attorney Fees and 
Costs with supporting memoranda and affidavit of Kevin Dinius. This motion is made upon the 
following grounds: (1) plaintiffs are not prevailing parties; (2) plaintiffs are not entitled to attorney 
fees under Idaho Code section 12-120(3) because there was no commercial transaction; (3) 
defendants' opposition to enforcement of the oral settlement agreement was not frivolous, and 
MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND FEES - 1 
plaintiffs arc not entitled to attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-12]; (4) plaintiffs' 
claimed attorney fees are excessive; and ( 5 )  plaintiffs have failed to adequately document their 
claimed costs. both of right and discretionary. 
I'his motion is based upon the Memorandum in Support of Motions to Vacate Judgment and 
Disallow Attorney FeesiCosts, the pleading and records in this action. and sucli other oral and 
documentary evidence which may be presented at hear~ng. 
DATED this I I L h  day of Scptcrnber, 2008. 
Attorney for defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 1 l th  day of September, 2008, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Mr. Kevin E. Dinius li S. Mail 
Morrow, Dinius Hand Delivery 
5680 E. Franklin Road, Suite 220 Overnight Mail 
Nampa, Idaho 83687 
- X- Facsimile 
475-220 1 
Allen B. ~ l l i s '  w 
MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND FEES - 2 
ALL,EN E3. ELLIS 
EL,121S, B R O W  Cit: SHEII.,S, C'HARTEIZEU 
Attorneys-at-l,aw 
707 North 8th Street 
P.O. Box 388 
Boise. Ida110 8370 1-0388 
(208) 345-7832 (Telephone) 
(208) 345-9564 (Facsimile) 
ISB No. 1626 
Attorneys for Defendants 
1N 'I'HE UIS'I'RICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
Henry Ogden, an unmanied man; and 
Michelle Hurst, an unmarried woman, 
Plaintiffs. 
Dennis C. Griftitl~, an unmarried man; 
and, Bonnie M. Porter, an ~ ~ n m a n i e d  
woman, 
Defendants. 
1 
1 Case No. CV 2006-5807*M 
) 
1 MEMORANDI IM IN SUPPORT 
) C)F MOTIONS r0  VACATE- 
) J1JDC;MENT A N D  DISALLOW 
1 AI'TORNtlY FlSESICOS'TS 
) 
) 
1 
Preliminary note: As the Court is aware, this litigation arises out of the prospective sale to 
plaintiffs of defendants' residence and the forty acres on which it is located. As a result of a series 
of transactional and litigative events, defendants are now required, by judgment, to pay plaintiffs 
$40,000 to release plaintiffs' claim that they are entitled to specific performance of an expired real 
estate contract.. 
Event No. 1: It is undisputed that plaintiffs were unable to fund the transaction by the closing 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTIONS TO VACATE JUDGMENT 
AND DISALLOW ATTORNEY FEESICOSTS - 1 
date of November 30,2006, and the contract expired on its own terms (Memorandum Decision, p. 
6, February 15, 2008). However, defendants signed the closing documents on December 1,2006, 
and December 4,2006, igtiorant that the transaction had not yet funded by the closing deadline.' At 
the time defci~dai~ts signed the closing documents at the title company, they also signed, 
unkilcl\vit~gly, air extension agreement, extending the closing date to December 7,2006, which had 
beeti forwarded to the title company by their own agent Pete McArthur, However, this extensron 
agreement was never signed by plaintiff buyers, aid "it never became a part of the contract" 
(Memorandum Decision, supra, p. 7). This Court ultimately ruled that defendants' signing the 
extension agreement (Addendum No. 3) constituted a waiver of the original closing date 
(Memorandum Decision filed April 7, 2008,).~ The Court also ruled that there was a factual 
cluestion whether defendants signed the extension under duress. Impact of event: Through 
unsophistication and a lack of professional oversight, defendants signed the closing documents to 
a transaction which had not funded by the deadline and signed the extension agreement without 
reading it. 
Event No. 2: Plaintiffs sought to enforce an alleged settleme~~t agreement between plaintiffs 
and defendants. In opposition to a motion for summary judgment filed by plaintiffs, defendants' 
 h he record does not explain why the title company required the defendants to execute the 
closing documents subsequent to the closing deadline at a point when the transaction had not yet funded. 
 he Court's finding of waiver is not completely understood. The closing date of the transaction 
was November 30th. Plaintiffs argue that based upon their reliance on the extension (Addendum No. 3) 
they obtained additional funding. However, when defendants signed the extension (December 1 and 
December 4), the deadline for closing had already passed. In order for waiver to exist, the party asserting 
waiver inust have acted in reliance on the waiver. At the point defendants signed the so-called waiver 
(Addendum No. 3), "the contract expired on its own terms" (Memorandum Decision, February 25,2008, 
p. 6). Additionally, plaintiffs did not sign the extension agreement, further evidencing lack of reliance. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTIONS TO VACATE JUDGMENT 
AND DISALLOW ATTORNEY FEES/COSTS - 2 
co~insel srtbmitred defendants' affidavits recitlng conversatrons M hich occurred between defendarrrs 
and their predecessor attorney Ron Shepherd. Perceiving this to be a waiver of the attorneyiclient 
privilege. plaintiffs' attorney met with and marshaled the testimony of Mr. Shepherd against his 
clients, the defendants. Rased, in large part, on the testimony oftheir attorney (Shepherd), this Court 
ordered that there was a settlement agreement which required defendants to pay plaintiffs $40,000 
and execute a deed of trust on their residence. Impact of event: Defendants' counsel was aware 
that Shcpilerci withdrew because of defendants' refusal to execute a settlement agreement. See 
affidavit ofDennis Griffith. Notwithstanding that knowledge, he jettisoned whatever protection the 
attorneyIclient relationship affbrded by filing defendants' nilidavits, which waived the attorneyiclient 
privilege. 
Event No. 3: As this Court is aware, an agreement to convey an interest in real property, 
including an agreement to execute deed of trust, must be in writing to be enforceable. (See Idaho 
Code section 9-503 and Memorandum Decision filed August 10,2007, p. 5 j. In opposing Plaintiffs' 
Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement, defendants' counsel cited this point of law. (Defendants 
[proposed] Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, pp. 8,9j.  
In the Court's Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law upon Plaintiffs' Motion to Enforce 
Settlement ("FFICL"), he found that a deed of tnlst was "discussed" and "was an appropriate term 
and condition of the settlement" to unwind the real estate transaction. Id. p. 3. That is, the Court 
found that the deed of trust was a material term of the settlement agreement. In opposing the 
settlement, defendants' then counsel based his clients' opposition, in part, upon a well-recognized 
principle of real estate law which is statutorily set in Idaho by Idaho Code section 9-503. That is, 
assuming, arguendo, defendants agreed to execute a deed of trust, the oral settlement agreement is 
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not enforceable, because it involves the cotlveyance of an interest in real property. Impact of event: 
ilckndtlnts opposed errforcement of the oral agreernrnt bascd tiport the stature ut' fraitds M hie11 
oppitsttior~ was well groitndtld In fact and warranreti by eulstlng iitw, I e . dekndants Bere not acting 
The above factual backdrop is relevant to defendants' motion to set aside the judgment (Rule 
59(e). I.R.G.P.) as well as plaintifi' claim for attorney fees based upon Idaho Code section 12-12 1 
(allegedly frivolous defense). 
TIE  JUDGMENT IS AGAINST THE LAW AND SHOULD BE SET ASIDE BECAUSE 
THE ORAL SETTLEMENT' AGREEMENT IS SUBJECT TO THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
P~irpose of Rule 59(e): This Rule authorizes a party to file a motion to alter or amend a 
jrtdgment. A motion made pursuant to Rule 59(e) provides the trial court with the opportunity to 
correct errors of law or fact. The Rule constitutes a safety net for Court and counsel to catch 
errors without having to engage in an expensive, protracted appeal. Lowe v. Lym , 103 Idaho 259, 
263, 646 P.2d 1030 (Ct App. 1982); First Sec. Bank v. Neibaur, 98 Idaho 598,603, 570 P.2d 276 
The oral settlement agreement contemplates the transfer of an interest in real ~roper tv  and 
is unenforceable as within the Statute of Frauds: At its base, the settlement agreement contemplates 
the (1) unwinding of a real estate transaction and (2) the execution of a deed of trust. As such, the 
agreement must be in writing in order to be enforceable. Section 9-503 states in pertinent part: 
No estate or interest in real property, other than for leases for a term 
not exceeding one ( I )  year, nor any trust or power over or concerning 
it, or in any manner relating thereto, can be created, granted, assigned. 
surrendered, or declared, otherwise than by operation of law, or a 
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cotlveyance or other instrument in writing, subscribed by the party 
creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, or 
by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing. 
'I'he Court found tflat the settlement agreement b e t ~ e e n  the parties "incorporat[ed] as a term 
and cnnciiticrn of settlement, the idea of ;t deed of trust . . ." (FFiGL, p. 3). That is, as a security 
device, the agreement required defendants to execute a deed oftrust in plainrii?;' favor. According 
to Black's Law Dicttonary. Seventh Ediilon, p 423, a deed of trust is ciefir~ed as .'A deed conve)Ing 
title lo real property to st trustee as security untii the grantor repays the loan". Because the settlement 
conternplated the transfer of interest in real property, the settlement agreement must be in writing 
to be enforceable. 
Also, an indispensable provision in any settlement between plaintiffs and defendants, whether 
oral or written, would be that plaintiffs grant to defendants any interest plaintiffs claim in the subject 
real property, arising from the earnest money agreement. This term is also within the statute of 
frauds and unenforceable absent a writing. Even without the deed of trust issue, the settlement 
agreement contemplates the unwinding of a real estate transaction and is subject to the statute of 
frauds. 
The statute of frauds pertains to all agreements concerning the conveyance of an interest in 
real property, including settlement agreements. Idaho law is clear that when the subject of a 
settlement agreement falls within the proscription of the statute of frauds that agreement must be in 
writing. Olson v. Dep 't of Water Resources, 105 Idaho 98,666 P.2d 188 ( 1  983). 
Thus, if the oral stipulation entered into in this case was an executory 
contract establishing and declaring water rights, it is a contract falling 
within the statue of frauds and is unenforceable in the absence of a 
writing. See Sims v. Purcelf, 74 Idaho 109,257 P.2d 242 (1 953) (oral 
compromise agreements within the statute of frauds unless taken out 
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by part perfortnancc); ficrncrs v Green, 7 Idaho 668, 65 I). 362 
( 1  90 1 )  (oral settlement contract to convey water rights within statute 
of frauds unless taken out by part performance). 
105 Idaho at 10 1 
When the parties to a real estate contract attempt to include a security ~rovision, that 
provision becomes an essential term of the contract. Oral evidence is not admissible to establish an 
essential term of such an agreemmt. Lowjrence v Junes, 124 Idaho 748,75 I ,  864 P.2d 194 (App. 
1 C193) In Lrrwrence, the Court held that a failed atteillpt to include a security provision renders the 
security pl.ovision an "essential term of the agree~nent. Llkewise herc the deed of trust prov~sion 
is essential. Absent a writing respecting thls provisloll, an essential term is missing and the 
settlement agreement is unenforceable. 
EVEN HAD THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT BEEN IN WRITING, IT WOULD 
NOT HAVE BEEN ENFORCEABLE BECAUSE THE AUTHORIZATION OF 
DEFENDANTS' AGENT WAS NOT ITSELF REDUCED T O  A WRITING 
Paragraphs 2, 4 and 7 of the Findings of Fact describe the settlement negotiations which 
occurred between plaintiffs, on the one hand, and defendants' attorney (Mr. Shepherd), on the other 
There is no  writing which endows Mr. Shepherd with the authority to agree to execute a deed of trust 
or otherwise unwind the reai property transaction on behalf of the defendants. Because the 
settlement agreement was subject to the statute of frauds, Mr. Shepherd's authority to act can only 
be conferred by a writing executed by the defendants. There is no evidence of such written authority 
This principle of law is noted in the Restatement ofAgency, Second, section 28: "Except as 
stated in Subsection (2), an instrument executed by an agent as a sealed instrument does not operate 
as such unless authority or apparent authority to execute it has been conferred by an instrument under 
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seal ." 
In Arthzrr 11 k/~lp~(rzck Brorhel-.s 47 Idaho 306, 274 Pac 800 ( 1929). a power of attorrlcy 
contained no authority to convey real estate. The Court concluded that "the deed to Catherine .I. 
Arthur was ineffective by reason of illsufficiency of the power of attorney to authorize conveyance 
of real estate". Id. 47 Idaho at 3 1 I .  See also Johnson v. ,Sage, 4 Idaho 758,764,44 Pac. 641 (1 896). 
111. 
THERE IS NO PREVAILNG PARTY IN THIS MATTER 
Rule 54(d)(l)(B) sets forth the manner in which the trial court shall determine which party, 
if any, is the prevailing party: " . . . the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider the final 
judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties . . ." 
The plaintiffs did not prevail on any of the five counts alleged In the complaint: The 
complaint alleges the following counts: ( 1 )  breach of contract; (2)  inji~nction; (3) specific 
performance; (4) declaratory judgment; and (5) breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing. None of these counts were litigated. Rather, the plaintiffs sought the assistance ofthe Court 
in enforcing a settlement agreement. As part of that settlement, defendants retained ownership of 
the real property, contrary to the allegations of the complaint. Further, the terms of the settlement 
agreement did not include the payment of attorney fees in addition to the $40,000. 
Stated differently, plaintiffs did not sue to enforce a settlement agreement. Rather than 
adjudicate the five counts pleaded in the complaint, they settled those counts and then sought the 
assistance of the Court in enforcing the settlement. Simply put, plaintiffs did not prevail on any of 
the five counts contained in the complaint. 
Because they are not prevailing parties, under Rule 54(d), I.R.C.P., plaintiffs are not entitled 
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to costs or attorney fees. 
IV. 
THE TRANSACTION BE FWEt:N PLAWTIFFS AND DEFEND4NTS RESPECTIWC THE 
SALE Of- UEFk:NDAN'TSYIIESlDENGF IS N_C)'T A COMMFIRCIilL TRANSACTION 
W17%IllN I ' I iE CON?'T:MPL2ATION Ok IDAHO CODE SI'("S1ON 12- 120(3) 
Section 12- 120(3) states: 
In any civil action to recover or1 an open account, account stated, note 
bill, negotiable instrument, guaranty, or contract relating to the 
purchase or sale of goods, wares, merchandise, or services and in any 
commercial transaction unless otherwise provided by law, the 
prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee to be set 
by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs. 
The term "commercial tra~lsaction" is defined to mean all transactions 
except transactions for personal or household purposes. The term 
"party" is defined to mean any person, partnership, corporation, 
association, private organization, the state of Idaho or political 
subdivision thereof. 
Clearly, the oral settlement agreement between the parties is not a "contract relating to the 
purchase or sale of goods, wares, merchandise or services". By its language. this portion of the 
statute does not apply to contracts dealing with real property. C'risio C'ienr Pe~tec~ostal C'hurcbh rv  
Pcrz, 144 Idaho 304, 160 P.3d 743 (2007). 
Neither is the settlement agreement a "commercial transaction" as it involves the attempted 
purchase of defendants' personal residence. The Idaho Supreme Court has consistently held that 
disputes over real property do not constitute "commercial transactions" under Idaho Code section 
12-120(3). This is particularly so in the case at bench where the real property in question is 
defendants' personal residence: 
In B a t e r  v. Craney, 135 Idaho 166, 16 P.3d 263 (2000), the dispute involved a claim of 
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ad~rerse possession. The Supreme Court stated that disputes over real propelty interests do not 
entitie the prevailing party to section 12- 120(3) attorney fees "unless the commercial tmsaction is 
irltegral to the c1aim". ld. 135 at 174: 
The present case is analogous to others decided by this Court and the 
Court of Appeals involving the determination of property rights. See 
Jerry J. Joseph C L. U. Ins. Assoc. v. Vuughi, 1 17 Idaho 555,789 P.2d 
1 146 (Gt. App. 1990) (denying attorney fees under I.C. 5 12- 120(3) 
in an action where propeny owner sought a judgment compelling 
adjoining prOpeMy owners to reimburse i t  for irrigation assessmerlts, 
to record an instrument establishing an access easernent and to 
remove a fence hindering Its use of the easement and where aftcr 
settlement, adjo~ning property owners breached the settlen~e~lr 
agreement); C'hevr v C'onwujj, 12 1 Idaho 1006, 1012,829 P.2d 1355. 
136 1 (Ct. App.), opinion on review, 12 1 Idaho 1000,829 P.2d 1349 
(1  992) (determining that a quiet title action involving dispute over the 
existence of aprescriptive easement was not a commercial transaction 
under I.C. fj 12- 120(3)); Durranf v. Christensen, 1 17 Idaho 70, 785 
P.2d 634 (1990) (holding that an action in which landomers sought 
adjudication of water rights and a permanent restraining order 
prohibiting the defendant from interfering with their diversion and 
use of water determined was not based on a commercial transaction 
as defined in I.C. f j  12-120(3)); Sun Valley Hot Springs Ranch, Inc. 
v. Kelsey, 13 1 Idaho 657,962 P.2d 1041 ( 1998) (concluding that an 
action to determine ownership and easement rights did not f d l  within 
the meaning of a commercial transaction under I.C. 12-120(3) and 
therefore attorney fees were properly denied). Like the above cases, 
this action is primarily a dispute over property ownership and 
easement rights and as such does not fall within the meaning of a 
commercial transaction as defined in 1.C fj 12-1 20(3) and as applied 
by the courts. 
13 5 Idaho at 174, 175 
DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO THE MOTION TO ENFORCE THE 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT WAS NOT FRIVOLOUS 
Defendants incorporate herein sections I and I1 above, pertaining to the statute of frauds, 
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Ictaho Cock section 0-503 'I'hi. rnajcit t l ~ r t ~ s l  of the  oral setrlement itgreement {\as to unwtnd a real 
estate transaction and to uttlite a deed ot trust in the process Defcndziiits' asscrtlun that t h ~ s  oral 
agreement. is subject to the statute of fiauds and, thus, unenforceable is not frivolous. Plaintiffs are 
not entitled to attorney fees under Idaho Code section 12- 12 I .  
PLAINTIFFS CLAIMED FEES ARE EXCESSIVE AND THEIR COSTS 
HAVE NOT BEEN FULLY DOCUMENTED 
Attornev fees: The following claimed fees are excessive: (1) Preparation of Findings of Fact 
and Conciusions of Law: $1 521 .XO (12 hours); (2) Evidentiary hearing (one day): $2475.00 (14 
hours/two attorneys), 
Costs: (1) Plaintiffs' claimed costs 3s a matter of right are $570.50. I-fo~wver, plaintitt'has 
failed to itemize these costs and whether they pertained to enforcement of the settlement agreement. 
(2) The plaintiffs have failed to show the factual basis fbr claiming that the discretionary costs were 
"necessary and exceptional" and in what manner they pertained to enforcement of the settlement 
agreement. 
CONCLUSION 
The iudgment must be set aside because it seeks to enforce an oral settlement agreement 
which contemplates the convevance of an interest in realproperty: First, because the agreement calls 
for the unwinding of a real estate transaction and the utilization of a deed of trust to do so, it is 
subject to the statute of frauds and unenforceable due to the agreement's oral status. Secondlj. 
because the agreement was entered into by defendants' agent, who lacked written authority to convey 
defendants' interests in real property, the settlement agreement negotiated by the agent is 
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Plaintiffs are not entitled to attorney fees or costs: 
( 1  ) Plaintiffs did not prevail on any of the five counts alleged In  the complaint. Rather. the) 
settled the case anit sougl~t he assistance ofthe Court 1 0  enforc~ng a scttIcrncnr agreement fur the^ 
the settlen~ent agreenlerlt iacks an attorney fee provision. 
(2) The settlement agreement is not a '"commercial transaction" as conten~plated by Idaho 
Code section 12-120(3). Real property transactions are not considered commercial in nature, 
particularly where they involve the sale of a personal residence. 
(3) Defendants opposition to enforcement of the settlement agreement was not frivolous 
based, as it was, upon a good faith assertion that the oral settlement agreement fell within the 
parameters of the statute of frauds. Plaintiffs do not have an entitlement to attorney fees arising from 
Ictaho Code section 12-12 1. 
(4) As noted above, plaintiffs' claimed attorney fees are excecsive. and the claimed costs 
have not been adequately documented. 
DATED this 1 l I h  day of Septen~ber, 2008. 
Attorney for defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I IIEREBY CERTIFY that on the 11'" day of September, 2008,I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
MI-. Kevin E. Dinius d; S Mail 
Morrow, Dinius 
-- - 
Hand Delivery 
5680 E. Frankl~n Road, Suite 220 
- Ovcrtilght Mail 
Narnpa, Idaho 83687 X 1-acslrnlle 
- - 
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ALLEN B. ELLIS 
ELLIS, BROWN & SFIEILS, GHARTERlZD 
Attorneys-at-law 
707 North 8th. Street 
P.O. Box 388 
Boise, Idaho 8370i-0388 
(208) 345-7832 (Telephone) 
(208) 345-9564 (Facsimile) 
ISB No. 1626 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TEIf-: THIRD JUDICIAI, 1)IS'I'KIC' I '  01. THE 
STATE OF IDAI-10, IN AND FOR TE-IE COLWTY 01: OWYl IE1: 
Henry Ogden, an unmarried man; and 
Michelle Hurst, an unmarried woman, 
Plaintiffs, 
Dennis C. Griffith, an unmarried man; 
and, Bonnie M. Porter, an unmarried 
woman, 
Defendants. 
) 
1 
1 Case No. CV 2006-5807*M 
1 
1 MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT 
1 PURSUANT TO RULE 59(e), IDAHO 
) RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
1 
1 
1 
Come now the defendants, through their attorney of record, and move to vacate the judgment 
in this matter entered September 9,2008. This motion is made upon the grounds that the judgment 
is against the law, to wit: (1) it seeks to enforce an oral settlement agreement which is subject to the 
statute of frauds and is unenforceable unless in writing, and (2) in entering into the agreement, 
defendants' agent (their attorney Ronald R. Shepherd) lacked written authority to convey their 
interests in real property; hence the agreement is unenforceable. 
MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO RULE 59(e), 
IDAHO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE - 1 
'I his nlorioit is based ripon the Merllorandum in S~tppot t oi'blotlons to Vacate Judgnlent and 
Disal lo~.  Attorney f%es/Costs, the pleadings and records In t h ~ s  action and s~ich other oral ltnci 
doctirnentnry evidence which may be presented at the time of hearing. 
DATED this 1 1 'h day of September, 2008. 
Attolney for defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1 FIEREBY CERTIFY that on the 1 1'" day of September. 2008. I ca~lsed to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Mr. Kevin E. Dinius 
Morrow, Dinius 
5680 E. Franklin Road, Suite 220 
Nnmpa, Idaho 83687 
lJ.S. Mail - - 
Hand Delivery 
Overnight Mail 
X Facsimile 
- - 
R 475-2201 
Allen B. EKS 
MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO RULE 53(e), 
IDAHO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE - 2 
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STATE OF IDAHO, JN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWWEE 
HENRY OGDEN, an unmarried man; and ) 
MICHELLE HURST, an unmarried woman, ) 
) Case No. 200645807*M 
Plaintiff, 1 
) 
) M E M O W D U M  DECISION 
-VS- ) UPON RULE 59(e) NOTION 
) TO VACATE SUDCMENT AND 
DENNIS C. GRIFFITH, an unmarried man; ) MOTION FOR FEES AND COSTS 
and, BONNlE M. PORTER, an unmarried ) 
woman, ) 
Defendants. 
1 
) 
On September 26, 2008, this matter came on for oral argument upon the Defendants' 
Motion to Vacate Judgment and upon Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorneys Fees and Costs related to 
their motion to enforce the e lement  agreement Appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs, Henry 
Ogden and Michelle Hurst, was Kevin Dinius, attorney at law. Appearing on behalf of the 
defendants, Dennis GriEth and Bonnie Porter, was Allen Ellis, attorney at law. 
During the course of oral argument? Mr. Ellis cited some further legal authority not 
previously addressed in the written arguments of the parties. AccordingIy, the court asked for 
further briefing. The court has now considered all the written and oral arguments presented by 
the parties. - - .  
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MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT 
This court prcviousty ganted the plaintiffs' Motion to Enforce Seniement Agreement as 
IS set forth in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law fifiled August 7, 2008. PlaiatiEsY 
cowsef prepared and submined a written Judgment shortly thereafter. On August 27, 2008, 
Defendants' counsel objected to the propsed Judgment on the basis that the Statue of Frauds 
invalidates any requirement that the defendants execute a dced of trust. Two days latcr, a Notice 
of Substitution of Counsel was filed with the court and attorney Allen Ellis replaced attorney 
Wade Curtis as counsel of record for the defendants. After a telephonic confe~ncc was heId 
involving the undersiped District Judge and anorneys Kevin Dinius and Allen Ellis, the Court 
exccuted the proposed Judmcnt on September 9, 2008. The defendants responded with a 
Motion to Vacate thc Judgment and to OisalIow Costs and Fees filed September 12,2008. 
In its Findings of Fact and Coi'1~1usions of Law filed August 7, 2008, the court found that 
an oral settlement agreement had bmn reached between the parties to this lawsuit and that one of 
the provisions of thc agreement was that the defendants agreed to pay a sum of $40,000 to the 
plaintiffs. Payment was to be made within six months of the settlement with interest thereon at 
the rate of  six percent. This court also found that the defendants agreed to provide the plaintiffs 
with a deed of trust to secure payment. It is this last provision that defendants now argue make 
the entirc settlement agreement unenforceable because it viofates the Statute of Frauds. 
In support of their argument, the defendants cite the legal authority of Lawrence v. Jones, 
124 Idaho 748, 864 P.2d 194 (Ct. App. 1.993). In Lawrence, the contract so~~ght to be enforced 
was an agreement for the purchase of land. Thc court of appeals stated: 
Because the contract in tki,s case was subject to the statute of 
kauds, I.C. $9-503, -505, gaps in essential terns cannot be filled 
by paroi evidence. 'When a written note or memorandum. is 
sought to be introduced as evidence of an oral agreement falling 
within the statute of frauds, it m.ust be speci.fic and parol. (oral) 
evidence is not admissible to establish essential prov.i&ions of the 
contract. Citations omitted. Lawrence, supra, at p. 75 1 . 
The Lawrence court dcterrnined that the security provision of the land sale contract was "central 
to the contract". Howevcr, it was so vague that its meaning could not be determined from the 
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writing. Since parol evidence could not be considered to assist in interpreting the contract, the 
court could never dctemine the acts to be perform&. The court held that because the security 
provision was an essential term of  the contract, the entire agreement was unenforcclable. See also 
Chapin v. Linden, 144 Idaho 393, 162 P.3d 772 (2007) (also involving an unenforceabte oral 
land sale ageernent). 
In this case, the agreement or contract is for the se~lemcnt of a lawsuit, not a land sale 
contract. The issue decided by thc court was whether the defendantshaorney had authority to 
bind them to the settlement ngrmment as set forth in thc court's Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of law.  This court found that the attorney was granted that authority. In Lawrence, 
an essential term of the agreement was vague and the Statute of Frauds prohibited the court fkom 
using parof evidence to assist in interpreting the mming of the vague term. In this case, there 
was nothing vague about the agreement. In t e t m  for dismissal of the lawsuit against them, the 
defendants agreed that they wouId pay $40,000 within six months, with interest, and execute a 
deed of trust to secure the payment. For that reason, this coM finds that Lmrence is 
This c o w  has had to find authority from other jurisdictions to assist in its analysis. The 
case o f  lialsfead v. Murray, 130 N.M. 560,547 A.2d 202 (New Hampshire 1988) is helpful. 'In 
that case, like this one, the plaintiff filed a motion to enforce a settlement agreement but the 
defendant objected "contendi.ng that the Statute of Frauds . . . had not been satisfied"'. Ifatstead, 
supra at p. 562. The case differs somewhat in that in Hulstead, the settlement agreement was a 
contract for the sale of land.' The New Hampshire Supreme Court reviewed the history and 
purpose of the Statute o f  Frauds as foIlows: 
The original Statute of  Frauds has an interesting history whj.ch is 
worthy of a brief review. The Englisl-r Parliament first enacted the 
statute in 1677 to prevent "any frauddent practices,, which are 
commonly endeavored to be upheld by perjury and subornation of 
perjury.' Note, The Doctrine of Eq'quifoble Estoppel and the Srortrfe 
of Frau&* 66 Mi,ch.L.Rev. 170 (1967), At that time, under 
't In the interest of full and fair disclosure, the court also locatcd a case decided by the Supreme Court of Missouri, 
Schmidt v. While, 43 S.W. 871 (2001), which reversed an order granting enforcement of a settlemcnt agreement on 
the basis that the Missouri Statute of Frauds requires an arrorney, as his client's agent, to have written authonmtion 
to enter into a settlement agreement for the sale of real estate in order to bind the client. This coittt finds that case is 
distinguisrlabie becnusc we do not have a land sale contract as a basis of the settlement ageement. 
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English trial practice, partics to a lawsuit were deemed to be 
incompetent witnesses and hence barred from ~stifjling. The 
statute thus was aimed at making virtually all contracts of 
significance unenforceable unless they had been reduced ro 
writing. The statute, of course, some~mes produced harsh results, 
and the English cows soon developed cxceptians, such as the rule 
that partial perfomanee of thc conlract took the ageemcnt out of 
the wquirements of the statute. Sincc that tim, all of the States of 
this country have adopted some portion of the original Stacute of  
Frauds. Id At f 70-71. However, they have done so with full 
knowledge that the Statute of Frauds has ken judiciafly 
inte'pretrsd in such a way as to attempt to prevent fsaud rather than 
to promote it. 
We have said that [the Stature of Frauds] 'is intended to promote 
certainty and to protect from frauds and perjuries in land 
transactions.' Further, we have said that 'a strtct enforcement of 
the statute can produce h t r a t ion  on the one had, and unethical 
conduct on the other Hence the law seeks to alleviate the 
harshcss of the statute when some opemting facts, such as fraud, 
part performance, or other equitable considerations, are present.' 
Citation omifted 
Ultimately, the New Hampshire Suprcme Court found that in those cases in which the 
client has authorized the attorney to settle a pending case involving land by the sale of the land 
vvhich is the subject of the suit, the Statute of Frauds does not require the authorization to be in 
writing. 
In has been heId by Idaho courts that "[t]he doctrine of part performance is best 
undcrstood as a specific form of the more general principle of equitable estoppel." Letfuntch r 
Key Bank Nut Ass 'n, 14 1 Idaho 362, 367, 109 P.3d 1 104 (2005); Sword v. Skeet, I40 Idaho 
242,92 P.3d 492,499 (2004) (quoting Fram v. Parke, 11 1 Idaho 1005,1007-08,729 P.2d 1068, 
1070-71 (Ct.App. 1986). 
To be specifically enforced by operation of the doctrine of part performance, an oral 
agreement "must be complete, definite and certain in all its material terms, or contain provisions 
which are capable in themselves of bcing reduced to certainty." Bear bland Wafer Ass 'n, Inc. v. 
Brown, 125 Idaho 7 17,723,874 P.2d 528,534 (1 994). 
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It is siwificant to notc that in this case, the plaintiffs, in reliance upon what they thou&t 
was an agreement to settle thc lawsuit, instructed the court to vacate the trial that had been set for 
many months. As pointed out in their brief, "[Pllaintiffs materially changed their position in 
reIim~e on the scttlcment agreed bctween the parties and vacated the trial after litigating the 
matter for over a year. . Clearly, equity must enforce the settlement agreement in this matter 
to prevent gross &iustice." 
This court believes that it is appropriate to use its equitable powers to invokc the doctrine 
of part perfomance or equitable estoppel to cnforce the settlement agreement. Were, the 
settlement agreement is clear and compIete as to all *the material terms. There is nothing vague 
or uncertain about tIte agreement. The only issue was whether the defendants' artomey had 
authority to enter into the agreement. That issue has b m  decided by the court in its earlier 
Findings of Fact and ConcIusions of Law upon the plainti.ffs7 motion to enforce the settlement. 
Accordingly, this Court is of the opinion that the motion to vacate the judgment should be 
denied. 
MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS 
The plaintiffs seek an award of attorneys' fees and costs for prevailing on its 
Motion to Enforce Settlement. Plaintiffs' first claim they are entitled to the award of attorneys 
fecs pursuant to I.G. 8 22-120 (3). I.C. $ 12-1 20(3) provides 
(3) In any civil action to recover on an open account, account slated, notc, bill, 
negotiable instrument, guaranty, or contract relating to the purchase or sale of 
goods, wares, merchandise, or services and in any commercial transaction unless 
otherwise provided by law, the prevailing party shall. be allowed a reasonable 
attorney's fee to be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs. 
The tcnn "commercial transaction" is defined to mean ail transactions 
except transactions for personal or househ,old purposes. The term "party" is 
defined to mean any person, partnership, co~&ration, association, private 
organization, the state o f  1daho or political subdivision thereof. 
This case arises out of a real estate purchase and safe agreement gone awry. The 
plaintiffs filed suit in this case seeking specific performance of the land sale agreement. The 
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plaintiffs argue that their conwact to puchasc the real property owned by the defendants formed 
the gavman  of this lawsuit. (See page 4 of the Memorandum in Support of Motion for Fees 
and Costs). Where thc basis fox a request for attorney fees is an action to quiet title in rcal 
property, a ruling that attorney fees were not awardable under the provision covering commercial 
transactions was affimcd by the Idaho Supreme C o w  in Treasure Valley Concrete, h c .  v. Statc, 
132 Idaho 673, 938 P.2d 233 (1999) ( a f w n g  that the term commercial traslsacfion is not 
generally applied to real cmte trmsactions, or to issues involvil~g the omership of property). 
See dsa  Merrill v. Gibson, 139 Idaho 840,87 P.3d 949 (2004). Therefore, the Court cannot find 
that attorney fees are recoverable pursuant to 12- 1 20(3). 
The court must then review the requcst for attorneys fees and costs pursuant to I.C. $12- 
12 1 and I.R.G.P. 54 (d)(l)@). In this case, the plaintiffs were clearly the prevailing pnrty upon 
their Motion to Enforce the Sertlement Agtectnent* However, to award attorneys fees, the court 
must bc leA with an abiding belief that the defendants' opposition to the motion was frivolous. 
Minich V. Gem State Developers, Tnc.. 99 ldaho 91 I ,  591 P.2d I078 (1979). A misperception of 
law or of one's interest under the taw is not, by itself, unreasonable conduct. The question to be 
answered is whether the losing party was not only incorrect but so plainly fallacious that it coutd 
be deemed frivolous. unreasonable or without foundation. King v. Amalgamared Sugar Co., 106 
Idaho 905,684 P.2d 307 (Gt.App. t984), ovmruled on othcr grounds, N13C Leusing Co. v. R & T 
Farms, Inc., 1 12 ldnho 500, 733 P.2d 721 (1987). Ths  court cannot make that fmding. Mr. 
Curtis, prior counsel for the defendants, opposed the Motion to Enforce the Settlement 
&yee~nent by arguing that the entire grant of authority needed to be in writing to conform to the 
Statute of  Fr~uds. The court docs not find this position so fallacious that it can be decmcd 
frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation. Indeed, the Court had to give carefbl 
consideration to the argument as set Forth above. 
Accordingly, an award of attorneys' fees pursuant to I.C. 12-121 is not warranted. Costs 
as a Matter of Right totaI $570.50 and Discretionary Costs of $76.37 should be awarded to the 
plaintiffs for a total award of $646.87. 
Therefore, 
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ORDER 
IT  IS WIEEBY OmERED. 
1. The defendan&' hAbtion to Vacate the Judgment i s  DENIED. 
2. The plaintiffs Motion for an Award of Attorneys Fees is DEnIED. 
3. The plaintiffs are awarded Costs as a Matter o f  kght of $570.50 and Discretionary 
Costs of $76.37 for a total cost award of $646.87. 
DATED: , l ( & ( 0 6  
- 
Thomas J. Ryan 
District judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a bue and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed or 
delivered to the following persons on thts b h  day of November, 2008. 
Kevin E. Dinius 
Morrow Dinius 
5680 East Franklin Road, Ste. 220 
Nampa, Idaho 83687 
Allen B. Ellis 
Ellis, Brown & Shiels, Chartered 
707 North 8th Street 
P.O. Box 388 
Boise, Idaho 8370 1 -03 88 
, /i /?  By: t, /l; 1: d ~;LLL[,) 
Deputy Clerk 
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ALLEN B. ELLIS 
ELLIS, BROWN & SHEILS, CHARTERED 
Attorneys-at-Law 
707 North 8th Street 
P.O. Box 388 
Boise, Idaho 83701 -0388 
(208) 345-7832 (Telephone) 
(208) 345-9564 (Facsimile) 
ISB No. 1626 
FILED 
DEC 1 1 2008 
CHARLOT;rEi5;WERBltRN, CLERK 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN '1 HE DISTRICT COlJRT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
Henry Ogden, an unmarried man; and 
Michelle Hurst, an unmarried woman, 
Plaintiffs, 
Dennis C. Griffith, an unmarried man; 
and Bonnie M. Porter, an unmarried 
wornan, 
Defendants. 
1 
1 
1 
1 Case No. CV 2006-5807*M 
1 
1 NOTICE OF APPEAL 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANTS, THEIR ATTORNEYS OF 
RECORD, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED 
COURT: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named defendants, Dennis C. Griffith and Bonnie M. Porter, appeal 
against the above-named plaintiffs to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Memorandum Decision re 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider entered April 17,2008, from Judgment entered September 9,2008, 
and from the Memorandum Decision denying defendants' motion to vacate judgment which decision 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1 
was entered Novernber 6,2008, the f ionorable Thomas J. Ryan presiding. 
2. I h e  appellants have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the Judgment 
and Memorandusn Decision identified in paragraph I above are appealable under and pursuant to 
Rule 1 l(a)(l), I.A.R. 
3. A preliminary statement of the issue on appeal which the appellants intend to assert 
in the appeal is as follows: 1) Whether it was against the law for the district court to rule that 
defendants had waived their right to enforce the closing date deadline in the subject real estate 
transaction; (2) Whether the district court committed an error of law when it ruled that (a) the alleged 
settlement agreement was not subject to the statute of frauds; and (b) that because defendants' agent 
was an attorney, it was unnecessary that his agency authority to undertake a transaction subject to 
the statute of frauds be in writing. 
4. There has been no order entered sealing all or any portion of the record. 
5. The appellants request the preparation of the following portions of the reporter's 
transcript: those hearings held on April 17,2008 and June 26,2008. 
6 .  The appellants request those portions of the clerk's record automatically inciuded 
under Rule 28, Idaho Appellate Rules, as well as the following: 
a. Complaint filed December 7,2006; 
b. Answer and Demand for Jury Trial filed January 4,2007 
c. Memorandum Decision and Order of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary filed February 
25, 2008; 
d. Motion for Leave to Withdraw filed March 26, 2008; 
e. Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement filed April 3, 2008; 
f. Affidavit of Kevin E. Dinius in Support of Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2 
filed April 3,2008; 
g. Memorandum Decision Re: Plaintifrs Motion to Reconsider; 
h. Order Allowing Withdrawal of Counsel; 
I .  Motion for Summary JudgmcntiMotion to Enforce Settlement Agreen~ent filed April 
18,2008; 
Notice of Appeara~~ce; 
Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Enforce Settlement 
Agreement filed May 23, 2008; 
Affidavit of Bonnie M. Porter filed May 23,2008; 
Affidavit of Dennis Griffitl-t filed May 23,2008; 
Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law Upon Plaintiffs' Motion to Enforce 
Settlement filed August 7, 2008; 
Judgment filed September 9,2008; 
Motion to Disallow Costs and Fees filed September 12,2008; 
Motion to Vacate Judgment filed September 15,2008; 
r. Memorandum in Support of Motions to Vacate Judgment and Disallow Attorney 
FeesiCosts filed September 15, 2008; 
s. Memorandum Decision Upon Rule 59(e) Motion to Vacate Judgment and Motion for 
Fees and Costs filed November 6,2008. 
7. I certify: 
(a) That the clerk of the district court has been paid the estimated fee for preparation of 
the reporter's transcript. 
(b) That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid. 
(c) That the appellate filing fee has been paid. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3 
(d) That the ~0u t - t  reporter has been served pursuant to Rule 17(k)(l), I.A.R. 
(e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 
20, I.A.R. 
DATED This I l th  day of December, 2008. 
Attorney for Defendants 
NOTTCE OF APPEAL - 4 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the I l ' v a y  of December, 2008,I caused to be served a tme 
and correct mpy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Mr. Kevin E. Di~zius U.S. Mail 
Morrow, Dinius Hand Delivery 
5680 E. Franklin Road, Suite 320 
- Overnight Mail Nampa, Idaho 83687 
- 
X- Facsimile 
475-2201 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 5 
FILED 
ALLEN B. ELI,IS ,/ 1 [--# ;LA.M._P.M. 
ELLIS. BROWN & S1 JEILS, CIiAlI?'ERE<D 
Anorneys-at-Law DEC 1 5 2008 
707 North 8th Street CHARLOTIE SMERBURN, CLERK 
P.O. Box 388 j ( &,I&---- - 
Boise, Idaho 83701 -0388 Deputy Clerk 
(208) 345-7832 (Telephone) 
(208) 345-9564 (Facsimile) 
ISB No. 1626 
Attorneys for Defendants 
1N '1'ElE DIS'T'RICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
Henry Ogdetl, an unmarried man; and 
Michelle Hurst, an unmarried woman, 
Plaintiffs, 
Dennis C. Griffith, an unmarried man; 
and Bonnie M. Porter, an unmarried 
woman, 
Defendants. 
1 
1 
Case No. CV 2006-5807*M 
1 
) AMENDED 
1 NOTICE OF APPEAL 
1 
1 
1 
TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED PLAINTIFFS, THEIR ATTORNEYS OF 
RECORD, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED 
COURT: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1 .  The above-named defendants, Dennis C. Griffith and Bonnie M. Porter, appeal 
against the above-named plaintiffs to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Memorandum Decision re 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider entered April 17,2008, from Judgment entered September 9,2008, 
and from the Memorandum Decision denying defendants' motion to vacate judgment which decision 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - I 
was entered November 6,2008, tfle f-lonorabfe Thotnas J. Ryan presiding. 
2. 'The appellants have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the Judgment 
and bfemorandum Decision identified it1 paragraph 1 above are appealable under and pursuant to 
Rule I 1 (a)(l), I.A.R. 
3 .  A preliminary statement of the issue on appeal which the appellants intend to assert 
in the appeal is as follows: 1) Whether it was against the law for the district court to rule that 
defendants had waived their right to enforce the closing date deadline in the subject real estate 
transaction; (2) Whether the di'strict court committed an enor of law when it ruled that (a) the alleged 
settlement agreement was not subject to the statute of frauds; and (b) that because defendants' agent 
was an attorney, it was unnecessary that his agency authority to undertake a transaction subject to 
the statute of frauds be in writing. 
4. There has been no order entered sealing all or any portion of the record. 
5.  The appellants request the preparation of the following portions of the reporter's 
transcript: those hearings held on April 17,2008 and June 26,2008. 
6. The appellants request those portions of the clerk's record automatically included 
under Rule 28, Idaho Appellate Rules, as well as the following: 
a. Complaint filed December 7,2006; 
b. Answer and Demand for Jury Trial filed January 4,2007 
C. Memorandum Decision and Order of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary filed February 
25, 2008; 
d. Motion for Leave to Withdraw filed March 26,2008; 
e. Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement filed April 3, 2008; 
f. Affidavit of Kevin E. Dinius in Support of Notion to Enforce Settlement Agreement 
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filed April 3,2008; 
g. Memoranduln Decision Re: Plaintifrs Motion to Reconsider; 
h. Order Allocving Withdrawal of Counsel; 
I. Motion for Summary JudglnentiMotion to Enforce Settlement Agreement filed April 
18, 2008; 
j. Notice of Appearance; 
k. Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Enforce Settlement 
Agreement filed May 23,2008; 
1. Affidavit of Bonnie M. Porter filed May 23,2008; 
m. Affidavit of Dennis Griffith filed May 23,2008; 
n. Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law Upon Plaintiffs' Motion to Enforce 
Settlement filed August 7,2008; 
o. Judgment filed September 9,2008; 
p. Motion to Disallow Costs and Fees filed September 12,2008; 
q. Motion to Vacate Judgment filed September 15,2008; 
r. Memorandum in Support of Motions to Vacate Judgment and Disallow Attorney 
Fees/Costs filed September 15,2008; 
S. Memorandum Decision Upon Rule 59(e) Motion to Vacate Judgment and Motion for 
Fees and Costs filed November 6,2008. 
7. I certify: 
(a) That the clerk of the district court has been paid the estimated fee for preparation of 
the reporter's transcript. 
(b) That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid. 
(c) That the appellate filing fee has been paid. 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3 
(d) 'I'hat the court repot-ter has been served pttrsuant to Rule 17(k)(l), I.A.R. 
(e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 
20. I.A.R. 
DATED This 1 2Ih day of December, 2008. 
I I 
~ 1 1 & ~ , ~ f l i s  
Attorney for Defendants 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 4 
CERTIFICATE Of: SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 12Ih day of December, 2008,I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Mr. Kevin E. Dinius U.S. Mail 
Morrow, Dinius IHand Delivery 
5680 E. Franklin Road, Suite 220 Overnight Mail 
Nampa, Idaho 83687 X Facsimile 
- - 
475-220 1 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 5 
Kev~n E. Dinius 
Shelli D. Stewart 
MORROW DINIl JS 
5680 East Frankl~n Road, Suite 220 
Nampa. Idaho 83687-7901 
'Telephone: (208) 475-2200 
Facarnile: (208) 475-220 1 
ISB Yos. 5974,7459 
kdin us@morrov+~dinus corn 
~.sfettar.f@iizorro~\~~~'~~?iu.~ COM 
Attorneys fur PIaintir'l's 
DEC 1 6  2008 
IN 'THE DISTRICT COIJRT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAI, DISTRICT OF 
TlIE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
IIENRY OCDEN, an unmarried man; and, ) 
MICHELLE HUICST, an unmarried woman, ) 
) CASE NO. CV 2006-5807"M 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, ) 
) NOTICE OF APPEAL 
-VS- ) 
) Fee Category: 'I' 
DENNIS C. CRIFFITH, an unmarried man; ) Fee: $95.00 
dnd, BONNIE hd. PORTER, an unmarried 
woman, 1 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS, DENNIS C. GRIFFITH and BONNIE M. 
PORTER, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT NOTICE IS 
HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
I .  The above-named Appellants, HENRY OGDEN and MICHELLE HURST, 
appeal against the above-named Respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from the final order 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1 ORIGINAL 
clltcrccl In the abo~c-entltled actlon on the 6"' day of November, 2008, llorrorahlc I.hotrlas J .  
Ryan p r c s ~ d ~ r ~ g  
2 I he party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court. and the judgment 
described in Paragraph 1 above is appealable under and pursuant to ICufe I l (a)(l) ,  of the Idaho 
Appelate Itules. 
3. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the Appellants then i n t e ~ ~ d  
to assert in the appeal; provided any such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent tl-rc Appellants 
from asserting other issues on appeal; 
3.1 Whether the Court erred in denying Plaintiffs an award for attorney fees. 
4. Has an order been entered sealing all or any portion of the record? No. If so, what 
portion? NlA 
5.  (a) Is a reporter's transcript requested? 
No. 
6. The Appellants request those portions of the clerk's record automatically included 
under Rule 28, I.A.R. 
7. 1 certify: 
7.1 That the appellate filing fee has been paid; and 
7.2 'That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant 
to Rule 20, I.A.R. 
DATED this 1 5Ih day of December, 2008. 
MORROW DINIUS 
Shelli b. Stewart 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2 
CEK7'1E'ICr-l'f'l;, OF SEKVIC'K 
I hcrcby certify tl-tat otl this 15'" day ot I>ccen~ber, 2008. 1 ca~iscd to bc served a t r i ~ ~  and 
correct cctpy of the hregoing document by the mcthocl indicated belotv to the fbllo\vxitng: 
Allen £3. flllis 
EIIJl,lS BROUrN & SIII<II,S 
P . 0  Box 388 
Ro~re. ID 83701 
El lJS Mail 
El Overnight Mail 
ill Hand Delivery 
I'acsirnile - No. 345-9564 
cmif \Cllents\O\Ogden, I ienry 22396\Seitlement L-'nforce~nenl\Kottce of Appedl doc 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDmO, IN AND 
* * * * * * *  
HENRY OGDEN, an unmarried man; and 
MICHELLE WURST, an unmarried woman, 
plaintiff (s) / Respondent (s) /
Cross-Appellant, 
VS . 
DENNIS C. GRIFFITH, an unmarried man; and 
BONNIE M. PORTER, an unmarried woman, 
Defendant(s) /Appellant(s)/ 
Cross-Respondents. 
SUPREME COURT 
CASE NUMBER: 35964 
CERTIFICATE 
OF EXHIBITS 
I, Charlotte Sherburn, Clerk of the District Court of the 
Third Judicial District of the State of Idaho in and for the 
County of Owyhee, do hereby certify that the following is a list 
consisting of documents to be sent as exhibits and which will be 
lodged with the Supreme Court: 
June 26, 2008 
P l a i n t i f f s  E x h i b i t  5 - Letter to Mr. Kevin Dinius from Mr. Ronald 
Shepard - admitted 
P l a i n t i f f F s  E x h i b i t  6 - Letter to Mr. Kevin Dinius from Mr. Ronald 
Shepherd - admitted 
P - 3 > a i n t i f f r  s E x h i b i t  11 - Email from Mr. Ronald Shepherd to Ms. 
". B V L 1  ( 
Brenda Seeger and reply - admitted 
In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho 
HENRY OGDEN, an unmarried man; and 
MICHELLE HIAXST, an unmarried woman, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents-Cross Appellants, 
v. 
DENNIS C. GRIFFITH, an unmarried man; 
and BONNIE M. PORTER, an unmarried 
woman, 
Defendants-Appellants, Cross 
Respondents 
) 
) ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 
) AUGMENT THE RECORD 
) 
) Supreme Court Docket No. 35964-2008 
) Owyhee County No. 2006-5807 
) 
A STIPULATION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD AND STATEMENT IN SUPPORT 
THEREOF was filed by counsel for Respondents on April 2, 2009. Therefore, good cause 
appearing, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that the STIPULATION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD be, 
and hereby is, GRANTED and the augmentation record shall include the documents listed below, 
file stamped copies of which accompanied this Motion, as EXHIBITS: 
1. Memorandum of Stipulated Facts, file stamped March 4,2008; 
2. Ron Shepherd's handwritten notes; 
3. Offer letter dated March 5,2008; 
4. Letter Confirming Settling Agreement dated March 5,2008; 
5. Email to Ron Shepherd dated March 27,2008; 
6. Memorandum re: Pretrial Conference dated March 6,2008; 
7. Memorandum to Ron Shepherd re: telephone conversations dated March 6,2008; and 
8. Handwritten Memo dated March 26,2008 and March 27,2008. 
DATED this 8 s  of April 2009. 
cc: Counsel of Record 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 12 - Memo to Mr. Ronald Shepherd from Mr. 
Bruce Hendricks - admitted 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 13 - Memo to Mr. Ronald Shepherd from Mr. 
Bruce Hendricks - admitted 
Plaintiffrs Exhibit 14 - Note - admitted 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set b hand and affixed 
the seal of the said Court this /$! day of 3C4 , 2009. 
CHAROLOTTE SHERBURN 
Clerk of the District Court 
I 
@!id$&< J ~h&l 
aeputy Clerk 
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In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho 
HENRY OGDEN, an unmarried man; and 
MICHELLE HURST, an unmarried woman, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
v. 
DENNIS C. CRIFFITH, an unmarried man; 
and BONNIE M. PORTER, an unmarried 
woman, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
1 
) ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 
) AUGMENT THE RECORD 
1 
) Supreme Court Docket No. 35964-2008 
) Owyhee County No. 2006-5807 
1 
1 
A STIPULATION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD AND STATEMENT IN SUPPORT ill i 11 THEREOF was filed by counsel for Respondents on May 28, 2009. Therefore, good cause ;I! /!I 
appearing, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that the STIPULATION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD be, 
and hereby is, GRANTED and the augmentation record shall include the documents listed below, 
file stamped copies of which accompanied this Stipulation, as EXHIBITS: 
1. Exhibit 1 - Affidavit of Daniel Godoy in Support of Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum, 
dated June 28,2007; and 
2. Exhibit 2 - Affidavit of Carrie Redovian in Support of Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum, 
dated June 29,2007. 
DATED this \??of June 2009. 
For the Supreme Court 
CC: Counsel of Record 
IN TEE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
* * * * * * * * * *  
HENRY OGDEN, an unmarried man; and 
MICHELLE HURST, an unmarried woman, 
plaintiff (s) / Respondent (s! / 
Cross-Appellant, 
vs  . 
DENNIS C. GRIFFITH, an unmarried man; and 
BONNIE M. PORTER, an unmarried woman, 
Defendant (s) /Appellant (s) / 
Cross-Respondents. 
)/SERVICE - 28-DAY NOTICE I 
2 2 a , ,he Notice is hereby given that on 
Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcript in the above referenced 
appeal was lodged with the District Court Clerk. 
The parties shall have twenty-eight (28) days from the 
date of service of the appeal record to file any objections, 
together with a Notice of Hearing, with the District Court. If no 
objection is filed, the record will be deemed settled and will be 
filed with the Supreme Court. 
~f there are multiple (Appellants) (Respondents), 1 
will serve the record, and any transcript, upon the parties upon 
receipt of a stipulation of the parties, or court order stating 
which party shall be served. If no stipulation or order is filed 
in seven ( 7 )  days, I will serve the party whose name appears first 
in the case title. 
CHARLOTTE SHERBURN, CLERK 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
cc :  Clerk of the Court 
Idaho Supreme Court 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Id 83720-0101 
Allen B. Ellis 
Attorney at Law 
PO Box 388 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0388 
BY Deputy Clerk 
Kevin E. Dinius 
5680 E. Franklin Road, Suite 220 
Nampa, Idaho 83687 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYWEE 
I, Trina Aman, Deputy Clerk the undersigned authority, do 
hereby certify that I have personally served or mailed, by either 
United States Mail or Interdepartmental Mail, one copy of the 
following: 
I 
HENRY OGDEN, an unmarried man; and i 
MICHELLE HURST, an unmarried woman, ) 
Plaint iff (s) / Respondent (s) /
Cross-Appellant, 1 
vs . 1 
) 
1 
DENNIS C. GRIFFITH, an unmarried man; and 
BONNIE M. PORTER, an unmarried woman, 
Clerk's Record and Court Reporter's Transcript 
SUPREME COURT 
)CASE NWBER: 35964 
CERTIFICATE 
OF SERVICE 
to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows: 
Allen B. Ellis 
Attorney at Law 
PO Box 3 8 8  
Boise, Idaho 83701-0388 
Kevin E. Dinius 
5680  E. Franklin Road, Suite 220 
Nampa, Idaho 83687 
CHARLOTTE SHERBURN 
Clerk of the District Court 
Date of Service: - BY ~ ~ # @ &  
Deputy Clerk 
